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Abstract 
This thesis consists of three studies that investigate how regulation affects 
Certified Public Accountant (CPA) and financial adviser markets.  
The first chapter, which is co-authored with Stefano Cascino and Ane Tamayo, 
investigates whether local occupational licensing regimes create geographical labor 
market barriers. To study this question, we investigate the labor market consequences of 
a regulatory change that extended the geographical scope of CPA licenses. Prior to the 
regulatory change, CPAs required a separate license for each U.S. state they wished to 
provide services to. With the regulatory change, CPAs can offer services across state lines 
holding a single CPA license. Our study reveals that local occupational licensing regimes 
create meaningful labor market barriers. Specifically, we find that CPA wages and service 
prices decline with the removal of licensing induced geographical barriers.  
The second chapter, which is co-authored with Zachary Kowaleski and Andrew 
Sutherland, explores whether the content of exams financial advisers need to take to 
provide investment advice affects financial adviser misconduct. Specifically, we study 
differences in misconduct between advisers that are subject to exams with an emphasis 
on professional ethics and advisers subject to exams with an emphasis on technical 
material. Comparing two advisers within the same firm and year, we find that advisers 
subject to more ethics-related topics exhibit lower future misconduct rates. 
The third chapter, which is solo authored, investigates the relation between firm 
licensing requirements and entrepreneurship in audit markets. Specifically, I study 
whether mandatory peer review—that is, CPAs having to monitor each other in an effort 
to promote service quality—affects CPA entrepreneurship. I find that CPA 
entrepreneurship declines and entrepreneur exit rates increase with the introduction of 
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mandatory peer review. Increases in exit rates, however, are not pronounced for low-
quality service providers, but are concentrated among young female CPA entrepreneurs. 
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1 Labor Market Effects of Spatial Licensing 
Requirements: Evidence from CPA Mobility  
1.1 Introduction 
Accounting professionals play a pivotal role in the production and auditing of 
financial information disclosed by firms. Yet, very little is known about how the supply 
of competent, qualified and independent accountants is determined in the labor market 
and how institutions shape the labor supply (Francis, 2011). In this paper, we shed light 
on these issues by examining the economic impact of occupational licensing regulations 
on the accounting profession.  
Occupational licensing—that is, the requirement to hold a license for the 
provision of certain services—is widespread and regulates, along with accountants, a 
number of other professions including doctors, lawyers, and engineers. In fact, between 
25% and 30% of the U.S. workforce is currently regulated through licensing (Kleiner and 
Krueger, 2010; Kleiner and Vorotnikov, 2017). The labor economics literature discusses 
the merits and demerits of occupational licensing. On the one hand, by imposing 
minimum quality standards, occupational licensing effectively protects the public from 
unqualified professionals, thereby preventing market failures (Akerlof, 1970; Leland, 
1979). As such, licensing may increase welfare by reducing consumer uncertainty over 
the quality of licensed services, which in turn may drive up overall demand (Arrow, 1971; 
Shapiro, 1986). On the other hand, by constraining supply and increasing prices, licensing 
may mainly serve the interests of licensed professionals (Friedman, 1962; Stigler, 1971; 
Maurizi, 1974; Rottenberg, 1980). The origins of this latter view date back as far as the 
18th century when, in The Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith argues that occupational 
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regulations are by no means an assurance of quality, but rather a way to restrain 
competition, grant privileges, and allow for rents to be extracted by incumbents.1 
One way in which licensing may impose barriers to entry is by constraining the 
geographic mobility of licensed individuals. In the United States, licensing requirements 
for Certified Public Accountants (CPAs), as well as for other professions, are primarily 
regulated at the state level (Kleiner and Vorotnikov, 2017). Therefore, licensees must 
obtain separate licenses for each state in which they provide services. The resulting 
barriers to geographic mobility may prevent licensees from competing for business across 
state lines potentially misallocating the provision of services and ultimately driving up 
their prices (Holen, 1965; Rottenberg, 1980; Kleiner, 2000).  
In this paper, we empirically examine how these licensing-induced geographic 
barriers affect labor market outcomes. In particular, we study the effects of lifting spatial 
licensing requirements on wages and employment levels of CPAs, as well as their 
implications for service pricing and quality. To do so, we take advantage of the staggered 
adoption of CPA mobility provisions (henceforth, CPA Mobility) across U.S. states.  
CPA Mobility constitutes the most significant change to CPA interstate license 
recognition according to the National Association of State Boards of Accountancy 
(NASBA), effectively allowing individual out-of-state CPAs to enter markets other than 
their home states without the need to notify boards, obtain reciprocal licenses, and pay 
related fees.2 We exploit variation in state-level adoption dates, in a difference-in-
 
1 Discussing the privileges of the guilds, Adam Smith (1776) states: “It is to prevent this reduction of price, 
and consequently of wages and profit, by restraining that free competition which would most certainly 
occasion it, that all corporations, and the greater part of corporation laws, have been established. [...] and 
when any particular class of artificers or traders thought proper to act as a corporation without a charter, 
such adulterine guilds, as they were called, were not always disfranchised upon that account, but obliged 
to fine annually to the king for permission to exercise their usurped privileges” (The Wealth of Nations, 
Book I, Chapter X, paragraph 72). 
2 State-level CPA Mobility provisions in the mid-2000s were based on the Uniform Accountancy Act 
(UAA) developed by the NASBA and the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA). 
The NASBA and the AICPA introduced the UAA as a blueprint legislation which was subsequently 
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differences (DiD) research design, to compare labor market outcomes between states that 
adopt CPA Mobility and states that have not (yet) adopted the policy. This research design 
allows us to control for general time trends, as well as time-invariant state-level factors 
that may possibly correlate with state-level licensing requirements and labor market 
outcomes. 
The first part of our empirical analysis explores the effects on wages and 
employment levels. This analysis is based on the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ (BLS) 
Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW) program data, which provide 
detailed industry-level information on employment and wages for employees of CPA 
firms. Using this dataset, we find that, subsequent to CPA Mobility, CPA firm employees 
experience an average wage decline of around 1.0%. The estimated magnitude is 
economically meaningful, especially when considering the size of the accounting 
profession and that wage declines persist over time. We further test whether CPA 
Mobility affects employment levels in CPA firms and find no evidence that this is the 
case.  
A potential concern that we share with virtually any study investigating policy 
changes is that regulation does not occur in a vacuum (Leuz and Wysocki, 2016; Leuz, 
2018). In our setting such a concern would arise if unobservable state-year factors affect 
both the adoption sequence of CPA Mobility provisions and labor market outcomes. The 
commonly-held belief by practitioners, however, suggests that the adoption sequence of 
CPA Mobility is mainly determined by the number of state-level authorities involved in 
the implementation process, more subtle factors such as personal ties between State 
Boards of Accountancy and national regulatory bodies, State Boards of Accountancy 
 
adopted by all states. Prior to the adoption of CPA Mobility, states required temporary licenses for out-of-
state CPAs in order to grant CPA practice privileges.  
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board composition, as well as state legislation session schedules (U.S. Department of 
Treasury’s Advisory Committee on the Auditing Profession, 2008:VII:5). Nonetheless, 
to allay this concern, we investigate whether variables capturing the macroeconomic, 
entrepreneurial, political, and regulatory environment of the state over time, as well as 
characteristics of State Boards of Accountancy, can predict the adoption sequence. 
Interestingly, we find that the adoption sequence is primarily determined by state board 
characteristics. 
To further alleviate concerns that local unobservable time-varying factors may be 
driving our results, we conduct a difference-in-difference-in-differences (DiDiD) analysis 
and a county-level analysis.  
In our DiDiD tests, we rely on two within-state control samples, which allow us 
to difference out time-varying state-level factors. First, we estimate treatment effects for 
accounting professionals operating in small CPA firms relative to a control sample of 
accounting professionals operating in large CPA firms in the same state. Large CPA firms 
are likely unaffected by CPA Mobility adoption as they could already circumvent regional 
barriers by leveraging on their national networks and thus the competitive effects of CPA 
Mobility accrue to (and derive from) small local CPA firms. Second, given that prior 
studies identify legal professionals as a suitable control group for accounting 
professionals (e.g., Bloomfield et al., 2017), we estimate treatment effects for accounting 
professionals relative to a control sample of legal professionals in the same state. The 
results of our DiDiD tests are in line with those of our main analysis and indicate that the 
effects stem entirely from small local CPA firms. 
In our county-level tests, we restrict the estimation sample to contiguous counties 
in different states to exploit regulatory discontinuities across state borders (Card and 
Krueger, 1997; Holmes, 2006; Dube et al., 2010), which allows us to control for 
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heterogeneity in local economic conditions. The identifying assumption in this set of tests 
is that local time-varying conditions that could correlate with labor market outcomes and 
the adoption sequence are common along a state border. The results of our border-county 
tests closely mirror our state-level findings.  
Besides CPA Mobility effects on wage levels, we also investigate the policy 
impact on wage elasticities. We find that the removal of geographic barriers stemming 
from CPA Mobility leads to wages becoming less sensitive to local economic conditions 
and to smaller wage differentials across states after all states adopt. 
While our prior analyses based on QCEW program data allow us to examine 
policy effects on a near-census of all employees in CPA firms, ideally we would like to 
isolate labor market effects for accounting professionals holding a CPA license only. To 
this end, we utilize a proprietary dataset obtained from the American Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants (AICPA) Management of an Accounting Practice (MAP) survey, 
which includes detailed wage information for accounting professionals working in CPA 
firms by seniority rank, albeit for a smaller number of states. In this sample, we find wage 
declines of 3.4% subsequent to the introduction of CPA Mobility. Furthermore, we find 
that lifting spatial licensing restrictions significantly reduces wage dispersion, mostly 
because of reductions in the wages of top earners (i.e., accounting professionals holding 
senior positions in CPA firms). In addition, we find that billing rates decline, but we do 
not find any impact on the number of hours charged to clients. This finding is in line with 
the reported wage declines and absence of detectable effects on employment levels in our 
prior analyses. 
To supplement our evidence on billing rate declines, we also investigate the 
effects of CPA Mobility on service prices using a novel dataset of private pension plan 
audits. In the United States, most private pension plans are subject to mandatory audits, 
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which are typically performed by nation-wide as well as by local audit-service providers. 
Our dataset allows us to observe audit fee responses for this fairly homogenous service 
that is offered by both types of audit-service providers. We find that pension plan audit 
fees decrease by 1.7% on average. Further, we document that the reported effect is 
concentrated among local audit-service providers.  
Finally, since proponents of occupational licensing argue that licensing 
restrictions are ultimately meant to preserve service quality (Leland, 1979), we conduct 
an additional set of analyses to assess whether CPA Mobility provisions lead to changes 
in the quality of the professional services CPAs provide. Entry-level licensing 
requirements do not substantially change during our sample period, but CPAs facing 
enhanced wage or fee pressure might minimize costs, resulting in the provision of lower-
quality services. To empirically explore this possibility, we take a three-pronged 
approach. First, we construct a state-year panel of sub-standard professional service cases 
based on disciplinary action announcements by the AICPA. Second, we construct a 
dataset of pension plan deficient filer cases (i.e., sub-standard pension plan filings) to 
investigate whether the reported pension plan audit fee decreases are associated with 
declines in service quality. Third, we collect CPA firm license and disciplinary action 
data for the population of all CPA firms in Colorado to estimate disciplinary action 
probabilities. Collectively, the results of these tests do not support the view that relaxing 
geographic licensing requirements impairs service quality. 
Our paper makes three distinct contributions. First, it adds to the nascent 
accounting literature examining the impact of regulation on the labor market for 
accounting professionals (Aobdia et al., 2017; Bloomfield et al., 2017; Barrios, 2019) and 
provides a direct response to Francis’ (2011) call for research on “the people who conduct 
audits.” While labor is considered to be the most decisive input to audit-production 
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functions (e.g., Lee et al., 1999), surprisingly little is known about the underlying 
structure of the labor market for accounting professionals, including the potential impact 
of regulatory actions. Our study directly addresses this gap in the literature and 
complements the recent findings of Barrios (2019) who provides valuable insights on the 
effects of changes to the entry requirements for CPAs. 
Second, we contribute to the labor economics literature that examines 
occupational licensing by showing that lifting spatial licensing requirements produces 
non-trivial wage and service pricing effects while preserving service quality. Geographic 
barriers are believed to be one of the most severe costs imposed by occupational licensing 
regulations (e.g., Kleiner, 2000), yet no compelling empirical evidence supports this 
claim. DePasquale and Stange (2016) investigate the impact of such restrictions on the 
labor market for nurse practitioners and find no evidence of wage effects, suggesting that 
the potential costs of geographic barriers are not severe. However, their results may hinge 
on the low tradability of healthcare services that naturally require “face-to-face” provision 
(Crino, 2010). In contrast, we focus on a profession providing highly-tradable services, 
for which geographic barriers may impose greater costs and for which we have, unlike in 
healthcare, reasonable service quality measures. As such, our findings complement those 
of DePasquale and Stange (2016) and suggest that licensing-induced geographic costs are 
especially relevant when services are highly tradable (Crino, 2010; Criscuolo and 
Garicano, 2010). 
Third, our paper contributes to the recent regulatory debate on the potential costs 
resulting from state-level occupational licensing regulation (e.g., Kleiner and Vorotnikov, 
2017). CPA Mobility constitutes a major change to the licensure of CPAs in the United 
States, which renders the policy inherently important to study. Furthermore, CPA 
Mobility is subject to an ongoing debate within the public accounting profession and 
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among the profession’s regulatory bodies. In fact, the most recent edition of the Uniform 
Accountancy Act (UAA) proposes further reforms regarding mobility provisions. More 
generally, interstate barriers have caught the attention of regulators beyond the 
accounting profession. The U.S. Department of the Treasury Office of Economic Policy, 
the Council of Economic Advisers, and the Department of Labor (2015) place the 
reduction of geographic licensing barriers among their top regulatory priorities. Similarly, 
the European Union has taken a number of steps to limit licensing barriers across its 
member countries and is considering further changes. In this respect, our empirical 
findings may guide policy makers in their recent regulatory efforts. 
 
1.2 Prior Literature and Institutional Background 
1.2.1 Prior Studies and Regulatory Debate 
The study of occupational licensing has a long tradition in economics (Kleiner, 
2000). Occupational licensing is the restriction of the provision of goods and services to 
individuals holding a license and is intended to protect the public interest. Public 
protection arguments for licensing rest on asymmetric information about service-provider 
quality (Shapiro, 1986). In such settings, occupational licensing takes the form of 
minimum quality standards (Leland, 1979) and aims at mitigating quality deterioration as 
proposed by Akerlof (1970). Leland (1979) acknowledges, however, that quality 
standards tend to be set higher than socially optimal when mandated by profit-maximizing 
self-regulated industries. 
A large stream of the labor economics literature assesses this rent-seeking view 
of occupational licensing (Friedman, 1962; Stigler, 1971; Maurizi, 1974; Rottenberg, 
1980). These studies generally argue that licensing mainly serves licensed professionals 
by creating barriers to entry. Licensed professionals may maximize producer rents: (i) by 
 19 
lowering the occupational licensing exam pass rates (Maurizi, 1974; Pagliero, 2013); (ii) 
by imposing both higher general and more specific education requirements (Kleiner and 
Kudrle, 2000; Barrios, 2019); and/or (iii) by creating geographic barriers (Holen, 1965; 
Kleiner et al., 1982; DePasquale and Stange, 2016).  
The rent-seeking view has recently gained juridical and legislative traction. For 
instance, in 2015 the Supreme Court ruled that a state’s occupational licensing boards, 
which are primarily composed of individuals active in the market, only have immunity 
from antitrust investigations if they are actively supervised by the state (see, North 
Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners v. The Federal Trade Commission).3 The 
Supreme Court ruling has been accompanied by wider efforts to reform occupational 
licensing regulation, which highlights the timeliness of studying related policies. In the 
same year, the U.S. Department of the Treasury Office of Economic Policy, the Council 
of Economic Advisers, and the Department of Labor released a joint report proposing a 
roadmap to reform occupational licensing regulation, including the removal of 
geographic barriers.4 Based on these proposals, 11 states are participating in a “Peer 
Learning Consortium” to identify best practices aimed at enhancing interstate license 
reciprocity and portability.5 In a similar vein, Alexander Acosta, U.S. Labor Secretary, 
and Dennis Daugaard, Governor of South Dakota, have recently promoted regulatory 
efforts to reduce geographic licensing barriers (Wall Street Journal, 2018). 
Despite its importance and timeliness, interstate license recognition has received 
limited attention in the academic literature. In a recent paper, Johnson and Kleiner (2017) 
 
3 Prior to the Supreme Court decision, the North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners had issued 
several cease-and-desist orders to non-dentists offering cosmetic dentistry services. These orders prompted 
non-dentists to stop offering cosmetic services and, ultimately, led to a complaint by the Federal Trade 
Commission alleging that such actions were anti-competitive and unlawful under the Federal Trade 
Commission Act. 
4 U.S. Department of the Treasury Office of Economic Policy, Council of Economic Advisers, and the 
Department of Labor (2015). 
5 See the National Conference of State Legislators (2017). 
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examine the demographic effects of occupational licensing and provide evidence of a 
negative association between licensing and migration patterns. DePasquale and Stange 
(2016) exploit the staggered introduction of the Nurse Licensure Compact (NLC), which 
allows nurse practitioners to provide services in states other than their state of licensure, 
to examine the effects of licensing on labor market outcomes. Despite an extensive set of 
tests, the authors do not find evidence that the NLC impacts labor market outcomes. The 
absence of an effect may indicate that the potential costs of geographic barriers are not as 
high as previously thought. However, an alternative explanation may hinge on the low 
tradability of healthcare services, which typically require “face-to-face” provision (Crino, 
2010; Criscuolo and Garicano, 2010) and potentially relocation. In contrast, we focus on 
a profession providing highly-tradable services, for which licensing-induced geographic 
barriers may impose greater relative costs. Given that the provision of accounting services 
across states does not require relocation (and its associated costs), the removal of 
licensing-induced geographic barriers represents a relatively more substantial reduction 
in the costs of providing services to other states.6  
In conclusion, despite the increasing regulatory interest and the ubiquity of 
licensing in labor markets, empirical evidence on licensing-induced geographic barriers 
is surprisingly scant. By focusing on a profession providing highly-tradable services, for 
which geographic barriers may impose greater costs, and for which we have—unlike in 
healthcare—reasonable (albeit imperfect) service quality measures, our study intends to 
fill this void. We believe this could be especially relevant to policy makers in the 
European Union who are considering regulatory actions to relax geographic licensing 
restrictions across its member countries. 
 
6 The fact that relocation is not necessary also differentiates our study from the immigration economics 
literature.  
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1.2.2 Institutional Background: Stylized Facts on CPA Mobility Adoptions 
CPA Mobility provisions constitute the most significant change to CPA interstate 
license recognition according to the NASBA (2008). By effectively removing temporary 
licenses for individual CPAs engaged in interstate practice, CPA Mobility provisions 
introduce a “driver’s license” model for CPAs.  
Prior to the adoption of CPA Mobility, CPAs who intended to provide services in 
states other than their home states had to navigate through a patchwork system of 
notifications, fee models, and board application requirements in order to obtain temporary 
licenses. According to Art Berkowitz, a Wall Street Journal columnist and CPA, 
temporary practice privilege applications entailed, among others, the provision of copies 
of college transcripts and the payment of fees of up to USD 450 even for a single 
engagement.7 Similarly, Scott Voynich, former chair of the AICPA Board of Directors 
and chair of the AICPA’s Special Committee on Mobility, states that the main costs of 
obtaining temporary licenses stemmed from the lengthy applications and the associated 
fees. He points out that this process not only was burdensome for CPAs already engaged 
in interstate practice, but also deterred other CPAs from offering services to out-of-state 
clients. In his view, the problem related to interstate practice reached a tipping point due 
to increasing interstate business operations of CPA clients.  
In a joint effort, the AICPA and the NASBA addressed these issues with the 
introduction of the Fifth Edition of the UAA. In particular, Section 23 stipulates that an 
out-of-state CPA with a license in good standing shall be granted the same privileges as 
resident license holders, effectively removing temporary license applications. The UAA, 
 
7 Art Berkowitz kept record of the issues related to temporary licenses on his blog 
cpaoutofstatelicensing.blogspot.com. We are indebted to him for taking the time to discuss with us the 
temporary license application process numerous times. 
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however, serves as a mere “evergreen” legislation and therefore is only binding for 
adopting states.  
A natural question that arises is why State Boards of Accountancy would support 
the adoption of CPA Mobility provisions, which mainly benefit out-of-state CPAs (rather 
than their own constituents) and reduce their fee revenue generation opportunities.8,9 First, 
as a matter of fact, State Boards of Accountancy were “encouraged” to support the 
adoption of CPA Mobility; The U.S. Department of Treasury’s Advisory Committee on 
the Auditing Profession called for Congress to pass a federal provision if state boards 
failed to (voluntary) adopt the mobility provisions included in the UAA (U.S. Department 
of Treasury’s Advisory Committee on the Auditing Profession, 2008:II:2). Second, not 
all CPA firms would lose out from CPA Mobility—that is, while small local CPA firms 
would be harmed from a regulation that increases competition, large CPA firms would 
not because they were already exposed to the competition of other (out-of-state) large 
CPA firms that could use their national networks to circumvent regional barriers before 
CPA Mobility.  
 
8 The question arises because the occupational licensing literature suggests that regulatory bodies do not 
necessarily maximize the overall welfare of the profession but, rather, maximize their own interests or those 
of their constituents (Maurizi, 1974; Leland, 1979; Shaked and Sutton, 1981). CPA Mobility provisions 
reduce the means by which State Boards of Accountancy can generate fees since the provisions effectively 
eliminate temporary individual licenses and the related fees. Moreover, the immediate benefits of CPA 
Mobility adoption by a State Board of Accountancy do not directly accrue to home-state CPAs but to out-
of-state CPAs. Thus, it is unclear why states would adopt CPA Mobility provisions. It is worth noting, 
however, that this reasoning applies primarily to State Boards of Accountancy rather than to the NASBA. 
First, according to its bylaws, the NASBA primarily represents professional interests at the national level. 
Second, the NASBA is primarily financed through national CPA exam related program fees. Regarding 
this latter point, we hand collect data on the NASBA’s revenue sources and find that the NASBA generates 
less than 4% of its revenues from state board membership fees during our sample period.  
9 For a detailed discussion of the political economy of trade policies, see Baldwin (1989). Considering CPA 
Mobility, the decision of a state to implement mobility provision shares characteristics of a prisoners’ 
dilemma game: a uniform adoption of the system increases the overall mobility of CPAs in the country but 
an individual state adoption benefits out-of-state CPAs, who can enter the adopting state market, while the 
benefits for home-state CPAs depend on the adoption decision of other State Boards of Accountancy. 
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In Table 1.1, Panel A, we report both the enactment, as well as the effective, dates 
for each state adopting CPA Mobility during our sample period.10 Our discussions with 
regulators suggest that important drivers of the adoption sequence are: (i) the number of 
state-level authorities involved in the implementation process; (ii) professional (and 
social) ties; and (iii) states’ legislative schedules (U.S. Department of Treasury’s 
Advisory Committee on the Auditing Profession, 2008:VII:5).11 This mitigates the 
concern that the policy adoption correlates with factors driving labor market outcomes 
(e.g., Leuz and Wysocki, 2016; Karpoff and Wittry, 2018).  
To further alleviate this potential concern, in Panel B, we examine whether the 
adoption sequence can be predicted using a host of variables capturing: (i) local CPA 
labor market macro factors (e.g., CPA wage and employment trends and differentials); 
(ii) factors related to the political economy of local CPA labor markets (e.g., demographic 
characteristics of State Boards of Accountancy); (iii) general state macro factors (e.g., 
state-level unemployment, GDP, entrepreneurial activity, etc.); and (iv) factors related to 
the general political economy of a state (e.g., the share of Democrats/Republicans in the 
House/Senate in a state, the number of bills introduced and enacted in a state, etc.). We 
find that a state’s representation in the NASBA’s “Mobility Task Force,” which captures 
the proximity between the NASBA and the State Boards of Accountancy, predicts the 
 
10 In our main analyses, we exclude the states of Ohio and Virginia since their CPA Mobility adoption dates 
(respectively 1961 and 1999) precede our sample period (i.e., 2003-2017). In untabulated sensitivity tests, 
we assess the robustness of our main findings to the inclusion of these states (considering them as “always 
treated” throughout the sample period). Results from these tests yield qualitatively similar inferences. 
11 Samuel K. Cotterel, former Chair of the National Association of State Boards of Accountancy (NASBA), 
and David A. Castello, former President and Chief Executive Officer of the NASBA, suggest that 
legislative schedules might have played a role as to why not all states have adopted CPA Mobility 
provisions as of 2008. They propose this argument in a response to the U.S. Department of Treasury’s 
Advisory Committee on the Audit Profession (U.S. Department of Treasury’s Advisory Committee on the 
Auditing Profession, 2008:VII:5). To corroborate their argument, we collect historical legislative schedules 
from the Book of States Archives at the Council of State Governments. Historical legislative schedules 
show that only Montana, Nevada, North Dakota, Oregon, and Texas do not hold scheduled legislative 
sessions in even-numbered years during the CPA Mobility adoption period. Interestingly, none of these 
states adopts CPA Mobility in even-numbered years (Table 1.1, Panel A). 
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adoption sequence. In addition, we find that the share of board members working in small-
sized local audit-service providers is associated with later adoption. This finding is in line 
with Colbert and Murray (2013) who argue that it is local CPA firms that perceive CPA 
Mobility as a source of increased competition, whereas large audit-service providers 
operating in nation-wide networks do not.12 Most importantly, we find that general and 
local labor market conditions, as well as general political economy factors, do not predict 
the adoption sequence, which alleys the concern that adoption timings may be driven by 
local labor market shocks. 
 
1.2.3 A Simple Model of Spatial Licensing Requirements 
In this section, we present a simple model of spatial licensing requirements to 
provide the economic intuition behind our empirical tests. We start with the individual 
supply of an accounting professional (henceforth, “accountant” in this section). We then 
derive the aggregate labor supply and provide comparative statics. Finally, we introduce 
geographic barriers and derive our predictions.13 The intuition of our model builds on 
Perloff (1980: 412) who argues that (local) licensing restricts quantity adjustments 
“leaving only wage adjustments to clear the market.” 
Let us assume an individual accountant ! with the following utility function: "!($!) = '$! − )$!", where $! is the number of labor units (e.g., hours) provided, ' 
denotes wages, and ) > 0 is a cost parameter. We assume quadratic costs since the 
number of hours an accountant can provide to the market is limited. Taking the first order 
condition, individual labor supply for a given wage ' is given by: $! = #"$. The aggregate 
 
12 We are indebted to Gary Colbert and Dennis Murray for kindly sharing their survey data on State Board 
of Accountancy board member characteristics. 
13 Our model setup can be adapted to assess the labor market outcomes of initial licensing requirements 
and yields predictions similar to those of Leland (1979).  
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supply, ,, can simply be written as the sum of individual supply $! as follows: , =∑ $!%!&' = . #"$, where . denotes the number of accountants in the market.  
Let us now assume an inelastic demand of quantity ,∗.14 The market clearing 
wage can then be written as a function of the number of market participants, .: '∗ =
)∗% 2).  
Before introducing licensing costs, we provide some comparative statics to 
confirm that our model captures the intuition provided in Perloff (1980). We can see that 
*#∗*) > 0, i.e., supply is upward sloping, and *#∗*% < 0, i.e., the wage level decreases as a 
function of the number of participants in the market. Since . is, for now, exogenous, an 
increase in . corresponds to shifting the supply curve to the right, i.e., the wage is lower 
when more accountants participate in the local market. Furthermore, we can see that 
*"#∗*)*% < 0, i.e., the aggregate supply curve is flatter (more elastic) when the number of 
accountants participating in the market increases. Graphically, we illustrate this in Figure 
1.1, in which we show supply curves for two levels of market participation, . and .′, 
with . < .′. In Figure 1.1, Panel A, we see that a market with .′ accountants exhibits 
lower wages as well as a more elastic (flatter) supply curve vis-à-vis a market with . 
accountants. To visualize the supply elasticity effect of increasing . to .′, let us assume 
an exogenous shock to demand, e.g., a new regulation requiring a larger number of 
accounting services that shifts the demand curve from ,∗ to ,∗′. In Figure 1.1, Panel B, 
we see that the resulting change in wages is larger for a supply assuming . accountants 
in the market, i.e., ∆'% > ∆'%#. 
 
14 Our predictions with regard to wage responses and supply elasticities are not driven by the assumption 
of inelastic demand.  
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Next, we provide a framework for the potential effects of removing licensing-
induced geographic barriers by introducing a fixed cost parameter (licensing cost, 3). Let .+, denote the number of local accountants in state 4 and .-./	the number of out-of-
state accountants (potentially providing services to state 4). The total supply . in our 
local market 4 is given by: . = .+, + 7.-./.15 This decomposition assumes that the 
number of accountants in the state, .+,, is fixed (in the short run) while a share, 7, of out-
of-state accountants providing labor to 4 may vary. The parameter 7 describes the 
proportion of out-of-state accountants providing labor to state 4. Accordingly, let 0 ≤7 ≤ 1.  
To describe 7, we illustrate the decision problem an out-of-state accountant : faces 
when considering to provide services to state 4 as follows: 
1. The accountant : observes two wage offers: '0 when providing services to state 4, and '-./ when providing services only in the home state;  
2. Each accountant : also receives random draws of utility associated with providing 
services to either state 4 or the home state: ;<1,0, <1,-./>; 
3. Crucially, providing services to state 4 prior to the introduction of CPA Mobility 
provisions imposes a fixed licensing cost 3. 
Accountants outside of state 4 will provide services to state 4 if max{'0 − 3, 0} + <1,0 > max{'-./ , 0} + <1,-./. The introduction of CPA Mobility provisions effectively 
removes the fixed cost component 3. We can think of 3 as a threshold level, which 
determines the share of accountants 7 who are willing to provide services to state 4. We 
would expect that 7 increases as 3 decreases (*3(5)*5 < 0), i.e., the inequality 
 
15 Our decomposition effectively assumes that !$% and !&'( are substitutes. This assumption seems, in our 
context, reasonable since, to the best of our knowledge, there are no major state-level changes in the initial 
licensing criteria.  
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max{'0 − 3, 0} + <1,0 > max{'-./ , 0} + <1,-./ will be satisfied for a larger number of 
accountants for all ∆' =	'+, −'-./, holding constant the utility draws. It follows that . = .+, + 7(3).-./ < .+, + 7(3′).-./ = 	.′ if 37 < 3 for all ∆'. As shown with the 
comparative statics and graphically in Figure 1.1, we expect that a reduction from 3 to 37, 
i.e., the introduction of CPA Mobility provisions in state 4, leads to an increase in ., 
which, in turn, results in lower wages in state 4, as well as in a more elastic supply. 
To summarize, based on our model, we expect that the introduction of CPA 
Mobility will lead to a reduction in wages. Further, we expect that wages of accountants 
become less sensitive to local economic conditions. In addition, assuming a fairly 
inelastic demand, we would not expect to observe sizable effects on quantities.  
 
1.3 Research Design 
To empirically examine whether the removal of licensing-induced geographic 
barriers affects labor market outcomes, we take advantage of the staggered introduction 
of CPA Mobility provisions across states. We exploit variation in adoption dates of CPA 
Mobility provisions in a generalized DiD research design, effectively comparing labor 
market outcomes in states that adopt CPA Mobility with those that have not (yet) adopted 
the policy. To capture the effect of the policy, we estimate model specifications of the 
following form: 
$8,/ = DEFGHIJ!K!L$8,/9' + M′N8,/9' +	O8 +	)/ + P8,/. (1) 
In this model, $8,/ is the respective state-year CPA mean wage or employment 
level.16 The policy indicator (EFGHIJ!K!L$8,/9') is switched on for states that adopt CPA 
 
16 In the analyses presented in Sections 1.4.6, 1.4.7, and 1.4.8, we also explore the effects on service pricing 
and quality as alternative dependent variables.  
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Mobility provisions in the year following the adoption and thereafter.17 The policy 
indicator is lagged by one year for two reasons: (i) to allow for time until the policy effect 
materializes; and (ii) to account for different adoption dates within a year.18  
The coefficient D captures the policy effect on wages or employment levels. To 
control for state-level time-invariant confounders, we include state fixed effects (O8). To 
control for time-varying factors affecting the response variable of interest, we include a 
set of year fixed effects ()/). Finally, we include a vector of state-year control variables 
(N8,/9') to account for state-year-specific potential confounders, such as differences in 
state-year macroeconomic conditions and migration patterns. Following prior studies 
(e.g., Dube et al., 2010; Autor et al., 2016), we proxy for state-year macroeconomic 
conditions using lagged unemployment rates (QRST7KI$TSRL8,/9') and real GDP per 
capita (UVFFSWEX7!LX8,/9'). We also include lagged control variables for state-year 
specific migration patterns (Y!Lℎ!R[TT!\WXL!IR8,/9' and		GJWIX][TT!\WXL!IR8,/9') 
to account for the effect of structural demographic changes.19 We provide detailed 
variable definitions in Appendix 1.A.  
To account for the grouped structure of our wage data—that is, our units of 
observations are average wages for the employed in a state-year—we estimate weighted 
least squares (WLS) regressions using annual employment share weights (e.g., Autor et 
 
17 The policy indicator, "#$%&'()(*+),(+,, effectively corresponds to the product of a state indicator 
variable and a post-adoption indicator variable. To enhance readability, we do not write out the product of 
the state indicator and the post-adoption indicator but, rather, refer to the product as "#$%&'()(*+),(+,. 
Since we include state and year fixed effects, we suppress the respective main effects. 
18 Rather than choosing an arbitrary cut-off month, we lag the policy indicator by one year. We assess the 
sensitivity of our findings to this design choice by examining pre-treatment trends (Figure 1.2).  
19 In untabulated robustness tests, we also include further state-year-level controls for demographics: 
gender, minority, and marital status variables. Prior literature (e.g., Kleiner et al., 2016) identifies 
demographic characteristics to be meaningful wage determinants in American Community Survey (ACS) 
micro-level regressions. While these variables exhibit explanatory power in micro-level regressions, 
variation at the state-year level is very modest and therefore they contribute only very little over our fixed 
effects structure. The inclusion of demographic controls does not alter the tenor of our empirical findings.  
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al., 2006). We cluster standard errors at the state level (e.g., Bertrand et al., 2004; Donald 
and Lang, 2007). 
 
1.4  Empirical Analysis 
1.4.1 State-Level Difference-in-Differences Analysis: CPA Mobility Wage Effects 
In our first set of tests, we examine the effect of CPA Mobility provisions on state-
level wages of CPA firm employees. We source the data for this analysis from the BLS 
Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW) program. The QCEW program 
provides data on wages and employment levels disaggregated by industry and geographic 
units and is, to the best of our knowledge, the most comprehensive data source to explore 
CPA labor market effects.  
Our state-year panel of CPA firm employee wages and employment levels, the 
QCEW State-Level Sample, covers the period from 2003 to 2017 and comprises 720 state-
year observations. We provide detailed variable definitions and sample selection criteria 
in Appendices 1.A and 1.B, respectively. Table 1.2, Panel A presents descriptive 
statistics. On average, CPA firm employees earn USD 63,514 per year and employment 
levels are around 8,000 employees. When looking at regional patterns (unreported), state-
level CPA firm employment is positively correlated with the total labor force (pairwise 
correlation above 0.90 across all years). Moreover, highly-populated states, such as 
California, Texas, New York, and Illinois show high levels of CPA firm employment.  
To gauge the effect of CPA Mobility on wages, we estimate model (1). Our 
dependent variable is the natural logarithm of wages paid to CPA firm employees. In 
Panel B, we present different specifications of model (1) in which we individually and 
jointly account for macro-level factors (Columns (2), (3), and (6)), as well as migration 
patterns (Columns (4), (5), and (6)). All models include state and year fixed effects. 
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Across all model specifications, the negative coefficient estimate on our policy indicator 
(EFGHIJ!K!L$8,/9') is statistically significant and economically meaningful. The 
estimated decrease in average wages is similar in magnitude across alternative model 
specifications and fairly insensitive to the inclusion of macro- and migration-level control 
variables. Our most conservative estimate yields a coefficient of -0.010 (Column (6)), 
indicating average wage declines of 1.0% subsequent to the adoption of CPA Mobility. 
This percentage decrease implies that state average pre-treatment wages experience a 
USD 541 decrease subsequent to CPA Mobility adoption. In gauging and interpreting the 
economic magnitude of this effect, it is important to make several important 
considerations. First, the documented wage declines persist over time and reflect the 
overall size of the accounting profession. Second, a limitation of our QCEW program 
data is that wages and employment levels are averaged across all employees of CPA 
firms, including non-accounting professionals (e.g., administrative and IT staff), for 
whom the reduction of licensing-induced barriers may have smaller effects.20 Lastly, our 
treatment estimates likely capture both CPA Mobility wage declines in adopting states 
(that face more competition) and potential wage increases in non-adopting states (that can 
offer services in adopting states).21 The magnitude of our results should therefore be 
considered with these caveats in mind and interpreted as a lower bound of the policy 
effect.  
 
20 We directly address this limitation in our analyses presented in Section 1.4.6 in which we provide 
estimates based on more granular data (i.e., specific wages of accounting professionals vis-à-vis all CPA 
firm employees) for a sub-set of states. Moreover, to gauge the extent to which our data reflect actual CPA 
wages, we compare QCEW wage data in the most recent year of our sample to wage information provided 
by online job advertisement websites such as roberhalf.com, glassdoor.com, and payscale.com. We find no 
discernible differences. For instance, workers in New York CPA firms earn an average income of USD 
110,539 based on our QCEW data which are in close proximity to estimates of New York CPA incomes of 
USD 103,200 provided by payscale.com. 
21 We examine potential SUTVA violation concerns in Section 1.4.3. 
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An important identifying assumption of our DiD design is that wage trends 
between treated states and control states would move in parallel absent the CPA Mobility 
treatment. Because counterfactual trends are not empirically observable, we test for 
differences in pre-treatment trends. Accordingly, we examine differences in wages across 
states that adopt CPA Mobility and states that have not (yet) adopted the policy by 
mapping out treatment effects in event-time. In Figure 1.2, Panel A, we map out these 
effects by replacing our policy indicator with separate event-time dummies, each marking 
a period relative to the policy announcement (t=0), and plot the estimated treatment 
effects.22 The evidence from this figure suggests that, while prior to CPA Mobility 
adoption the treatment effects are statistically indistinguishable from zero, they 
experience a sharp decrease in the years following CPA Mobility adoption that persists 
over time. These results mitigate concerns that our prior findings could be driven by 
differences in pre-treatment trends. Importantly, this graphical evidence further suggests 
that the reported effects are not limited to the short run only. Rather, we observe wage 
declines persisting at least up to four years after the time of adoption. This persistence is 
consistent with predictions from the intra-industry (or “cross-hauling”) trade theory (e.g., 
Brander and Krugman, 1983) according to which consumers are better off in the long run 
if the same quantity of services is offered by more (competing) firms even when the total 
number of suppliers in the overall economy stays constant. 
Overall, in line with our predictions, the results of this analysis indicate that the 
removal of licensing-induced geographic barriers results in negative wage pressure.  
  
 
22 We omit the indicator for t-1, which serves as benchmark period. 
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1.4.2 State-Level Difference-in-Differences Analysis: CPA Mobility Employment 
Effects 
In our previous tests, we assess the effect of CPA Mobility on state-year CPA 
wages. We now move to examine the effect of the policy on average employment levels 
in CPA firms. To explore the effects on employment levels, we estimate a version of 
model (1) in which our dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the number of 
employees working in CPA firms (3I\(^T7KI$TSRL8,/:;<=)). In Table 1.2, Panel C, we 
present the results of this analysis based on our QCEW State-Level Sample. 
Our coefficient estimates across all specifications (Columns (1) to (6)) do not 
suggest effects of CPA Mobility provisions on the number of employees in CPA firms. 
As the potential effects of CPA Mobility on employment may take longer to materialize, 
or CPA firms may anticipate the policy change and adjust employment levels, in 
untabulated tests we also explore the extent to which the timing of CPA Mobility 
provisions may affect employment. Evidence from these sensitivity tests indicates neither 
lagged nor anticipation effects. 
 
1.4.3 Neighbor CPA Mobility Adoption Effects 
The introduction of CPA Mobility provisions allows out-of-state CPAs to enter 
adopting states more easily. Thus, a potential concern with our DiD analysis is that control 
observations may be indirectly treated—that is, a potential violation of the stable unit 
treatment value assumption (SUTVA). While we share the SUTVA violation concern 
with virtually every study that examines the removal of trade barriers (e.g., Donaldson, 
2015), we conduct a further set of tests to assess whether spillover effects from our control 
group may be driving our findings.  
Following prior studies (e.g., Heider and Ljungqvist, 2015; Simintzi et al., 2015), 
we include neighbor treatment effects (.S!\ℎJIWEFGHIJ!K!L$8,/9') in our main model 
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specification to capture potential spillover effects. The neighbor treatment is constructed 
as the employment-weighted treatment of all neighbor states.23 In the odd-numbered 
columns of Table 1.2, Panel D, we augment our base model specification (model (1)) by 
including neighbor treatments as additional control variables. Controlling for neighbor 
treatments does not subsume the effect of each state’s own treatment (coefficients on EFGHIJ!K!L$8,/9' remain negative and significant). In the even-numbered columns, we 
report coefficient estimates of model specifications in which we suppress a state’s own 
treatment and, instead, include only neighbor treatments. For each individual state, 
neighbor treatments, which effectively serve as “pseudo-treatments,” should not induce 
any effects. The coefficient estimates on neighbor treatments are not statistically 
significant, which suggests that indirect control group effects are unlikely to drive our 
findings. 
 
1.4.4 Mitigating the Influence of State Time-Varying Factors 
Unobservable state time-varying factors may pose a challenge to our 
identification strategy and bias our inferences if correlated with the timing of CPA 
Mobility adoption and labor market outcomes. To make an initial assessment of the 
robustness of our findings to omitted variable bias and evaluate the stability of our 
treatment effects, we implement the bounding methodology proposed by Oster (2019). 
The evidence from this analysis, which we discuss in Section 1.8.2, suggests that it is 
unlikely that our treatment effects are driven by omitted variables, as unobservables 
would need to be almost eight times (D = 7.864) as important as the observables to 
produce a treatment effect of zero (Table 1.OA-3 in Section 1.8). Nevertheless, we 
 
23 In untabulated tests, we repeat the analyses presented in Table 1.2, Panel D with neighbor treatment 
variables constructed as the Census Region average treatment, the Census District average treatment, 
unweighted neighbor treatment, first neighbor’s treatment, as well as inverse distance weighted treatment. 
Estimates based on these alternative definitions of neighbor treatment closely mimic our reported results.  
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employ several other strategies to alleviate this potential concern, including: (i) a DiDiD 
analysis in which we use different within-state control groups; and (ii) a contiguous-
county analysis in which we compare labor market outcomes across neighboring counties 
located in different states. 
To alley the concern that the wage declines that we document in our state-level 
analysis may be due to unobservable local shocks, we employ a DiDiD research design, 
which allows us to compare labor market outcomes of CPA Mobility within each state 
using additional within-state control groups. 
First, we argue that not all CPA firms lose out from CPA Mobility—that is, while 
small (local) CPA firms experience wage declines because of increased competition from 
other small CPA firms, large (national) CPA firms were already exposed to the 
competition of other (out-of-state) large CPA firms even before CPA Mobility given that 
these could already use their national networks to circumvent regional barriers. 
Accordingly, we design a set of tests in which we estimate the effects of CPA Mobility 
for small CPA firms, relative to control group of large CPA firms in the same state. To 
capture CPA firm size, we use state-level data from the Census Statistics of U.S. Business 
(SUSB) program, which allow us to observe wage (and employment) responses for 
accounting professionals employed in firms of different sizes. We discuss the 
construction of our SUSB State-Level Sample in Appendix 1.B.  
To test whether wages of small CPA firms decline after CPA Mobility adoption 
relative to wages of large CPA firms, we use a DiDiD specification, which includes: (i) 
state × year fixed effects to control for unobservable state-year specific factors potentially 
correlated with both the adoption sequence and labor market outcomes; (ii) state × firm 
size fixed effects to account for CPA firm size heterogeneity across states; and (iii) firm 
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size × year fixed effects to capture differences in wage and employment trends across 
large and small CPA firms. 
We report the results of this analysis in Table 1.3, Panel A. We find that, following 
CPA Mobility adoption, wages in small CPA firms decline by 1.9% relative to wages in 
large CPA firms (Column (1)). This percentage decrease implies that, relative to large 
CPA firms in treated states, small CPA firms’ average pre-treatment wages decrease by 
USD 793 subsequent to CPA Mobility adoption. In contrast, we do not observe 
statistically significant effects on total employment (Column (2)), average employment 
(Column (3)), and total number of CPA firms (Column (4)), which provides reassurance 
that our wage findings are not driven by CPA firm employees switching across firms of 
different sizes. 
The key identifying assumptions of this analysis are that (i) large CPA firms are 
unaffected by the treatment and (ii) trends across large and small firms would have moved 
in parallel absent the regulatory intervention. To assess the validity of the first 
assumption, in Table 1.OA-2, Panel B, we report separate treatment effects for large firms 
and find that wages of large CPA firm employees are not affected by CPA Mobility, 
which provides reassurance on the suitability of this control group. We assess the validity 
of the second assumption by mapping out the treatment effects in event-time. In Figure 
1.2, Panel B, we plot event-time coefficient estimates around CPA Mobility adoption 
dates and observe no statistically significant differences prior to the adoption time.24 
Reported wage declines accrue subsequent to CPA Mobility adoption only. 
Next, following Bloomfield et al. (2017), we use legal professionals an additional 
within-state control group. We leverage on the industry disaggregated information 
 
24 Unfortunately, SUBS program data are unavailable prior to 2007, which limits the extent to which we 
can examine pre-treatment trends. 
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provided by our QCEW program data to collect information on legal professionals’ wage 
and employment levels from 2003 to 2017 using the NAICS code 541110 “Offices of 
Lawyers.”25 
Conceptually, legal professionals are likely to be a suitable benchmark for 
accounting professionals as both professions require substantial investment in education 
and expert knowledge, and are subject to state-level licensing in the United States. 
Accordingly, we estimate a DiDiD model specification, which includes: (i) state × year 
fixed effects to control for state-year specific shocks potentially correlated with the 
adoption of CPA Mobility provisions and local labor market conditions; (ii) state × 
profession fixed effects to account for unobservable local differences between 
professions; and (iii) profession × year fixed effects to capture differences in national-
level trends between professions.  
In Table 1.3, Panel B, we report the results of this analysis. We find that, relative 
to legal professionals, CPAs experience a 0.9% decline in wages following CPA Mobility 
adoption (Column (1)), which is in close proximity to our state-level DiD estimates. This 
percentage decrease implies that, relative to legal professionals from treated states, 
accounting professionals’ average wages decrease by USD 487 after CPA Mobility 
adoption. Moreover, in line with our previous findings, we do not observe statistically 
significant effects on total employment (Column (2)), average employment (Column (3)), 
and total number of firms (Column (4)).  
We assess the suitability of legal professionals as a control group by estimating 
separate treatment effects for the wages of legal professionals only and find that these are 
not affected by CPA Mobility (Table 1.OA-2, Panel C). To gauge the validity of the 
 
25 In an additional set of tests, which we discuss in Section 1.8.3 and whose results are reported in Table 
1.OA-4, we also take a synthetic control group approach (Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003; Abadie et al., 
2010) and use two “synthetic groups” of CPAs based on business professionals (other than accounting 
professionals) as alternative control samples. 
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parallel-trends assumption, we map out the reported effects in event-time. The graphical 
evidence in Figure 1.2, Panel C, suggests that treated and control units do not show 
statistically significant pre-treatment differences in wages.  
Finally, in the spirit of the double-matched approach proposed by Bloomfield et 
al. (2017), we pair small and large CPA firms to small and large legal firms each sample 
year to form quadruplets. This research design effectively allows us to gauge wage and 
employment heterogeneity across small and large CPA firms, controlling for state time-
varying factors. The results of this analysis, reported in Table 1.3, Panel C, are, once 
again, similar to our main findings. 
To further address the concern that unobservable local factors may drive our 
results, we conduct an additional analysis in which we take advantage of more granular 
county-level wage- and employment-level data. We follow Dube et al. (2010) and 
construct a sample of contiguous counties located on different sides of a state-pair border 
(see Figure 1.3). Dube et al. (2010) argue that such border counties provide a powerful 
setting to assess policy effects on labor market outcomes. The basic argument for this test 
is that contiguous counties are subject to similar economic conditions that may correlate 
with policies and outcomes (Card and Krueger, 1997; Holmes, 2006; Dube et al., 2010). 
However, since these counties are located in different states, they differ in terms of 
adoption dates. To operationalize the idea outlined above, we estimate a model of the 
following form: $>,?,8,/ = DEFGHIJ!K!L$8,/9' + M7N8,/9' + _QRST7KI$TSRL>,/9' +O> +	)?,/ + P>,?,8,/. (2) 
In this model, $>,?,8,/ is the respective county-year CPA mean wage or 
employment level. Each county belongs to a border segment denoted by the subscript b 
and a state denoted by the subscript s. The state in which a county is located determines 
 38 
the treatment timing. To control for county-level time-invariant confounders, we include 
county fixed effects (O>). This design choice effectively allows us to control for time-
invariant factors that may correlate with occupational licensing legislation and labor 
market outcomes. To control for time-varying factors along each border segment, we 
include a set of border-year fixed effects ()?,/). All other variables are as previously 
defined except for unemployment rates, which are available at the county-year-level 
through the BLS LAUS program. Detailed variable definitions are provided in Appendix 
1.A. 
For our border-county analysis, we source data from the BLS QCEW program. 
We identify contiguous counties located on different sides of border segments using the 
BLS County Adjacency Files. We provide detailed data construction and sample selection 
information in Appendix 1.B. Table 1.4, Panel A presents the descriptive statistics for our 
QCEW Border-County Sample.  
In Panel B, we present our DiD estimates. In Columns (1) to (4), we show CPA 
Mobility effects on wages, whereas in Columns (5) to (8), we show effects on 
employment levels. Despite the extensive fixed effect structure used in these tests, 
estimates of the policy impact on wages remain statistically significant across all 
specifications. Most importantly, despite the differences in research design, coefficient 
magnitudes are very close to those documented in our main analysis (Table 1.2, Panel B). 
Furthermore, similar to the state-level analysis in Section 4.2, we do not find an effect on 
employment levels. 
In conclusion, the evidence from our border-county analysis mitigates concerns 
that the results of our state-level analysis are driven by unobservable local 
macroeconomic conditions. 
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1.4.5 CPA Mobility and Wage Sensitivities to Local Economic Conditions 
In this section, we explore whether the removal of licensing-induced geographic 
barriers extend beyond wage levels and also affect elasticities. We expect that wage 
sensitivities to local economic conditions and wage differentials to become smaller over 
time as a result of the increased CPA labor market integration brought about by CPA 
Mobility. 
To empirically gauge the long term effects of CPA Mobility, we separately 
estimate wage sensitivities to local economic conditions for accounting and legal 
professionals over the period before the first of our sample states adopts CPA Mobility 
(i.e., 2002-2005) and after the last of our sample states adopts CPA Mobility (i.e., 2014-
2017). Following prior studies (e.g., Mian and Sufi, 2014), we conduct this analysis at 
the Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) level, which allows us to gather more granular 
information on changes in  GDP per capita—our proxy for changes in local economic 
conditions—and wage data for both accounting and legal professionals. The data 
construction details for our QCEW MSA-Level Sample are presented in Appendix 1.B. 
In Figure 1.4, we provide graphical evidence on the long term effects CPA 
Mobility on wage elasticities. In Panel A, we plot wage sensitivities for our treatment 
group (accounting professionals), whereas in Panel B we show wage sensitivities for our 
control group (legal professionals) both before (left-hand side plots) and after (right-hand 
side plots) CPA Mobility adoption. These plots suggest that, relative to the wage 
elasticities of legal professionals, the wage elasticities of accounting professionals decline 
over time.  
We then complement our graphical evidence with a formal regression analysis in 
which we estimate wage sensitivities to local economic conditions separately for 
accounting and legal professionals before the first of our sample states adopts CPA 
 40 
Mobility and after the last of our sample states adopts CPA Mobility. Table 1.5, Panel A, 
presents the results of this analysis. Consistent with the graphical evidence shown in 
Figure 1.4, we document a statistically significant decline in wage elasticities for 
accounting professionals (negative and significant coefficient on FI`LG]I7L!IR/ ×∆3I\bYX\S@,/:;<=c in Column (1)), but not for legal professionals (Column (2)). 
However, the difference in coefficients is not significantly different across the accounting 
and legal professional partitions. 
Next, we explore whether (cross-sectional) wage volatility and (cross-sectional) 
wage dispersion decline with the introduction of CPA Mobility. To operationalize these 
two constructs, we calculate, for each year, standard deviations and interquartile ranges 
for ∆3I\(UVF7SWEX7!LX@,/) and 3I\(UVF7SWEX7!LX@,/) for both groups of 
professionals, respectively. We then examine how wage dispersion and wage volatility 
vary before and after the adoption of CPA Mobility. We present the respective point 
estimates in Table 1.5, Panels B and C. Although based on very small samples of 16 
observations (2 professions × (4 years before + 4 years after Mobility adoptions)), these 
tests suggest that both wage dispersion and wage volatility decrease with the introduction 
of CPA Mobility.  
 
1.4.6 CPA Mobility Effects Within CPA Firms  
Our analyses so far are based on QCEW program data, which are disaggregated 
by industry. As discussed in Section 1.4.1, the QCEW program data do not allow us to 
distinguish between accounting professionals and other staff employed in CPA firms. 
Because of this data limitation, a potential concern with our previous analyses is that the 
policy effect that we document may be underestimating the “true” effect.  
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Ideally, we would want to obtain data on the individuals actually targeted by the 
policy change (i.e., accounting professionals holding a CPA license within CPA firms). 
To this end, we hand-collect data from the survey response sheets of the AICPA’s 
Management of an Accounting Practice (MAP) survey. The AICPA MAP survey is a 
biennial survey of CPA firms and serves as a benchmarking tool for participating firms. 
Participating firms receive a report which provides them with state-level mean 
performance metrics, permitting thereby state-peer performance comparisons.  
We obtain these confidential state-level reports from the AICPA. While the 
survey is not explicitly designed to allow for comparisons over time, part of it includes 
wage information for CPAs, which is collected and presented consistently over time. The 
MAP survey also provides us with an opportunity to collect information on billing rates 
charged by CPA firms, as well as the number of hours charged to clients. A detailed 
presentation of our AICPA MAP Survey Sample is provided in Appendix 1.B. 
In Table 1.6, Panel A, we present descriptive statistics for the AICPA MAP Survey 
Sample. The mean wage of USD 85,039 in this sample is considerably higher than the 
mean wage in the QCEW State-Level Sample. This discrepancy is partly due to disclosure 
restrictions; we are able to obtain survey reports at the state-year level only for highly 
populated states in which CPAs, on average, earn higher wages. In addition, the higher 
mean wage is consistent with limiting observations to accounting professionals only (i.e., 
excluding other CPA firm staff members who presumably earn less). 
In Panel B, we replicate our analyses based on the QCEW State-Level Sample with 
AICPA MAP survey data and document similar findings. We find that, relative to state 
average pre-treatment levels, wages decrease by 3.4% subsequent to CPA Mobility 
adoption (Column (1)), which imply a USD 2,564 wage decrease. In Column (2) we 
document a decline in billing rates (d!KK!R\eXLS8,#ABC), whereas in Column (3) we show 
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that the effect on hours charged (3I\(fI"W`EℎXW\S]8,#ABC)) is insignificant. The 
combined finding on billing rates and hours charged is consistent with the wage and 
employment-level effects that we document in our QCEW State-Level Sample analyses. 
Quite interestingly, the coefficient magnitude on the policy indicator in the wage 
regression is substantially higher than our prior estimates based on QCEW program data. 
This could be due to our prior results underestimating the true wage effect of CPA 
Mobility because QCEW program data do not allow us to estimate effects for accounting 
professionals only, while the AICPA MAP Survey Sample does. Importantly, there are 
also differences in the population of CPA firms forming the aggregated wage statistics 
we use in our analyses.  In particular, while wages paid by large audit-service providers 
(e.g., Big 4 firms) are included in our QCEW State-Level Sample, these are not part of 
our AICPA MAP Survey Sample (see Section 1.8.1 for details on how we identify whether 
Big 4 firms are part of our samples). Unlike small-sized local audit-service providers 
(e.g., non-Big 4 firms), Big 4 firms operate through national networks and hence bypass 
interstate licensing restrictions. Therefore, Big 4 firms are less likely to be affected by the 
introduction of CPA mobility provisions. 
Next, we test for differences in policy effects conditional on accounting 
professional seniority. In Panel C, we examine the effect of CPA mobility on wage 
dispersion, measured as logratios, which we compute as the natural logarithm of the ratio 
of wages across different seniority levels (e.g., natural logarithm of senior-level wages to 
junior-level wages).26 Our results show that the effect of CPA Mobility on wages is 
stronger for high-seniority personnel (Columns (1) and (2)). This result partly reflects the 
fact that more senior accounting professionals within CPA firms, because of their longer 
 
26 Logratios are commonly used in labor economics studies as a measure of wage dispersion (e.g., Autor et 
al., 2008; 2016). 
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tenure, are more likely to hold a CPA license. Also, the stronger effect on wages for more 
senior CPAs is consistent with their compensation entailing a higher proportion of 
variable pay, which is typically more responsive to shocks.27 Our results on billing rates 
(Panel B, Column (2)) are consistent with the latter. 
In Panels D and E, we focus on billing rates and hours charged, respectively. We 
find declines in billing rates only relative to junior accounting professionals, which is 
consistent with the effect being more pronounced for accounting professionals holding a 
CPA license. Lastly, our results for hours charged (Panel E) do not provide any evidence 
for differential policy impact across seniority levels.  
Collectively, our results show that CPA Mobility effects are more pronounced for 
senior professionals, which suggests that wages become more homogenous after the 
policy adoption. 
 
1.4.7 CPA Mobility Effect on Service Prices 
Prior literature argues that licensing-induced geographic barriers prevent 
licensees from competing across state lines and, ultimately, drive up service prices. To 
explore whether wage declines reported in our prior analyses are accompanied by declines 
in service prices, we investigate the effects of CPA Mobility on audit fees. In addition, 
we examine whether such effects, if any, differ between national audit firms, which 
 
27 There are two potential concerns with this analysis: (i) there may be concurrent changes in compensation 
structures and (ii) CPAs may adjust wage structures to receive preferable tax treatments for their total 
compensation packages to compensate for wage decreases in pre-tax compensation. The QCEW program 
data and the AICPA MAP survey report total wages as opposed to limiting wages to, for instance, fixed 
wage components, which allays the first concern. To address the second concern, we examine whether 
including state-level income tax rates alters our results and find this not to be the case (results are 
untabulated for brevity). We focus on income tax rates since the vast majority of CPA firms are organized 
as either S Corporations, Sole Proprietorships, or Partnerships. To assess the distribution of legal structures 
of CPA firms in the United States, we use Census CBP program data that reports the number of 
establishments by industry classification, state, year, legal form, and size class. Our (untabulated) results 
reveal that less than 10% of all CPA firms are organized as Corporations, for which profits are taxed at the 
company level. We graphically show the shares of CPA firm legal structures for different (BLS-defined) 
size classes in Figure 1.OA-1.  
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operate in nation-wide networks, and local audit firms, which are typically smaller and 
tend to operate on a more local basis. Colbert and Murray (2013) point out that, while 
audit firms operating more locally regard CPA Mobility as a source of increased 
competition, CPA Mobility should not affect national audit firms whose (national) 
networks already allowed them to circumvent the licensing-induced barriers removed by 
the policy adoption. 
To investigate the effect of CPA Mobility on service prices and potential 
differences between national and local audit firms, we require a standardized service 
provided by both types of audit firms. Hence, we focus on limited scope pension plan 
audits, which are fairly homogenous in terms of engagement complexity (AICPA, 2018). 
Moreover, unlike mandatory financial statement audits that are mainly provided by 
national audit firms, these services are provided by both national and local firms.28 To 
this end, we collect private employee benefit plan files available from the Employee 
Benefit Security Administration (EBSA) of the Department of Labor. In the United 
States, most private employee benefit plans are subject to mandatory audits according to 
Section 103(a)(3) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). These 
private pension plan audits are provided by both audit-service providers operating in 
nation-wide networks, as well as by small-sized local audit-service providers. We define 
national audit firms using Statista’s list of “national accounting firms.” The data 
construction details for our Private Pension Plan Audit Sample are provided in Appendix 
1.B. 
 
28 Based on Audit Analytics data, the average (fee-weighted) Big 4 market share in the mandatory financial 
statement audit segment amounts to 65% (90%). This, in turn, highlights that the mandatory financial 
statement audit market segment is not a suitable setting for our analysis since it is mainly dominated by 
large audit-service providers operating in nation-wide networks. Nonetheless, we construct a sample based 
on Audit Analytics data and estimate our generalized DiD model augmented with control variables 
frequently used in studies on audit fee determinants (e.g., DeFond and Zhang, 2014). As expected, given 
the dominance of Big 4 firms in the mandatory financial statement audit segment, we do not find an effect 
of CPA Mobility provisions on fees. 
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In Table 1.7, Panel A, we present the descriptive statistics for our Private Pension 
Plan Audit Sample. The mean (median) plan-level audit fees in our sample amount to 
around USD 17,243 (USD 12,000). The average national audit firm market share is 30% 
in our sample, which is considerably lower than their market share in the mandatory 
financial statement audit market segment.  
To examine the effects of CPA Mobility on pension plan audit fees, we estimate 
a version of the generalized DiD model presented in Section 1.3 augmented with the 
control variables proposed by Cullinan (1997), who investigates the determinants of 
pension plan audit fees. We provide detailed variable definitions for these control 
variables in Appendix 1.A. In addition, we include: (i) state × audit firm type fixed effects 
to account for audit firm type heterogeneity (local vs. national) across states; and (ii) audit 
firm type × year fixed effects to control for time-varying audit firm characteristics. 
In Table 1.7, Panel B, we present the results of our analysis. The estimate 
presented in Column (1) suggests that, relative to the pre-treatment period, pension plan 
audit fees decline by 1.7% subsequent to the introduction of CPA Mobility, which implies 
a USD 277 decrease. This result is consistent with our prior findings suggesting both 
wage and billing rate declines. In Column (2), we investigate whether the reported decline 
in pension plan audit fees varies conditional on the type of audit firm. Given that national 
audit firms operate in nation-wide networks and have licensed personnel in every state, 
the average effect reported in Column (1) is likely driven by local audit firms. In line with 
our expectations, the coefficient magnitude is more negative for pension plans audited by 
local audit firms, suggesting fee declines of 2.2% on average relative to pre-treatment 
levels (Column (2)), which implies that audit fees on average decrease by USD 359. 
Overall, our analysis investigating the effect of CPA Mobility on service prices is 
in line with the view that licensing-induced geographic barriers prevent licensees from 
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competing across state lines and, ultimately, drive up service prices. In addition, we find 
that service price declines are only observable for local audit-service providers. 
 
1.4.8 CPA Mobility Effect on Service Quality 
Since the raison d’être for occupations to be organized through licensing 
regulations is to ensure minimum quality standards (Leland, 1979), in our last set of tests 
we assess whether the removal of geographic barriers affects service quality. Along with 
increased wage and fee pressure, the provisions of CPA Mobility may induce quality 
deterioration in the services provided by accounting professionals.  
A number of reasons suggest that such service quality deterioration should not 
obtain. First, we do not observe substantial changes in the initial licensing requirements 
during our sample period. Second, CPA Mobility includes a “no escape” provision, which 
gives adopting states direct jurisdiction over out-of-state CPAs providing in-state 
services. Third, as pointed out by Lynch and McDonnell (2008), the removal of 
notification or application requirements should free up resources that State Boards of 
Accountancy could allocate to enforcement. Fourth, UAA provisions effectively require 
CPAs engaging in cross-border service provision to have “substantially equivalent” 
qualifications.  
Notwithstanding the abovementioned reasons that speak against service quality 
deterioration, we take a three-pronged approach to explore this possibility in our last 
series of tests. First, we obtain data on AICPA misconduct cases from Jack Armitage and 
Shane Moriarity and examine if the frequency of misconduct cases changes after CPA 
mobility adoption. Armitage and Moriarity (2016) examine AICPA disciplinary actions 
from 1980 to 2014. AICPA misconduct cases provide a direct measure for the adherence 
to professional standards of CPAs. The AICPA’s enforcement process is designed to 
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identify and sanction, if necessary, substandard professional services by either 
admonishment, suspension of membership, or termination of the membership. AICPA 
membership is automatically terminated when a member is convicted of a crime, or a 
CPA license is suspended or revoked by the issuing jurisdiction of the license. Since the 
AICPA is the largest CPA association in the United States, AICPA misconduct cases 
provide a suitable sample for assessing professional standard adherence for a large 
number of CPAs. The dataset construction details for our AICPA Misconduct Dataset are 
presented in Appendix 1.B. In Table 1.8, Panel A, we present the results of this analysis. 
Since our dependent variable is the count of misconduct cases per state-year and AICPA 
misconducts are a low-frequency events (Armitage and Moriarity, 2013), we report 
coefficient estimates based on Poisson regression models in addition to ordinary least 
squares (OLS) estimates. We find no evidence suggesting that the introduction of CPA 
Mobility is associated with deteriorating service quality. If anything, our results suggest 
an increase in service quality (i.e., a decline in misconduct cases). 
Second, we investigate whether the declines in pension plan audit fees reported in 
Section 1.4.7 are associated with pension plan audit-service quality deterioration. To 
investigate this possibility, we construct a sample of EBSA deficient filer enforcement 
cases using EBSA data. Deficient filers are plans that do not adhere to ERISA’s Form 
5500 annual reporting requirements and, therefore, provide a suitable sample to 
investigate potential pension plan audit-service quality effects. The sample construction 
details for our EBSA Deficient Filer Sample are presented in Appendix 1.B. In Table 1.8, 
Panel B, we present the results of this analysis, which are inconsistent with a negative 
effect of CPA Mobility on service quality. 
Third, following Vetter (2020), we collect CPA firm license and disciplinary 
action data for the population of CPA firms in the state of Colorado whose State Board 
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of Accountancy makes these data accessible for all its CPA firms. Combining disciplinary 
action and CPA firm license data allows us to estimate firm-level disciplinary action 
probabilities—as opposed to incident counts—which helps to address the concern that 
our previous service quality findings based on AICPA data could be driven by lack of 
statistical power. The sample construction details for our CPA Firm Disciplinary Action 
Sample are presented in Appendix 1.B.  
An inherent limitation of relying on data from one state only is, however, that we 
cannot compare firm-level disciplinary action probabilities across states.29 Nevertheless, 
as the competitive effects of CPA Mobility should entirely accrue to (and derive from) 
small CPA firms—as large CPA firms could already circumvent licensing barriers 
because of their national networks—we design empirical tests in which we estimate 
service quality deterioration effects on small CPA firms using large CPA firms as a 
control group. Moreover, because CPA firm-level data on size are not available, we 
assume that younger CPA firms are on average smaller than older CPA firms and 
operationalize CPA firm size by using age, which we gather via tracking entries to and 
exits from the profession.30  
In Panel C, we present the results of our tests assessing whether younger CPA 
firms experience a change in disciplinary actions compared to older CPA firms 
subsequent to the adoption of CPA Mobility provision in the state of Colorado. Using 
within state-year variation only—that is, holding constant state-level oversight regimes 
 
29 Relative comparisons are crucial for our quality analysis as State Boards of Accountancy frequently 
remove disciplinary action incidents after some years, which results in mechanical increases in (observed) 
disciplinary action incidents over time. 
30 We gauge the validity of this assumption by collecting additional data from the Census Business 
Dynamics Statistics program, which provides employment data disaggregated by firm age for professional 
services firms (Census Sector Code 70 “Professional Services”). Using firm age and firm size data based 
on the Census definition of firm age categories, we find a strong positive correlation between firm age and 
firm size. This strong positive correlation provides reassurance that CPA firm age is a sensible proxy for 
CPA firm size. 
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as well as related factors that may correlate with disciplinary action incidents—we 
document, again, no effect on service quality. 
In sum, across the different empirical approaches described above, we find no 
evidence suggesting that the introduction of CPA Mobility is associated with 
deteriorating service quality. We acknowledge, however, that we cannot observe service 
quality directly, but rather capture “extreme cases” of poor quality.31  
 
1.5 Conclusion 
In this paper, we explore the effects of removing spatial occupational licensing 
restrictions on the labor market for accounting professionals by exploiting the staggered 
introduction of CPA Mobility provisions in the United States. We document substantial 
wage declines subsequent to CPA Mobility. We find these effects to be persistent over 
time, to stem from small local CPA firms, and to be more pronounced for accounting 
professionals holding more senior positions. Furthermore, our analysis of service prices 
reveals sizable audit fee declines, which are only observable for small-sized local CPA 
firms. The increased wage and audit fee pressure does not seem to be accompanied by 
deteriorating service quality, however. 
Our study caters to the current regulatory debate on the potential costs resulting 
from spatial occupational licensing restrictions. Our findings may inform the ongoing 
debate within the public accounting profession and among the profession’s regulatory 
bodies on the desirability of further reforms regarding mobility provisions. More 
generally, they may be relevant to a broader audience considering reforms in a variety of 
occupations subject to licensing. For example, our results may prove helpful in guiding 
 
31 In addition, we cannot trace back the exact timing of the misconduct leading to AICPA or EBSA 
investigations. We address this shortcoming by re-estimating all models by lagging our policy indicators 
to allow for later manifestations of lower quality detection and find similar results (untabulated). 
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regulatory efforts to reform the licensing requirements for legal professionals as recently 
proposed by Winston and Karpilow (2016).  
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1.6 Appendix 1.A: Variable Definitions 
Variable Definition "#$,-./0(11/2/3*(-))  The pre-treatment difference between wages paid to accounting 
professionals in state s relative to the national average (Source: 
QCEW variable “avg_annual_pay”). We calculate "#$,-./0(11/2/3*(-))  in 2005, that is, before the first of our 
sample states adopts CPA Mobility. "#$456)&+5/3*0(11/2/3*(-))  The pre-treatment difference employed accounting professionals in 
state s relative to the national average (Source: QCEW variable 
“annual_avg_emplvl”). We calculate "#$456)&+5/3*0(11/2/3*(-))  in 2005, that is, before the first 
of our sample states adopts CPA Mobility. "#$,-./72/38)  Five-year accounting professional wage trends (Source: QCEW 
variable “avg_annual_pay”). Trends are calculated from 2000 to 
2005, that is, before the first of our sample states adopts CPA 
Mobility. "#$456)&+5/3*72/38)  Five-year accounting professional employment trends (Source: 
QCEW variable “avg_annual_pay”). Trends are calculated from 
2000 to 2005, that is, before the first of our sample states adopts 
CPA Mobility. "#$9&-28%/5'/2:)  The number of CPA members in public practice on the State Board 
of Accountancy in state s relative to the number of total board 
members (Source: Survey data of Colbert and Murray (2013)). ;&<-)"#$9&-28%/5'/2:)  The number of CPA members in public practice working in local 
(non-national) CPA firms relative to "#$9&-28%/5'/2:)  
(Source: Survey data of Colbert and Murray (2013)).  %&'()(*+7-:=>&2</)  An indicator variable equal to one if state s has a representative in 
the NASBA’s “Mobility Task Force,” and zero otherwise (Source: 
Hand collection from NASBA’s Annual Reports).  >?38(3.$?*&3&5+)  An indicator variable equal to one if the State Board of Accountancy 
in state s has funding autonomy (Source: Hand collection from State 
Board of Accountancy bylaws, state legislation, and survey data of 
Colbert and Murray (2013)). @3/56)&+5/3*),( Unemployment rate for state s in year t defined as total unemployment divided by the total labor force in state s in year t 
(Source: BLS LAUS). A0##/2"-6(*-),( Real GDP per Capita in state state s in year t (Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA)). >(259(2*ℎ),(	 The net number of new establishments in state s in year t (Source: Census Business Dynamics Statistics (BDS). D&'9(2*ℎ),(	 The net number of new jobs created in state s in year t (Source: Census BDS). E/3-*/0/5&<2-*:),(	 The share of democrats in the State Senate in state s in year t (Source: Hand collection from the Book of States Archive at the Council of 
State Governments). F&?:/0/5&<2-*:),(	 The share of democrats in the State House or Assembly in state s in year t (Source: Hand collection from the Book of States Archive at 
the Council of State Governments). 9()):G3*2&8?</8),(	 The number of bills introduced in state s in year t (Source: Hand collection from the Book of States Archive at the Council of State 
Governments). 9()):43-<*/8),( The number of bills enacted in state s in year t (Source: Hand 
collection from the Book of States Archive at the Council of State 
Governments). 
  
 52 
Appendix 1.A (continued) 
 ,-./),(-./0	 State-year annual wage mean in state s in year t (Source: QCEW 
variable name “avg_annual_pay”).  ;&.(,-./),(-./0) Natural logarithm of ,-./),(-./0. 456)&+5/3*),(-./0 Employment level for state s in year t (Source: QCEW variable name 
“annual_avg_emplvl”). ;&.(456)&+5/3*),(-./0) Natural logarithm of 456)&+5/3*),(-./0. "#$%&'()(*+),( An indicator variable switched on the year CPA Mobility becomes 
effective in state s and thereafter, and zero otherwise. Effective dates 
for each state are reported in Table 1.1. ,(*ℎ(3G55(.2-*(&3),(	 The ratio of American Community Survey (ACS) respondents in 
state s in year t indicating they moved to state s from another state 
within the United States (Source: ACS Public Use Microdata 
Samples).  $'2&-8G55(.2-*(&3),(	 The ratio of ACS respondents state s in year t indicating they moved 
to state s from abroad (Source: ACS Public Use Microdata Samples). !/(.ℎ'&2"#$%&'()(*+),(+,	 Employment weighted neighbor CPA Mobility adoption of state s. ,-./),(1213 State-year annual average wage in state s, firm size category j, and 
year t (Source: SUSB). ;&.(,-./),(1213) Natural logarithm of ,-./),4,(1213. 456)&+5/3*),(1213 Employment level in state s, firm size category j, and year t (Source: 
SUSB). ;&.(456)&+5/3*),(1213) Natural logarithm of 456)&+5/3*),4,(1213. $J.456)&+5/3*),(1213 Average employment per establishment in state s, firm size category 
j, and year t calculated as 456)&+5/3*),4,(1213 divided by >(25:),4,(1213(Source: SUSB). ;&.($J.456)&+5/3*),(1213) The natural logarithm of $J.456)&+5/3*),4,(1213. >(25:),(1213 The number of establishments in state s, firm size category j, and 
year t (Source: SUSB). ;&.(>(25:),(1213) The natural logarithm of >(25:),(1213. E5-))4  An indicator variable equal to one for firms with less than 20 
employees, and zero otherwise. "#$5  An indicator variable equal to one for CPA firms, and zero otherwise 
(NAICS code 541211). ,-./6,7,),(-./0 County-year annual wage mean in county c at border b located in 
state s in year t (Source: QCEW variable name “avg_annual_pay”). ;&.(,-./6,7,),(-./0) Natural logarithm of ,-./6,7,),(-./0. 456)&+5/3*6,7,),(-./0 Employment level in county c at border b located in state s in year t 
(Source: QCEW variable name “annual_avg_emplvl”). ;&.(456)&+5/3*6,7,),(-./0) Natural logarithm of 456)&+5/3*6,7,),(-./0. @3/56)&+5/3*6,7,),( Unemployment rate for county c at border b located in state s in year 
t defined as total unemployment divided by the total labor force in 
county c at border b located in state s in year t (Source: BLS LAUS). 
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Appendix 1.A (continued) 
 
Variable Definition ,-./8,(-./0 MSA-year average wage in MSA m and year t (Source: QCEW).  ;&.(,-./8,(-./0) Natural logarithm of ,-./8,(-./0. ∆;&.(,-./8,(-./0) First difference of ;&.(,-./8,(-./0). A0#6/2"-6(*-	8,( MSA-year average GDP per capita (Source: BEA). ;&.(A0#6/2"-6(*-	8,() Natural logarithm of A0#6/2"-6(*-	8,(. ∆;&.(A0#6/2"-6(*-	8,() First difference of ;&.(A0#6/2"-6(*-	8,(). #&:*$8&6*(&3(  An indicator variable equal to one after the last of our sample states 
adopts CPA Mobility provisions, and zero otherwise. L M∆;&.N,-./8,5,(-./0OP5,( The standard deviation of ∆;&.N,-./8,5,(-./0O calculated across MSAs for industry o in year t. GQR M∆;&.N,-./8,5,(-./0OP5,( The interquartile range of ∆;&.N,-./8,5,(-./0O calculated across MSAs for industry o in year t. L M;&.N,-./8,5,(-./0OP5,( The standard deviation of ;&.N,-./8,5,(-./0O calculated across MSAs for industry o in year t. GQR M;&.N,-./8,5,(-./0OP5,( The interquartile range of ;&.N,-./8,5,(-./0O calculated across MSAs for industry o in year t. ,-./),:;<= Survey-year average annual wage over all positions in state s in 
survey-year w. ;&.(,-./),:;<=) Natural logarithm of ,-./),:;<=. ,-./E/3(&2),:;<= Survey-year average annual wage for senior-level positions in state 
s in survey-year w. ,-./%(8),:;<= Survey-year average annual wage for mid-level positions in state s 
in survey-year w. ,-./D?3(&2),:;<= Survey-year average annual wage for junior-level positions in state 
s in survey-year w. 9())(3.R-*/),:;<= Survey-year average hourly billing rate for all positions in state s in 
survey-year w. 9())(3.R-*/E/3(&2),:;<= Survey-year average hourly billing rate for senior-level positions in 
state s in survey-year w. 9())(3.R-*/%(8),:;<= Survey-year average hourly billing rate for mid-level positions in 
state s in survey-year w. 9())(3.R-*/D?3(&2),:;<= Survey-year average hourly billing rate for junior-level positions in 
state s in survey-year w. F&?2:"ℎ-2./8),:;<= Survey-year average hours charged for all positions in state s in 
survey-year w. ;&.(F&?2:"ℎ-2./8),:;<=) Natural logarithm of F&?2:"ℎ-2./8),:;<=. F&?2:"ℎ-2./8E/3(&2),:;<= Survey-year average hours charged for senior-level positions in 
state s in survey-year w. F&?2:"ℎ-2./8%(8),:;<= Survey-year average hours charged for mid-level positions in state 
s in survey-year w. F&?2:"ℎ-2./8D?3(&2),:;<= Survey-year average hours charged for juniors-level positions in 
state s in survey-year w. 
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Appendix 1.A (continued) 
 
Variable Definition "#$%&'()(*+),:;<= Due to the biennial structure of the AICPA MAP Survey we have 
to align the effective dates with the survey-years. We move 
effective dates to the next year a survey-year is available. For 
instance, CPA Mobility became effective in Texas in 2007. We 
code "#$%&'()(*+),:;<= as equal to one for Texas in 2008 and 
thereafter, and zero otherwise. $?8(*>//:>,),( Audit Fees (Source: Form 5500 Schedule C). ;&.($?8(*>//:>,),() Natural logarithm of $?8(*>//:>,),(. ;&.($::/*:>,),() Natural logarithm of total plan assets (Source: Form 5500 Schedule 
H).  "&3*2('?*(&3:>,),( Total contributions divided by the total number of plan assets 
(Source: Form 5500 Schedule H). F-28*&-?8(*>,),( Assets invested in joint ventures and real estate divided by total plan 
assets (Source: Form 5500 Schedule H).  G3J/:*5/3*>//:>,),( Investment management fees divided by total plan assets (Source: 
Form 5500 Schedule H).  G3<&5/>,),( Plan income divided by total plan assets (Source: Form 5500 
Schedule H). "#$%&'()(*+?,),(+,@56?A<'BC(DCE8 An indicator variable equal to one if "#$%&'()(*+),( is switched on 
and the pension plan is audited by a local audit firm, and zero 
otherwise. We define national audit firms as firms that are not listed 
in Statista’s list of top-10 audit firms. "#$%&'()(*+?,),(+,F?(C5%?A<'BC(DCE8 An indicator variable equal to one if "#$%&'()(*+),( is switched on 
and the pension plan is audited by a national audit firm, and zero 
otherwise. We define national audit firms as firms that are listed in 
Statista’s list of top-10 audit firms. "-:/:),(<; Number of AICPA misconduct cases in state s in year t.  ,/(.ℎ*/8"-:/:),(<; Number of AICPA misconduct cases weighted by severity in state 
s in year t.  "-:/:),(/31< Number of EBSA Deficient Filer enforcement cases in state s in 
year t. ,/(.ℎ*/8"-:/:),(/31< Number of EBSA Deficient Filer enforcement cases weighted by 
severity in state s in year t. 0(:<(6)(3-2+$<*(&3C,( An indicator variable equal to one if CPA firm i is subject to a 
disciplinary action in year t (Source: Collection from Colorado’s 
State Board of Accountancy following the approach of Vetter 
(2020).  S&?3.>(25C  An indicator variable equal to one if firm i’s age is below the 
median firm age in 2007, and zero otherwise. 
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1.7 Appendix 1.B: Data and Samples 
1.B.1 QCEW State-Level Dataset 
We obtain state-year data from the BLS Quarterly Employment and Wage 
Statistics (QCEW) Annual Average Files (BLS QCEW Aggregation Level Code 58) 
based on the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) Code 541211 
(“Offices of Certified Public Accountants”).32 The NAICS-based disaggregation allows 
us to identify wages and employment in firms that fall under a definition that follows the 
UAA’s definition of CPA firms almost verbatim. QCEW data are based on 
unemployment insurance filings that every establishment is required to file for purposes 
of calculating payroll taxes related to unemployment insurance. Since 98% of all workers 
in the United States are covered by unemployment insurance, the QCEW program 
constitutes a near-census of employment and wages (Dube et al., 2010). We restrict 
QCEW state-level data to privately-owned establishments (QCEW Ownership Code 5). 
We obtain data for all states (and the District of Columbia) adopting CPA Mobility within 
our sample period from 2003 to 2017.  
We merge wage and employment QCEW program data with information on state-
level macroeconomic conditions. In particular, we obtain information on unemployment 
rates from the BLS Local Area Unemployment Statistics (LAUS) program and 
information on real GDP per capita from the Bureau of Economic Analysis’ Regional 
Economic Accounts program. Our immigration controls are based on the American 
Community Survey (ACS) Public Use Microdata Sample (PUMS). We merge these data 
sources for the years from 2003 to 2017. Our final QCEW State-Level Sample comprises 
720 state-year observations. All variables used in the QCEW State-Level Sample are 
 
32 For a recent study using this data source to examine audit markets, see Duguay et al. (2020). 
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denoted by the superscript QCEW. Variables are further denoted by the subscript s and t, 
where s indicates the respective state and t the year. 
We further augment this dataset with data for NAICS Code 541110 (“Offices of 
Lawyers”) following the steps we outline above.  
 
1.B.2 SUSB State-Level Dataset 
We obtain state-year data from the Census Statistics of U.S. Business (SUSB) 
program based on the NAICS Code 541211 (“Offices of Certified Public Accountants”). 
The NAICS-based disaggregation allows us to identify wages and employment in firms 
that fall under a definition that follows the UAA’s definition of CPA firms almost 
verbatim. We collect data for the aggregate firm size categories “<20 employees” and 
“20-99 employees.” We first obtain data for all states (and the District of Columbia) 
adopting CPA Mobility within our sample period for the years from 2007 to 2015, that 
is, the entire period for which SUSB data disaggregated by six-digit NAICS Codes are 
available. Then, we require availability of wage and employment data throughout the 
sample period for both firm size categories and merge these data with information on both 
state-level macro conditions and migrations patterns (as outlined in Section 1.B.1). Based 
on these sample selection criteria, our SUSB State-Level Sample comprises 369 state-year 
observations for each size category. All variables used in the SUSB State-Level Sample 
are denoted by the superscript SUSB. Variables are further denoted by the subscript s and 
t, where s indicates the respective state and t the year. 
We further augment this dataset with data for NAICS Code 541110 (“Offices of 
Lawyers”) following the steps we outline above.  
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1.B.3 QCEW Boarder-County Dataset 
We obtain county-year data from the BLS QCEW Annual Average Files (BLS 
QCEW Aggregation Level Code 78) based on the NAICS Code 541211 (“Offices of 
Certified Public Accountants”). These data cover all counties located in states (and the 
District of Columbia) adopting CPA Mobility within our sample period from 2003 to 
2017. We restrict QCEW county-level data to privately-owned establishments (QCEW 
Ownership Code 5). We further restrict QCEW county-level data to contiguous counties 
located in different states (border counties). Border counties are identified using the 
Census Bureau’s County Adjacency File. We follow Dube et al. (2010) and require 
availability of data for each county for the entire period from 2003 to 2017. In our QCEW 
state-level dataset, we do not have to impose such restrictions as data do not fall under 
BLS confidentiality and are disclosed for all states (and the District of Columbia). Since 
QCEW county-level data provide a significantly more detailed geographic disaggregation 
allowing for easier identification of the firms, employees, or self-employed, we face such 
disclosure restrictions in this sample.33 Finally, we restrict QCEW county-level data to 
border segments, where the two states forming the segment exhibit different effective 
policy implementation dates.  
Imposing the data availability screens outlined above, we construct a county-year 
panel of wage and employment information. We merge this panel with county-level 
unemployment rates to control for county-level time-varying macroeconomic conditions 
that may affect the outcome of interest. Unemployment rates are obtained from the BLS 
LAUS files. To identify individual border segments, we also merge this dataset with 
border segment information provided by Thomas Holmes.34 Thomas Holmes provides 
 
33 Detailed information on BLS confidentiality regulation and according disclosures are outlined at: 
https://www.bls.gov/bls/confidentiality.htm.  
34 The files are provided at: http://users.econ.umn.edu/~holmes/data/BorderData.html.  
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numerical identifiers for each border segment. A border segment is defined as the shared 
border between two states. Finally, we restrict the data to border segments with different 
treatment timings for the states forming the border segment. Our final QCEW Border-
County Sample comprises 3,285 county-year observations. All variables used in the 
QCEW Border-County Sample are denoted by the superscript QCEW. Variables are 
further denoted by the subscripts c and b, where c indicates the respective county and b 
the border. Furthermore, subscript s denotes the state in which each county is located and 
t denotes the respective year. 
 
1.B.4 QCWE MSA-Level Dataset 
We obtain annual Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) data from the BLS QCEW 
Annual Average Files (BLS QCEW Aggregation Level Code 48) based on the NAICS 
Code 541211 (“Offices of Certified Public Accountants”) and NAICS Code 541110 
(“Offices of Lawyers”). These data cover all MSAs. We restrict QCEW MSA-level data 
to privately-owned establishments (QCEW Ownership Code 5). Further, we collect data 
from 2002 to 2017 to obtain four-year estimation samples for the period before the first 
of our sample states adopts CPA Mobility (i.e., 2002-2005) and after the last of our 
sample states adopts CPA Mobility (i.e., 2014-2017). We then merge these data with 
MSA-level information on GDP per capita obtained from the BLS LAUS program. We 
further require MSA-industry-level data availability for at least five years. This yields our 
QCEW MSA-Level Sample comprising 2,536 observations. All variables used in the 
QCEW MSA-Level Sample are denoted by the superscript QCEW. Variables are further 
denoted by the subscript p, m, and t, where p indicates the industry, m the MSA, and t the 
year. 
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1.B.5 AICPA MAP Survey Dataset 
This dataset is based on the biennial American Institute of CPAs (AICPA) 
Management of an Accounting Practice (MAP) Survey. We obtain all available state-
level reports from the AICPA for the years, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012, and 
2014. We hand-collect wage information for each state for which we have at least 5 
survey waves available. We require data availability for wages, billing rates, and hours 
charged for all positions (senior-level, mid-level, and junior-level). We merge these data 
with CPA Mobility adoption dates. To account for the biennial structure of the survey, 
we move each effective policy implementation date to the respective next available 
survey year for cases where the implementation year and survey waves are not aligned. 
This procedure leads to our AICPA MAP Survey Sample which entails 129 observations. 
All variables used in the AICPA MAP Survey Sample are denoted by the superscript MAP. 
Variables are further denoted by subscripts s and w, where s indicates the respective state 
and w the survey-year. 
 
1.B.6 Private Pension Plan Audit Dataset   
This dataset is based on private pension plan data we hand-collect from the 
Employee Benefit Security Administration (EBSA) of the Department of Labor.35 We 
individually download every single file from EBSA. From these files, we select Form 
5500, Schedule C, and Schedule H. Schedule H contains plan-level financial information 
as well as the plan auditor. We identify plan auditors based on Employer Identification 
Numbers (EIN) provided on Schedule H. We then obtain audit fee information from 
Schedule C. Schedule C contains fee information for all service providers providing 
services to the respective pension plan. We merge the information from Schedules H and 
 
35 Private pension plan data are available at: https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ebsa/about-ebsa/our-
activities/public-disclosure/foia/form-5500-datasets.  
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C using a combination of EBSA filing identifiers and EINs to obtain plan-level audit fees. 
We merge by EIN numbers in addition to filing identifiers since pension plans have 
multiple service providers. Finally, we merge these data with Form 5500 data using 
EBSA filing identifiers to obtain plan-level information on plan administrators, which we 
require to assign our policy intervention variable. Finally, we limited the sample to plans 
that are subject to mandatory audits, that is, plans with 100 or more participants, and 
restrict the sample to “limited scope” audits to hold the underlying audit service constant. 
This procedure yields our Private Pension Plan Audit Sample. Variables based on this 
dataset are denoted by subscripts p, s, and t, where p indicates the plan, s the state the 
plan is located in, and t the year. 
 
1.B.7 AICPA Misconduct Dataset 
This dataset is based on AICPA misconduct cases as identified in Armitage and 
Moriarity (2016). We augment this information with hand-collected data from the AICPA 
website and, for earlier years, AICPA misconduct notifications from The CPA Letter. 
Misconduct notifications are part of the “Disciplinary Actions” sections of The CPA 
Letter. The CPA Letter issues for the years from 2003 to 2008 are available through the 
archives of the University of Mississippi. All variables in the AICPA Misconduct Sample 
are denoted by the superscript AM. Variables are further denoted by subscripts s and t, 
where s indicates the respective state and t the year. 
 
1.B.8 EBSA Deficient Filer Dataset 
This dataset is based on EBSA Enforcement Data provided by the Department of 
Labor.36 The original dataset consists of closed cases that resulted in penalty assessments 
 
36 The original EBSA enforcement files are available at: 
https://enforcedata.dol.gov/views/data_catalogs.php.  
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by EBSA since 2000. These data provide information on EBSA’s enforcement programs 
to enforce ERISA’s Form 5500 Annual Return/Report filing requirement focusing on 
deficient filers, late filers, and non-filers. We restrict the original data to cover the years 
from 2003 to 2015. This yields our EBSA Deficient Filer Sample. All variables in the 
EBSA Deficient Filer Sample are denoted by the superscript EBSA. Variables are further 
denoted by subscripts s and t, where s indicates the respective state and t the year. 
 
1.B.9 CPA Firm Disciplinary Action Dataset 
This dataset is based on CPA firm license data collected from the Colorado State 
Board of Accountancy (available at: 
https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/dora/Accountancy). We collect data on all CPA firm 
licenses along with disciplinary action filings from this website. CPA firm license data 
include information on the firm license issue and expiration dates, alongside information 
on addresses, as well as data on disciplinary actions brought forward against each CPA 
firm. We use data on firm license issue and exit dates to construct a panel of active CPA 
firms in Colorado during the period from 2003 to 2015. We require CPA firms to be 
active at least one year prior to Colorado’s CPA Mobility adoption in 2007. We then 
merge 247 disciplinary action incidents occurring in Colorado during our sample period 
with this CPA firm panel. This yields our CPA Firm Disciplinary Action Sample. All 
variables in the CPA Firm Disciplinary Action Sample are denoted by the superscript DA. 
Variables are further denoted by subscripts i and t, where i indicates CPA firm i and t the 
year. 
 
62 
Figure 1.1: Aggregate Supply and Supply Elasticity 
 
This figure shows the supply curves for two (exogenous) numbers of accounting professionals in the 
market, ! and !′, where ! < !′, based on our simple model presented in Section 1.2.3. In Panel A, we 
see that a market with !′ accountants exhibits lower wages as well as a more elastic (flatter) supply 
curve vis-à-vis a market with ! accountants. In Panel B, we visualize a supply elasticity effect of 
increasing ! to !′. An exogenous shock to demand from S∗ to S∗′ results in a larger change in wages 
when assuming a supply of ! accountants in the market, i.e., ∆VF > ∆VF!. 
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Figure 1.2: CPA Mobility Wage Effect in Event-Time 
Panel A: CPA Mobility Effect on Wages in Event-Time (All CPA Firms) 
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Figure 1.2 (continued) 
 
Panel B: CPA Mobility Effect on Wages in Event-Time (Small vs. Large CPA Firms) 
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Figure 1.2 (continued) 
 
Panel C: CPA Mobility Effects on Wages in Event-Time (Accounting Professionals vs. 
Legal Professionals) 
 
This figure reports the coefficients of ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions, which we use to investigate 
CPA Mobility effects on wages in event-time. This analysis is based on our QCEW State-Level Sample 
(Panels A and C) and SUSB State-Level Sample (Panel B). In Panel A, we estimate ;&.(,-./),(-./0) =Y"#$%&'()(*+),(+, + [′\),(+, +	]) +	^( + _),(, but replace the policy indicator variable with separate 
event-time dummies, each marking a period relative to the policy announcement (t=0). We omit the 
indicator for t-1, which serves as benchmark period and include a set of state-year control variables (\),(+,). 
In Panel B, we show event-time CPA Mobility effects on wages for accounting professionals in small CPA 
firms relative to wages for accounting professionals in large CPA firms. Formally, we estimate ;&.(,-./),4,(1213) = Y"#$%&'()(*+),(+, × E5-))4 +	]),4 +	^),( + 4^,( + _>,),(, but replace the policy 
indicator variable with separate event-time dummies, each marking a period relative to the policy 
announcement (t=0). We omit the indicator for t-1, which serves as benchmark period. In Panel C, we show 
the event-time CPA Mobility effects on wages for accounting professionals relative to legal professionals. 
Formally, we estimate ;&.(,-./),5,(-./0) = Y"#$%&'()(*+),(+, × "#$5 +	]),5 +	^),( + ^5,( + _5,),(, but 
replace the policy indicator variable with separate event-time dummies, each marking a period relative to 
the policy announcement (t=0). We omit the indicator for t-1, which serves as benchmark period. Vertical 
bands represent 95% confidence intervals for the point estimates in each event-time period and are 
calculated based on standard errors clustered at the state level. 
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Figure 1.3: Border-Counties with Non-Overlapping Treatment Dates 
 
This figure shows contiguous counties located at border segments with non-overlapping treatment dates of the states forming the border 
segment. 
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Figure 1.4: CPA Mobility and Wage Sensitivities to Local Economic Conditions 
Panel A: Wage Sensitivities of CPAs Before the First and After the Last CPA Mobility 
Adoption 
 
Panel B: Wage Sensitivities of Legal Professionals Before the First and After the Last 
CPA Mobility Adoption 
 
This figure plots the relation between changes in CPA wages and changes in GDP at the MSA-level for the 
period before the first of our sample states adopts CPA Mobility (i.e., 2002-2005) and after the last of our 
sample states adopts CPA Mobility (i.e., 2014-2017). In Panel A, we plot the relation between changes in 
CPA wages and changes in GDP while in Panel B, we plot the relation between changes in lawyer wages 
and changes in GDP. 
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Table 1.1: CPA Mobility Adoption Sequence and Adoption Determinants 
Panel A: CPA Mobility Adoption Dates 
State # State  Effective Date Enactment Date 
1 Wisconsin Apr-06 Apr-06 
2 Tennessee Apr-07 Apr-07 
3 Texas Jun-07 Jun-07 
4 Indiana Jul-07 May-07 
5 Rhode Island Jul-07 Jul-07 
6 Maine Sep-07 Jun-07 
7 Louisiana Dec-07 Dec-07 
8 Illinois Jan-08 Aug-07 
9 Minnesota Apr-08 Apr-08 
10 Missouri Apr-08 Jan-08 
11 Connecticut May-08 May-08 
12 New Mexico May-08 Feb-08 
13 Utah May-08 Mar-08 
14 Michigan Jun-08 Jun-08 
15 South Carolina Jun-08 Jun-08 
16 Washington Jun-08 Mar-08 
17 West Virginia Jun-08 Mar-08 
18 Idaho Jul-08 Mar-08 
19 Kentucky Jul-08 Apr-08 
20 Colorado Aug-08 May-08 
21 Delaware Aug-08 Aug-08 
22 Arizona Sep-08 Jun-08 
23 Pennsylvania Sep-08 Jul-08 
24 Maryland Oct-08 May-08 
25 Oklahoma Apr-09 Apr-09 
26 Oregon Jun-09 Jun-09 
27 Arkansas Jul-09 Feb-09 
28 Florida Jul-09 May-09 
29 Georgia Jul-09 Jun-08 
30 Iowa Jul-09 Apr-08 
31 Mississippi Jul-09 Mar-08 
32 Nevada Jul-09 Apr-09 
33 New Hampshire Jul-09 Jun-09 
34 New Jersey Jul-09 Jul-08 
35 North Carolina Jul-09 Jul-09 
36 South Dakota Jul-09 Mar-09 
37 Vermont Jul-09 May-09 
38 Wyoming Jul-09 Mar-09 
39 North Dakota Aug-09 Apr-08 
40 Alabama Oct-09 May-09 
41 Montana Oct-09 Apr-09 
42 Kansas Nov-09 Mar-09 
43 Nebraska Sep-10 Feb-09 
44 Alaska Jan-11 Apr-10 
45 Massachusetts Jun-11 Jan-10 
46 New York Nov-11 Sep-11 
47 District of Columbia Oct-12 Oct-12 
48 California Jul-13 Sep-12 
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Table 1.1 (continued) 
Panel B: Determinants of CPA Mobility Adoption 
 Dependent variable: !"#$%&'(')*#+%,)'%- 
Independent Variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
CPA Macro Factors:      		!"#/0123'44252-)'0(!  0.731    0.350  (0.474)    (0.494) 		!"#67,(%*72-)3'44252-)'0(!  0.942    0.832  (0.129)    (0.175) 		!"#/012852-+!  0.367    0.130  (0.809)    (0.447) 		!"#67,(%*72-)852-+!  0.247    0.324  (0.286)    (0.547) 
CPA Political Economy:      		!"#9%05+$27&25:!   0.678   0.599   (0.418)   (0.656) 		;%<0(!"#9%05+$27&25:!   0.530   0.337**   (0.235)   (0.166) 		$%&'(')*80:=>%5<2!   2.432**   2.356*   (0.900)   (1.066) 		>?-+'-1#?)%-%7*!   0.878   0.677   (0.285)   (0.244) 
General Macro Factors:      		@-27,(%*72-)!,#$%   0.842  0.848    (0.153)  (0.133) 		A3",25!0,')0!,#$%   1.000  1.000    (0.000)  (0.000) 		>'579'5)ℎ!,#$%   2.612  0.000    (27.536)  (0.004) 		C%&9'5)ℎ!,#$%   0.914  0.847 
   (0.121)  (0.143) 
General Political Economy:      		D2-0)2327%<50):!,#$%    0.756 0.312     (1.163) (0.604) 		E%?:2327%<50):!,#$%    0.386 1.215     (0.723) (2.720) 		9'((:F-)5%+?<2+!,#$%    1.174 1.193     (0.116) (0.178) 		9'((:6-0<)2+!,#$%    1.080 1.248     (0.174) (0.329) 
Observations      272      272      272      272      272 
Pseudo R2 0.005 0.016 0.005 0.016 0.046 
This table reports CPA Mobility adoption dates as well as our analysis of adoption date determinants. Panel 
A reports the enactment and effective dates of CPA Mobility provisions obtained from the AICPA and the 
NASBA. States and the District of Columbia are ordered by effective dates. We present enactment and 
effective dates for all states adopting CPA Mobility provisions during our sample period from 2003 to 2017. 
Panel B reports the results of a Cox discrete time proportional hazard model analyzing the hazard of a state 
adopting CPA Mobility. We report hazard ratios and (in parentheses) standard errors. States are excluded 
from the sample after they adopt CPA Mobility. Detailed definitions of all variables are presented in 
Appendix 1.A. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. ***, **, and * denotes statistical significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
.
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Table 1.2: State-Level Mobility Effect on Wages 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics for the QCEW State-Level Sample 
 Obs. Mean S.D. P1 P25 P50 P75 P99 /012!,#&'() 720 63,514 17,755 36,795 51,009 60,390 71,830 123,469 ;%1(/012!,#&'()) 720 11.025 0.257 10.513 10.840 11.009 11.182 11.724 67,(%*72-)!,#&'() 720 7,984 10,203 552 1,669 4,480 8,577 48,325 ;%1(67,(%*72-)!,#&'()) 720 8.366 1.116 6.314 7.419 8.407 9.057 10.786 @-27,(%*72-)!,#$% 720 6.065 1.995 2.900 4.600 5.650 7.200 11.300 A3""25!0,')0!,#$% 720 51,928 20,415 33,395 42,373 47,637 55,519 175,653 /')ℎ'-F77'150)'%-!,#$% 720 0.027 0.012 0.011 0.020 0.025 0.032 0.082 #&5%0+F77'150)'%-!,#$% 720 0.004 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.004 0.006 0.014 
 
Panel B: CPA Mobility Effect on Wages 
 Dependent variable: ;%1(/012!,#&'()) 
Independent 
variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 		!"#$%&'(')*!,#$% -0.011** -0.011** -0.011** -0.011** -0.012** -0.010*  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
Macro Controls:       		@-27,(%*72-)!,#$%  -0.000    0.003   (0.002)    (0.002) 		A3",25!0,')0!,#$%   0.000**   0.000** 
   (0.000)   (0.000) 
Migration Controls:       		/')ℎ'-F77'150)'%-!,#$%    0.873  0.443 
    (1.106)  (1.085) 		#&5%0+F77'150)'%-!,#$%     2.413 0.415 
     (3.319) (2.989) 
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. .720 .720 .720 720 .720 .720 
Adj. R2 0.988 0.988 0.988 0.988 0.988 0.988 
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Table 1.2 (continued) 
 
Panel C: CPA Mobility Effect on Employment: 
 Dependent variable: ;%1(67,(%*72-)!,#&'()) 
Independent 
variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 		!"#$%&'(')*!,#$% -0.005 -0.004 0.004 -0.004 -0.006 0.001  (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) 
Macro Controls:       		@-27,(%*72-)!,#$%  -0.017***    -0.010**   (0.006)    (0.005) 		A3",25!0,')0!,#$%   0.000***   0.000** 
   (0.000)   (0.000) 
Migration Controls:       		/')ℎ'-F77'150)'%-!,#$%    1.707  -0.354 
    (2.057)  (1.584) 		#&5%0+F77'150)'%-!,#$%     8.171 6.277 
     (4.991) (4.012) 
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. .720 .720 .720 720 .720 .720 
Adj. R2 0.997 0.997 0.997 0.997 0.997 0.998 
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Table 1.2 (continued) 
 
Panel D: Neighbor CPA Mobility Effect 
 Dependent variable: !"#(%&#'!,#$%&') 
Independent variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) )*+,"-./.01!,#() -0.010**  -0.009*  -0.010**  -0.009*   (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.005)  2'.#ℎ-"4)*+,"-./.01!,#() -0.011 -0.012 -0.012 -0.014 -0.011 -0.012 -0.012 -0.014  (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) 
Macro Controls No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Migration Controls No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. .720 .720 .720 .720 .720 .720 .720 .720 
Adj. R2 0.988 0.987 0.988 0.988 0.988 0.987 0.988 0.988 
This table presents the results of our state-level difference-in-differences (DiD) analysis of CPA Mobility effects on CPA wages and employment, which is based on the QCEW 
State-Level Sample. Panel A presents summary statistics for all variables. Detailed definitions for all variables and sample selection criteria are presented in Appendices 1.A 
and 1.B, respectively. Panel B documents the effect of CPA Mobility on wages. The reported coefficients and (in parentheses) standard errors are obtained from weighted least 
squares (WLS) regressions of !"#(%&#'!,#$%&') on )*+,"-./.01!,#() and control variables, as indicated in each column. Regressions are weighted by state-year employment 
shares. State-year employment shares are defined as 567/"16'80!,#$%&' divided by the sum of all 567/"16'80!,#$%&'  in year t. Panel C documents the effect of CPA Mobility 
on employment. The reported coefficients and (in parentheses) standard errors are obtained from ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions of !"#(567/"16'80!,#$%&') on )*+,"-./.01!,#() and control variables, as indicated in each column. Panel D presents results of the analysis that examines the effect of regional CPA Mobility adoption 
patterns on wages. 2'.#ℎ-"4)*+,"-./.01!,#() is defined as the average treatment variable of neighbors weighed by the number of employees. Standard errors are clustered 
at the state level. ***, **, and * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 1.3: Difference-in-Difference-in-Differences Analysis of CPA Mobility Effects on Wages 
Panel A: Within-State Control Group – Firm Size 
 Dependent variables: 
 !"#(%&#'!,*,#+,+-) !"#(567/"16'80!,*,#+,+-) !"#(+9#567/"16'80!,*,#+,+-) !"#(:.46;!,*,#+,+-) 
Independent variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) )*+,"-./.01!,#()´<6&//* -0.019** -0.015 0.012 -0.016 
 (0.008) (0.027) (0.014) (0.027) 
State ´ Year FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State ´ Firm Size FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Size ´ Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 738 738 738 738 
Adj. R2 0.997 0.992 0.997 0.997 
 
Panel B: Within-State Control Group – Legal Professionals 
 Dependent variables: 
 !"#(%&#'!,.,#$%&') !"#(567/"16'80!,.,#$%&') !"#(+9#567/"16'80!,.,#$%&') !"#(:.46;!,.,#$%&') 
Independent variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) )*+,"-./.01!,#()´)*+.  -0.009** -0.016 0.003 -0.004 
 (0.004) (0.015) (0.014) (0.006) 
State ´ Year FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State ´ Profession FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Profession ´ Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 1,440 1,440 1,440 1,440 
Adj. R2 0.991 0.998 0.975 0.999 
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Table 1.3 (continued) 
 
Panel C: Within-State Control Group – Firm Size and Legal Professionals 
 Dependent variables: 
 !"#(%&#'!,*,.,#+,+-) !"#(567/"16'80!,*,.,#+,+- ) !"#(+9#567/"16'80!,*,.,#+,+- ) !"#(:.46;!,*,.,#+,+-) 
Independent variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) )*+,"-./.01!,#()´<6&//*´)*+.  -0.014* -0.020 0.016 -0.027 
 (0.007) (0.036) (0.017) (0.035) 
State ´ Year ´ Firm Size FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State ´ Year ´ Profession FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State ´ Firm Size ´ Profession FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Size ´ Profession ´ Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 
Adj. R2 0.998 0.999 0.999 0.997 
This table presents the results of our state-level difference-in-difference-in-differences (DiDiD) analysis of CPA Mobility effects in which we use within-state control groups. 
Test results presented in Panels A and C (Panel B) are based on our SUSB State-Level Sample (QCEW State-Level Sample). Detailed definitions for all variables and sample 
selection criteria are presented in Appendices 1.A and 1.B, respectively. We present summary statistics for each control group in Table 1.OA-1. In Panel A, the reported 
coefficients and (in parentheses) standard errors are obtained from weighted least squares (WLS) regressions (Columns (1) and (3)) and OLS regressions (Columns (2) and (4)) 
of the respective dependent variable on )*+,"-./.01!,#() × <6&//*  and control variables, as indicated in each column. The regression reported in Column (1) is weighted by 
state-year employment shares. State-year employment shares are defined as 567/"16'80!,#$%&' divided by the sum of all 567/"16'80!,#$%&'  in year t. The regression reported 
in Column (3) is weighted by state-year firm shares. State-year firm shares are defined as :.46;!,*,#+,+- divided by the sum of all :.46;!,*,#+,+-  in year t. In Panel B, the reported 
coefficients and (in parentheses) standard errors are obtained from weighted least squares (WLS) regressions (Columns (1) and (3)) and OLS regressions (Columns (2) and (4)) 
of the respective dependent variable on )*+,"-./.01!,#()´)*+.  and control variables, as indicated in each column. The regression reported in Column (1) is weighted by 
state-year employment shares. The regression reported in Column (3) is weighted by state-year firm shares. In Panel C, the reported coefficients and (in parentheses) standard 
errors are obtained from weighted least squares (WLS) regressions (Columns (1) and (3)) and ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions (Columns (2) and (4)) of the respective 
dependent variable on )*+,"-./.01!,#()´<6&//*´)*+.  and control variables, as indicated in each column. The regression reported in Column (1) is weighted by state-year 
employment shares. The regression reported in Column (3) is weighted by state-year firm shares. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. ***, **, and * denotes statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 1.4: Border-County Analysis 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics for the QCEW Border-County Sample 
 Obs. Mean Std. Dev. P1 P25 P50 P75 P99 %&#'/,0,!,#$%&'  3,285 51,563 18,593 22,415 38,724 48,123 60,785 113,276 !"#(%&#')/,0,!,#$%&' 3,285 10.791 0.343 10.017 10.564 10.782 11.015 11.638 567/"16'80/,0,!,#$%&' 3,285 565 2,274 9 40 91 314 11,914 !"#(567/"16'80/,0,!,#$%&') 3,285 4.800 1.483 2.197 3.689 4.511 5.749 9.385 >8'67/"16'80/,0,!,#() 3,285 6.424 2.565 2.600 4.600 5.900 7.700 14.700 ?@**'4)&7.0&!,#() 3,285 50,800 12,424 33,616 43,962 48,534 56,847 74,031 %.0ℎ.8A66.#4&0."8!,#() 3,285 0.023 0.009 0.011 0.016 0.022 0.029 0.054 +-4"&BA66.#4&0."8!,#() 3,285 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.004 0.005 0.008 
 
Panel B: CPA Mobility Effects on Wages and Employment 
 Dependent variables: 
 !"#(%&#'/,0,!,#$%&')  	!"#(567/"16'80/,0,!,#$%&') 
Independent variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) )*+,"-./.01!,#() -0.015** -0.014** -0.013*** -0.014**  0.007 0.009 0.012 0.011  (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006)  (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Macro Controls No Yes No Yes  No Yes No Yes 
Migration Controls No No Yes Yes  No No Yes Yes 
County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Border ´ Year FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs.      3,285      3,285      3,285      3,285   3,285 3,285 3,285 3,285 
Adj. R2 0.981 0.981 0.983 0.983  0.989 0.989 0.989 0.989 
This table presents summary statistics and the results of our border-county analysis, which is based on the QCEW Border-County Sample. Detailed definitions for all variables 
and sample selection criteria are presented in Appendices 1.A and 1.B, respectively. Panel A shows the descriptive statistics for all variables used in our border-county analysis. 
In Panel B, reported coefficients and (in parentheses) standard errors are from weighted least squares (WLS) regressions of !"#(%&#'/,0,!,#$%&') and ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regressions of !"#(567/"16'80/,0,!,#$%&') on )*+,"-./.01!,#() and control variables, as indicated in each column. Regressions in Columns (1) to (4) are weighted by county-
year employment shares. Employment shares are defined as 567/"16'80/,0,!,#$%&' divided by the sum of all 567/"16'80/,0,!,#$%&'  in year t. Macro Controls includes both 
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>8'67/"16'80!,#(), as well as ?@*7'4)&7.0&!,#(). Migration Controls includes both %.0ℎ.8A66.#4&0."8!,#(), as well as +-4"&BA66.#4&0."8!,#(). Standard errors are 
clustered at the state level. ***, **, and * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 1.5: CPA Mobility Effect on Wage Sensitivities to Local Economic 
Conditions 
Panel A: CPA Mobility and Wage Sensitivities to Local Economic Conditions 
 Dependent variable: ∆"#$(&'$(!,#$%&') 
 Accounting Professionals Legal Professionals 
Independent variables: (1) (2) *#+,-.#/,0#1#  -0.005 -0.004** 
 (0.004) (0.002) ∆"#$234*/(56'/0,'!,#7 0.214* 0.177*** 
 (0.118) (0.063) *#+,-.#/,0#1#× ∆"#$(34*/(56'/0,'!,#) -0.189* -0.023 
 (0.102) (0.090) 
   
Test for Difference in:*#+,-.#/,0#1# × ∆"#$(34*/(56'/0,'!,#)  9(-test [p-value]: 6*-+ = "';<(5+ [0.215] 
Obs.                1,524                 1,012 
Adj. R2 0.023 0.028 
 
Panel B: CPA Mobility and Wage Volatility 
 Dependent variables: 
 = >∆"#$2&'$(!,),#$%&'7?),# @AB >∆"#$2&'$(!,),#$%&'7?),# 
Independent variables: (1) (2) *#+,-.#/,0#1#  -0.006** 0.000 
 (0.002) (0.005) 6*-)  0.013** 0.018** 
 (0.006) (0.006) *#+,-.#/,0#1# × 6*-)  -0.013* -0.017** 
 (0.006) (0.007) 
Obs.  16       16 
Adj. R2 0.581 0.437 
 
Panel C: CPA Mobility and Wage Convergence 
 Dependent variables: 
 = >"#$2&'$(!,),#$%&'7?),# @AB >"#$2&'$(!,),#$%&'7?),# 
Independent variables: (1) (2) *#+,-.#/,0#1#  0.024*** 0.129*** 
 (0.004) (0.014) 6*-)  0.008** 0.040 
 (0.003) (0.030) *#+,-.#/,0#1# × 6*-)  -0.036*** -0.146*** 
 (0.005) (0.032) 
Obs.   16 16 
Adj. R2 0.796 0.683 
This table presents the results of our analysis assessing the effects of CPA Mobility on wage sensitivities 
to local economic conditions, wage (growth) volatility, and wage convergence. Test results are based on 
our QCEW MSA-Level Sample. Detailed definitions for all variables and sample selection criteria are 
presented in Appendices 1.A and 1.B, respectively. We present summary statistics in Table 1.OA-1, Panel 
D. Panel A documents wage sensitivities for CPAs and Lawyers for the period before the first of our sample 
states adopts CPA Mobility (i.e., 2002-2005) and after the last of our sample states adopts CPA Mobility 
 78 
(i.e., 2014-2017). The reported coefficients and (in parentheses) standard errors are from weighted least 
squares (WLS) regressions of ∆"#$2&'$(!,#$%&'7 on the interaction term *#+,-.#/,0#1# ×∆"#$(34*/(56'/0,'!,#), as well as control variables, as indicated in each column. Regressions are 
weighted by MSA-year employment shares. Standard errors are clustered at the MSA level. We report the 
p-value from a 9(-test for the difference in the interaction term across the accounting professionals and 
legal professionals partitions. Panel B documents the effect of CPA Mobility on wage growth volatility. 
The reported coefficients and (in parentheses) standard errors are from ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regressions of = >∆"#$2&'$(!,),#$%&'7?),# or @AB >∆"#$2&'$(!,),#$%&'7?),#on the interaction term *#+,-.#/,0#1# × 6*-)  and control variables, as indicated in each column. We report robust standard 
errors. Panel C documents the effect of CPA Mobility on wage convergence. The reported coefficients and 
(in parentheses) standard errors are from ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions of = >"#$2&'$(!,),#$%&'7?),# or @AB >"#$2&'$(!,),#$%&'7?),#on the interaction term 6*-) × *#+,-.#/,0#1#  
and control variables, as indicated in each column. We report robust standard errors. ***, **, and * denotes 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 1.6: CPA Mobility and Wage Dispersion 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics for the AICPA MAP Survey Sample 
 Obs. Mean Std. Dev. P25 P50 P75 !"#$!,#$%&  129 85,039 11,983 75,767 83,824 92,937 %&#(!"#$!,#$%&) 129 11.341 0.139 11.235 11.336 11.440 !"#$)$*+&,!,#$%&  129 173,252 29,374 154,058 170,241 186,174 !"#$-+.!,#$%&  129 77,994 14,752 66,114 76,591 87,769 !"#$/0*+&,!,#$%&  129 47,798 5,637 43,057 48,233 51,175 1+22+*#3"4$!,#$%&  129 129 20 114 128 141 1+22+*#3"4$)$*+&,!,#$%&  129 172 24 155 172 185 1+22+*#3"4$-+.!,#$%&  129 139 27 118 137 158 1+22+*#3"4$/0*+&,!,#$%&  129 94 13 85 95 103 5&0,67ℎ",#$.!,#$%&  129 1,422 64 1,381 1,421 1,464 %&#(5&0,67ℎ",#$.!,#$%&) 129 7.259 0.045 7.231 7.259 7.289 5&0,67ℎ",#$.)$*+&,!,#$%&  129 1,288 95 1,228 1,289 1,350 5&0,67ℎ",#$.-+.!,#$%&  129 1,422 86 1,377 1,423 1,472 5&0,67ℎ",#$./0*+&,!,#$%& 129 1,491 70 1,438 1,497 1,541 
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Table 1.6 (continued) 
 
Panel B: Effects on Wages, Billing Rates, and Hours Charged 
 Dependent variables: 
  %&#(!"#$!,#$%&) 1+22+*#3"4$!,#$%& %&#(5&0,67ℎ",#$.!,#$%&) 
Independent variables: (1) (2) (3) 79:-&;+2+4<!,#$%& -0.034* -5.188*** 0.001  (0.019) (1.300) (0.008) 
State FE Yes Yes  Yes  
Year FE Yes Yes  Yes  
Obs. 129 129 129 
Adj. R2 0.848 0.928 0.616 
 
Panel C: Differential Effects on Compensation 
 Dependent variables: 
  %&# ='()*+*,-./!,#$%&'()*01,-./!,#$%&>  %&# ='()*+*,-./!,#$%&'()*$-2!,#$%& >  %&# = '()*$-2!,#$%&'()*01,-./!,#$%&> 
Independent variables: (1) (2) (3) 79:-&;+2+4<!,#$%& -0.059** -0.074** 0.015  (0.028) (0.033) (0.028) 
State FE Yes Yes  Yes  
Year FE Yes Yes  Yes  
Obs. 129 129 129 
Adj. R2 0.407 0.619 0.525 
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Table 1.6 (continued) 
 
Panel D: Differential Effects on Billing Rates 
 Dependent variables: 
  %&# =3-44-,)5(6*+*,-./!,#$%&3-44-,)5(6*01,-./!,#$%&>  %&# =3-44-,)5(6*+*,-./!,#$%&3-44-,)5(6*$-2!,#$%& >  %&# = 3-44-,)5(6*$-2!,#$%&3-44-,)5(6*01,-./!,#$%&> 
Independent variables: (1) (2) (3) 79:-&;+2+4<!,#$%& -0.037* -0.011 -0.026**  (0.018) (0.020) (0.011) 
State FE Yes Yes  Yes  
Year FE Yes Yes  Yes  
Obs. 129 129  129 
Adj. R2 0.519 0.711 0.636 
 
Panel E: Differential Effects on Hours Charged 
 Dependent variables: 
  %&# =7.1/!89(/)*2+*,-./!,#$%&7.1/!89(/)*201,-./!,#$%&>  %&# =7.1/!89(/)*2+*,-./!,#$%&7.1/!89(/)*2$-2!,#$%& >  %&# = 7.1/!89(/)*2$-2!,#$%&7.1/!89(/)*201,-./!,#$%&> 
Independent variables: (1) (2) (3) 79:-&;+2+4<!,#$%& 0.024 0.033 -0.009  (0.015) (0.019) (0.011) 
State FE Yes Yes  Yes  
Year FE Yes Yes  Yes  
Obs. 129 129 129 
Adj. R2 0.483 0.369 0.237 
This table presents our analyses based on the AICPA MAP Survey Sample. Detailed definitions for all variables and sample selection criteria are presented in Appendices 1.A 
and 1.B, respectively. Panel A presents the summary statistics of all variable used in this analysis. In Panel B, we present estimates of our analysis examining the effect of CPA 
Mobility on wages, billing rates, and hours charged. In Panel C, we examine the differential effect of CPA Mobility across seniority levels on wages. In Panel D, we examine 
the differential effect of CPA Mobility across seniority levels on billing rates. In Panel E, we examine the differential effect of CPA Mobility across seniority levels on hours 
charged. Reported coefficients and (in parentheses) standard errors are from weighted least squares regressions. Regressions are weighted by the number of responding firms 
in state s in survey-year w. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. ***, **, and * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 1.7: CPA Mobility Effect on Service Prices 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics for the Private Pension Plan Audit Sample 
 Obs. Mean S.D. P1 P25 P50 P75 P99 !"#$%&''(!,#,$ 30,501 17,243 17,332 4,590 8,088 12,000 19,304 96,706 )*+(!"#$%&''(!,#,$) 30,501 9.493 0.658 8.432 8.998 9.393 9.868 11.479 ./%$*0/1&$23!,#,$ 30,501 0.277 0.447 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 4*0%2$5"%$*0(!,#,$ 30,501 0.050 0.206 -0.935 -0.012 0.068 0.148 0.555 607*3'!,#,$ 30,501 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 8/2#%*/"#$%!,#,$ 30,501 0.007 0.034 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.212 )*+(!(('%(!,#,$) 30,501 0.273 1.459 0.000 0.038 0.077 0.126 5.656 609'(%3'0%&''(!,#,$ 30,501 17.090 1.790 13.249 15.831 16.939 18.256 21.736 :/2%$7$;/0%(!,#,$ 30,501 0.002 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.003 0.013 
 
Panel B: CPA Mobility Effect on Pension Plan Audit Fees 
 Dependent variable: )*+(!"#$%&''(!,%,#,$) 
Independent variables: (1) (2) 4:!<*5$1$%=#,$&' -0.017*   (0.010)  4:!<*5$1$%=%,#,$&'()*%+,-./$0/12  -0.022**   (0.010) 4:!<*5$1$%=%,#,$&'3%$/)4%+,-./$0/12  -0.009   (0.032) 4*0%2$5"%$*0(!,#,$ 0.051*** 0.051*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) 607*3'!,#,$ -0.158*** -0.157*** 
 (0.031) (0.031) 8/2#%*/"#$%!,#,$ 0.480** 0.453* 
 (0.226) (0.225) )*+(!(('%(!,#,$) 0.137*** 0.136*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) 609'(%3'0%&''(!,#,$ 11.851*** 11.448*** 
 (2.967) (3.083) :/2%$7$;/0%(!,#,$ 16.553** 16.027** 
 (6.646) (6.472) 
   
Test for Difference in 4:!<*5$1$%=#,$&'   
F-test [p-value]: )*7/1!"#$%&$23 = ./%$*0/1!"#$%&$23 [0.092] 
State ´ Audit Firm Type FE Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes No 
Audit Firm Type ´ Year FE No Yes 
Obs.                 30,501                 30,501 
Adj. R2 0.544 0.547 
This table presents the results of our analysis assessing the effect of CPA Mobility on service prices. Panel 
A presents summary statistics. Detailed definitions for all variables and sample selection criteria are 
presented in Appendices 1.A and 1.B, respectively. Continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th 
percentile. Panel B documents the effect of CPA Mobility on pension plan audits fees. The reported 
coefficients and (in parentheses) standard errors are from ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions of )*+(!"#$%&''(!,#,$) on 4:!<*5$1$%=#,$&', or 4:!<*5$1$%=#,$&'()*%+0/12 and 4:!<*5$1$%=#,$&'3%$/)4%+0/12, and 
control variables, as indicated in each column. We report the p-value from an F-test for the difference 
between the coefficients on 4:!<*5$1$%=#,$&'()*%+0/12 and 4:!<*5$1$%=#,$&'3%$/)4%+0/12. Standard errors are 
clustered at the state level. ***, **, and * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. 
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Table 1.8: CPA Mobility and Service Quality 
Panel A: CPA Mobility and AICPA Misconduct Cases 
 Dependent variables: 
 !"#$#!,#$%  %$&'ℎ)$*!"#$#!,#$% 
 OLS OLS Poisson Poisson  OLS OLS Poisson Poisson 
Independent variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) !+,-./&0&)1!,#&' -1.320*** -0.071 -0.764** 0.024  -3.434*** -0.450 -0.790*** -0.028 
 (0.482) (0.347) (0.305) (0.221)  (1.168) (0.817) (0.288) (0.242) 
State FE No Yes No Yes  No Yes No Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 585 585 585 585  585 585 585 585 
Adj. R2 / Pseudo R2  0.008 0.588 0.026 0.419  0.007 0.611 0.029 0.505 
 
Panel B: CPA Mobility and EBSA Deficient Filer Enforcement Cases 
 Dependent variables: 
 !"#$#!,#()*$  %$&'ℎ)$*!"#$#!,#()*$ 
 OLS OLS Poisson Poisson  OLS OLS Poisson Poisson 
Independent variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) !+,-./&0&)1!,#&' -6.150 -1.139 -0.948*** -0.029  -9.336 -1.165 -0.913*** -0.005 
 (4.599) (0.834) (0.308) (0.063)  (6.926) (1.053) (0.308) (0.079) 
State FE No Yes No Yes  No Yes No Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 624 624 624 624  624 624 624 624 
Adj. R2 / Pseudo R2 0.110 0.666 0.188 0.694  0.109 0.640 0.207 0.740 
. 
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Table 1.8 (continued) 
Panel C: CPA Mobility and Disciplinary Actions 
 Dependent variable: !"#$"%&"'()*+$,"-'!,#$% 
Independent variables: (1) (2) ./+0-1"&",*#&'()*)+,-) × 3-4'5./+6")7!  -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
Firm Age FE  Yes No 
Firm FE No Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Obs.                13,401                13,401 
Adj. R2 0.006 0.012 
This table presents the results of our analysis assessing the effect of CPA Mobility on service quality. 
Detailed definitions for all variables and sample selection criteria are presented in Appendices 1.A and 1.B, 
respectively. In Panel A, we report coefficient estimates and standard errors (in parentheses) from ordinary 
least squares (OLS) regressions as well as coefficient estimates and standard errors (in parentheses) from 
Poisson regressions of AICPA Misconduct Cases on ./+0-1"&",*.,#&' and control variables, as indicated 
in each column. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. In Panel B, we report coefficient estimates 
and standard errors (in parentheses) from ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions as well as coefficient 
estimates and standard errors (in parentheses) from Poisson regressions of EBSA Deficient Filer 
Enforcement Cases on ./+0-1"&",*.,#&' and control variables, as indicated in each column. Standard 
errors are clustered at the state level. In Panel C, we report coefficients estimates and standard errors (in 
parentheses) from ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions of Disciplinary Action Incidents on ./+0-1"&",*()*)+,-),!,#&' × 3-4'5./+6")7!  and control variables, as indicated in each column. 
Standard errors are clustered at the CPA firm level. ***, **, and * denotes statistical significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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1.8  Online Appendix 
1.8.1  Big 4 Firm Sample Representation 
In this section, we provide details on our triangulation strategy through which we 
assess whether Big 4 firms are part of our QCEW State-Level Sample and/or our AICPA 
MAP Survey Sample as discussed in Section 1.4.6.  
First, we assess whether Big 4 firms are part of our QCEW State-Level Sample. 
Our QCEW State-Level Sample is based on data disaggregated by industry. The QCEW 
program assigns industries based on questionnaires.37 While these questionnaires are not 
accessible, which prevents us from directly identifying the industry assignment of Big 4 
firms used by government programs, we triangulate the industry assignment of Big 4 
firms using Census County Business Pattern (CBP) program data. These data provide 
establishment counts at the ZIP code level (for different size classes) and utilize the same 
industry classification as our QCEW program data. We use CBP data to identify ZIP 
codes in which we observe only small CPA firm establishments (10 employees or less) 
and one large CPA firm establishment. We then conduct searches of CPA firm licenses 
for the respective ZIP code using the CPA license lookup function of the State Board of 
Accountancy the respective ZIP code belongs to.  
To give an example, we start with the CBP data and search for ZIP Codes that have 
fewer than 10 CPA firms, of which there is one large firm (more than 500 employees) 
and, other than that, only small CPA firms (fewer than 20 employees). One of these ZIP 
Codes is “44133” in Ohio. This ZIP Code shows six CPA firms, of which five have fewer 
than 20 employees and one has 500 to 999 employees. We take this ZIP Code to the Ohio 
State Board of Accountancy and use its “License Lookup Function” to search for all CPA 
firms in this ZIP Code. The search result is shown below: 
 
37 For detailed information on the BLS industry assignments, see: https://www.bls.gov/cew/cewover.htm 
#Coverage. 
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We web search for each of these firms, which suggests that all firms in this ZIP 
Code are indeed small-sized local audit-service providers, the exception being Ernst and 
Young. Ernst and Young is likely to be the one firm in this ZIP Code with 500 to 999 
employees. Specifically, Ernst & Young’s “E&Y Tower” is located in this ZIP Code. 
Second, we assess whether Big 4 firms are part of our AICPA MAP Survey 
Sample. The AICPA MAP Survey is distributed among firms of the AICPA Private 
Companies Practice Section (PCPS). We search available PCPS membership lists for Big 
4 firms and do not find decisive membership information suggesting that the Big 4 are 
part of the AICPA MAP Survey. 
Taken together, our triangulations suggest that Big 4 firms are included in our 
QCEW State-Level Sample, but are not included in our AICPA MAP Survey Sample. 
 
1.8.2  Treatment Effect Stability 
 While our different fixed effects structures that we employ in the tests presented 
in Tables 1.3 and 1.4 already alleviate, to a great extent, a potential omitted variable bias 
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in our empirical analysis, in this section we implement the bounding methodology 
proposed by Oster (2019) to assess the stability of our treatment effects and evaluate their 
robustness to omitted variable bias. Nonetheless, to further allay potential omitted 
variable concerns, we follow the bounding methodology developed by Oster (2019) to 
assess the stability of our treatment effects and evaluate their robustness to omitted 
variable bias. Specifically, we re-estimate our main model specification (Table 1.2, Panel 
B, Column (6)) with and without macro and migration control variables. We then assume 
a value for Rmax (the R2 from a hypothetical regression of the outcome on treatment and 
both observed and unobserved control variables) and, based on this assumption, calculate 
the value of delta (the relative degree of selection on observed and unobserved control 
variables) for which the treatment effect would be zero. Delta is a function of Rmax and 
the change in the coefficient on !"#$%&'(')*!,#$% and R2 as the control variables are 
included in the regression. Following the most conservative approach proposed by Oster 
(2019), we set Rmax equal to 2 multiplied by the within R2 of a regression that includes all 
controls (we calculate delta based on the within R2 following Breuer et al. (2018) as our 
objective is to gauge the role of unmodelled (unobservable) state-year factors (following 
your suggestion)). We present the results of this analysis in Table 1.OA-3. Our delta of 
7.864 suggests that the unobservables would need to be almost eight times as important 
as the observables to produce a treatment effect of zero. The magnitude of this delta value 
indicates that our treatment effect is unlikely to be driven by unobservable factors alone. 
 
1.8.3 Within-State Synthetic Control Group 
In our DiDiD tests, we also use “synthetic” control groups of CPAs based on other 
business professionals. This synthetic control group approach (Abadie and Gardeazabal, 
2003; Abadie et al., 2010) offers a data driven method for choosing controls groups to 
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use in (individual) treatment case studies. In particular, for each state that receives a 
policy treatment, the synthetic control is the weighted average of untreated states (or other 
potential “donor” groups) that best matches the treated state trends prior to the policy 
intervention. In our setting, in which all states are eventually treated and treatment dates 
are clustered in time, we lack untreated (donor) groups within the accounting profession. 
To overcome this issue, we separately estimate synthetic control group weights for each 
state drawing donor units from the NAICS top-code 54 “Professional, Scientific, and 
Technical Services.” We restrict the donor group to “Professional, Scientific, and 
Technical Services” to ensure that we draw control units from industries that provide 
comparable services and to keep the computational requirements within feasible bounds. 
Besides defining a pool of potential donors, the synthetic control approach 
requires us to specify periods over which trends between treated and (potential) control 
units are matched. We define these periods in two different ways. First, we define equal 
periods across all states, that is, we match trends from 2003 to 2006. This approach 
assures a comparable matching algorithm across states but, for some states, does not 
utilize all available pre-treatment years. Second, we also rely on a different approach, in 
which we match trends from 2003 until one year prior to a state’s CPA Mobility adoption. 
In Table 1.OA-4, Panels A and B, we report the sample weights for each donor 
industry. We tabulate the mean and median weights calculated across all sample states 
for each six-digit donor industry sorted by mean weights (from highest to lowest). Panel 
A reports the weights obtained from the approach imposing equal matching periods across 
states. Panel B reports the weights based on the approach using state-specific matching 
periods. We use the sample weights obtained from our two synthetic control approaches 
to calculate (weighted average) synthetic CPA state-years. Panel C presents summary 
statistics for both synthetic control group samples—that is “Synthetic CPA 1” and 
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“Synthetic CPA 2”. Using these two synthetic control groups, we estimate DiDiD models 
similar to the model with use in our tests using legal professionals. The results of this 
analysis are presented in Panel D. We observe statistically significant and economically 
meaningful declines in wages subsequent to the introduction of CPA Mobility provisions, 
which range from 1.1% to 1.3%. We also investigate potential effects on employment 
levels and find no evidence suggestive of meaningful effects of CPA Mobility. Overall, 
these results are in line with the ones from our baseline specification. 
 
 90 
 
Figure 1.OA-1: CPA Firm Legal Structures 
 
This figure shows CPA firm (NAICS Code: 541211 - “Offices of Certified Public Accountants”) legal 
structures for different size classes defined by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). We plot the share of 
establishments relative to all establishments for each legal form provided by the BLS Census County 
Business Pattern (CBP) files. Establishment count information is derived from BLS CBP state-level files.  
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Table 1.OA-1: Summary Statistics for Additional Estimation Samples 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics for the SUSB State-Level Sample 
 Obs. Mean Std. Dev. P1 P25 P50 P75 P99 
  
 SUSB Small CPA Firm Sample !"#$!,#$%$& 369 45,151 6,230 32,835 40,516 44,165 49,836 59,123 %&#(!"#$!,#$%$&) 369 10.708 0.138 10.399 10.609 10.696 10.816 10.987 )*+,&-*$./!,#$%$& 369 4,126 4,359 493 1,441 2,951 4,795 23,063 %&#()*+,&-*$./!,#$%$&) 369 7.914 0.903 6.201 7.273 7.990 8.475 10.046 01#)*+,&-*$./!,#$%$& 369 3.850 0.428 2.972 3.534 3.836 4.195 4.760 %&#(01#)*+,&-*$./!,#$%$&) 369 1.342 0.113 1.089 1.262 1.344 1.434 1.560 234*5!,#$%$& 369 1,142 1,300 108 368 785 1,340 6,759 %&#(234*5!,#$%$&) 369 6.573 0.965 4.682 5.908 6.666 7.200 8.819 
         
 SUSB Large CPA Firm Sample !"#$!,#$%$& 369 67,219 10,867 49,735 58,733 65,839 73,770 96,160 %&#(!"#$!,#$%$&) 369 11.103 0.158 10.814 10.981 11.095 11.209 11.474 )*+,&-*$./!,#$%$& 369 1,637 1,653 185 537 1,141 1,979 8,480 %&#()*+,&-*$./!,#$%$&) 369 6.997 0.903 5.220 6.286 7.040 7.590 9.045 01#)*+,&-*$./!,#$%$& 369 25.641 5.236 14.385 21.667 25.903 29.538 37.765 %&#(01#)*+,&-*$./!,#$%$&) 369 3.222 0.215 2.666 3.076 3.254 3.386 3.631 234*5!,#$%$& 369 63 58 6 21 45 78 309 %&#(234*5!,#$%$&) 369 3.775 0.882 1.792 3.045 3.807 4.357 5.733 
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Table 1.OA-1 (continued) 
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics for QCEW Law Firm State-Level Sample 
 Obs. Mean Std. Dev. P1 P25 P50 P75 P99 
  
 QCEW Legal Professionals Sample (All Sizes) !"#$!,#'()* 720 70,644 20,824 39,387 56,336 67,312 80,642 145,049 %&#(!"#$!,#'()*) 720 11.128 0.269 10.581 10.939 11.117 11.298 11.885 )*+,&-*$./!,#'()* 720 20,808 27,469 1,302 5,007 12,869 21,308 127,198 %&#()*+,&-*$./!,#'()*) 720 9.309 1.136 7.172 8.519 9.463 9.966 11.754 01#)*+,&-*$./!,#'()* 720 5.813 2.903 2.863 4.636 5.350 6.013 23.253 %&#(01#)*+,&-*$./!,#'()*) 720 1.697 0.313 1.052 1.534 1.677 1.794 3.146 234*5!,#'()* 720 3,418 4,171 315 904 2,262 3,571 20,044 %&#(234*5!,#'()*) 720 7.612 1.011 5.753 6.806 7.724 8.181 9.906 
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Table 1.OA-1 (continued) 
Panel C: Descriptive Statistics for the SUSB State-Level Law Firm Sample 
 Obs. Mean Std. Dev. P1 P25 P50 P75 P99 
  
 SUSB Small Law Firm Sample !"#$!,#$%$& 369 54,045 9,458 36,300 46,367 53,395 60,844 76,030 %&#(!"#$!,#$%$&) 369 10.882 0.177 10.500 10.744 10.885 11.016 11.239 )*+,&-*$./!,#$%$& 369 11,025 12,233 1,224 3,580 7,290 12,332 59,212 %&#()*+,&-*$./!,#$%$&) 369 8.864 0.925 7.110 8.183 8.894 9.420 10.989 01#)*+,&-*$./!,#$%$& 369 3.197 0.307 2.586 3.028 3.183 3.359 4.481 %&#(01#)*+,&-*$./!,#$%$&) 369 1.158 0.092 0.950 1.108 1.158 1.212 1.500 234*5!,#$%$& 369 3,542 4,046 299 1,280 2,290 3,771 19,570 %&#(234*5!,#$%$&) 369 7.707 0.954 5.700 7.155 7.736 8.235 9.882 
         
 SUSB Small Law Firm Sample !"#$!,#$%$& 369 80,795 13,794 51,829 71,947 80,874 90,111 113,238 %&#(!"#$!,#$%$&) 369 11.285 0.175 10.856 11.184 11.301 11.409 11.637 )*+,&-*$./!,#$%$& 369 5,163 6,272 95 1,306 3,164 5,065 29,605 %&#()*+,&-*$./!,#$%$&) 369 7.997 1.092 4.554 7.175 8.060 8.530 10.296 01#)*+,&-*$./!,#$%$& 369 26.180 3.412 18.213 24.036 26.241 28.600 33.884 %&#(01#)*+,&-*$./!,#$%$&) 369 3.256 0.136 2.902 3.180 3.267 3.353 3.523 234*5!,#$%$& 369 189 224 5 58 119 177 1,107 %&#(234*5!,#$%$&) 369 4.741 1.020 1.609 4.060 4.779 5.176 7.009 
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Table 1.OA-1 (continued) 
Panel D: Descriptive Statistics for the QCEW MSA-Level Sample 
 Obs. Mean Std. Dev. P1 P25 P50 P75 P99 
  
 Accounting Professionals !"#$+,#'()* 1,524 54,411 16,022 27,540 42,816 52,266 63,282 105,115 %&#(!"#$,,+,#'()*) 1,524 10.862 0.289 10.223 10.665 10.864 11.055 11.563 ∆%&#(!"#$,,+,#'()*) 1,524 0.029 0.050 -0.112 0.006 0.028 0.053 0.149 
         
 Legal Professionals !"#$,,+,#'()* 1,012 62,708 20,669 27,859 47,366 60,491 74,952 122,153 %&#(!"#$,,+,#'()*) 1,012 10.993 0.331 10.235 10.766 11.010 11.225 11.713 ∆%&#(!"#$,,+,#'()*) 1,012 0.030 0.057 -0.153 0.004 0.028 0.053 0.217 
         
 MSA GDP 789+$4:"+3/"+,# 2,536 42,958 13,884 20,368 33,230 41,077 49,587 87,536 %&#(789+$4:"+3/"+,#) 2,536 10.624 0.291 9.922 10.411 10.623 10.811 11.380 ∆%&#(789+$4:"+3/"+,#) 2,536 0.014 0.030 -0.072 0.000 0.014 0.029 0.093 
This table presents the summary statistics for additional estimation samples. Detailed definitions for all variables and sample selection criteria are presented in Appendices 1.A 
and 1.B, respectively.   
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Table 1.OA-2: CPA Mobility Effect on Wages for Small CPA Firms, Large CPA Firms, and Legal Professionals 
Panel A: CPA Mobility Effects on Wages for Small CPA Firms 
 Dependent variables: %&#(!"#$!,#$%$&) 
Independent variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) :90;&<3,3/-!,#-. -0.008** -0.010** -0.008** -0.008** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) 
Macro Controls No Yes No Yes 
Migration Controls No No Yes Yes 
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 369 369 369 369 
Adj. R2 0.981 0.982 0.982 0.982 
 
Panel B: CPA Mobility Effects on Wages for Large CPA Firms 
 Dependent variables: %&#(!"#$!,#$%$&) 
Independent variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) :90;&<3,3/-!,#-. 0.010 0.007 0.009 0.006 
 (0.008) (0.006) (0.009) (0.007) 
Macro Controls No Yes No Yes 
Migration Controls No No Yes Yes 
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 369 369 369 369 
Adj. R2 0.921 0.927 0.920 0.927 
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Table 1.OA-2 (continued) 
Panel C: CPA Mobility Effects on Wages for Legal Professionals 
 Dependent variables: %&#(!"#$!,#$%$&) 
Independent variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) :90;&<3,3/-!,#-. -0.005 -0.002 -0.005 -0.003 
 (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.003) 
Macro Controls No Yes No Yes 
Migration Controls No No Yes Yes 
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 720 720 720 720 
Adj. R2 0.986 0.988 0.989 0.999 
This table presents the results of our analysis examining CPA Mobility effects on wages for the subsamples of small CPA firms, large CPA firms, and legal professionals. Tests 
results are based on the SUSB State-Level Sample (Panels A and B) and QCEW State-Level Sample (Panel C). Detailed definitions for all variables and sample selection criteria 
are presented in Appendices 1.A and 1.B of the paper, respectively. In Panel A, we report coefficient estimates and (in parentheses) standard errors from weighted least squares 
(WLS) regressions  of %&#(!"#$!,#$%$&) on :90;&<3,3/-!,#-. and control variables, as indicated in each column restricting the estimation sample to include small CPA firms 
only. Regressions are weighted by state-year employment shares. State-year employment shares are defined as )*+,&-*$./!,#$%$& divided by the sum of all )*+,&-*$./!,#$%$&  
in year t. Panel B documents the effect of CPA Mobility on wages restricting the estimation to include large CPA firms only. In Panel C, we report coefficient estimates and 
(in parentheses) standard errors from weighted least squares (WLS) regressions of %&#(!"#$!,#$%$&) on :90;&<3,3/-!,#-. and control variables, as indicated in each column 
for the subsample of legal professionals. Regressions are weighted by state-year employment shares. State-year employment shares are defined as )*+,&-*$./!,#$%$& divided 
by the sum of all )*+,&-*$./!,#$%$&  in year t. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. ***, **, and * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. 
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Table 1.OA-3: Treatment Effect Stability !!"#$"%&$''() -0.011 "!"#$"%&$''()*  0.010 !+$"%&$''() -0.010 "+$"%&$''()*  0.049 ∆ 7.864 
This table presents an estimate of the value of Delta (∆), the relative degree of selection on observed and 
unobserved control variables for which the treatment effect would be zero, following the methodology developed 
by Oster (2019). The table reports the coefficient on $%&'()*+*,-,,%./ and the within R2 from the estimation of 
our main model specification (Table 1.2, Panel B) with (!+$"%&$''(), "+$"%&$''()* ) and without (!!"#$"%&$''(), "!"#$"%&$''()* ) macro and migration control variables. Following the methodology proposed by Oster (2019) we 
set Rmax (the R2 from a hypothetical regression of the outcome on treatment and both observed and unobserved 
control variables) equal to 2.0 multiplied by the R2 of the regression that includes all control variables (i.e., the 
controlled regression).  
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Table 1.OA-4: Within-State Synthetic Control Groups 
Panel A: Synthetic Control Weights Calculated until 2005 
NAICS 
Code 
NAICS Description Mean Weight Median 
Weight 
541110 Offices of Lawyers 0.374 0.415 
541330 Engineering Services 0.177 0.042 
541940 Veterinary Services 0.066 0.038 
541511 Custom Computer Programming Services 0.051 0.016 
541611 Administrative Management and General 
Management Consulting Services 
0.022 0.012 
541512 Computer System Design Services 0.020 0.014 
541820 Public Relation Agencies 0.015 0.007 
541219 Other Accounting Services 0.013 0.012 
541910 Marketing Research and Public Opinion Polling 0.013 0.009 
541380 Testing Laboratories 0.013 0.010 
541513 Computer Facilities Management Services 0.012 0.007 
541213 Tax Preparation Services 0.012 0.007 
541310 Architectural Services 0.011 0.011 
541810 Advertising Agencies 0.011 0.010 
541613 Marketing Consulting Services 0.010 0.009 
541890 Other Services related to Marketing 0.010 0.007 
541214 Payroll Services 0.010 0.009 
541690 Other Scientific and Technical Consulting 
Services 
0.010 0.009 
541618 Other Management Consulting Services 0.009 0.009 
541612 Human Resource Consulting Services 0.009 0.009 
541519 Other Computer Related Services 0.009 0.009 
541620 Environmental Consulting Services 0.009 0.008 
541370 Survey and Mapping Services 0.009 0.007 
541840 Media Representatives 0.009 0.007 
541614 Process, Physical Distribution, and Logistics 
Consulting Services 
0.009 0.008 
541720 Research and Development in the Social Sciences 
and Humanities 
0.008 0.007 
541990 All Other Professional, Scientific and Technical 
Services 
0.008 0.007 
541430 Graphic Design Services 0.008 0.008 
541191 Title Abstract and Settlement Offices 0.008 0.008 
541860 Direct Mail Advertising 0.007 0.007 
541320 Landscape Architectural Services 0.007 0.007 
541850 Building Inspection Services 0.007 0.007 
541410 Interior Design Services 0.007 0.006 
541360 Geophysical Surveying and Mapping Services 0.007 0.006 
541350 Building Inspection Services 0.007 0.005 
541830 Media Buying Agencies 0.006 0.006 
541921 Photography Studios, Portrait 0.006 0.005 
541340 Drafting Services 0.006 0.006 
541199 All Other Legal Services 0.006 0.005 
541420 Landscape Architectural Services 0.006 0.006 
541870 Advertising Material Distribution Services 0.006 0.006 
541930 Translation and Interpretation Services 0.006 0.005 
541922 Commercial Photography 0.006 0.005 
541490 Other Specialized Design Services 0.005 0.005 
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Table 1.OA-4 (continued) 
Panel B: Synthetic Control Weights Calculated until State-Specific Treatment Date 
NAICS 
Code 
NAICS Description Mean Weight Median 
Weight 
541110 Offices of Lawyers 0.368 0.402 
541330 Engineering Services 0.176 0.043 
541940 Veterinary Services 0.070 0.040 
541511 Custom Computer Programming Services 0.049 0.015 
541611 
Administrative Management and General 
Management Consulting Services 0.025 0.013 
541512 Computer System Design Services 0.022 0.014 
541820 Public Relation Agencies 0.018 0.007 
541380 Testing Laboratories 0.013 0.010 
541513 Computer Facilities Management Services 0.013 0.008 
541219 Other Accounting Services 0.013 0.012 
541910 Marketing Research and Public Opinion Polling 0.013 0.009 
541310 Architectural Services 0.011 0.011 
541213 Tax Preparation Services 0.011 0.007 
541810 Advertising Agencies 0.010 0.010 
541890 Other Services related to Marketing 0.010 0.007 
541613 Marketing Consulting Services 0.010 0.009 
541690 
Other Scientific and Technical Consulting 
Services 0.010 0.009 
541618 Other Management Consulting Services 0.010 0.009 
541214 Payroll Services 0.009 0.008 
541612 Human Resource Consulting Services 0.009 0.008 
541620 Environmental Consulting Services 0.009 0.008 
541614 
Process, Physical Distribution, and Logistics 
Consulting Services 0.009 0.008 
541519 Other Computer Related Services 0.009 0.009 
541370 Survey and Mapping Services 0.009 0.007 
541990 
All Other Professional, Scientific and Technical 
Services 0.008 0.007 
541840 Media Representatives 0.008 0.008 
541720 
Research and Development in the Social Sciences 
and Humanities 0.008 0.007 
541430 Graphic Design Services 0.008 0.007 
541191 Title Abstract and Settlement Offices 0.008 0.008 
541860 Geophysical Surveying and Mapping Services 0.007 0.007 
541320 Landscape Architectural Services 0.007 0.006 
541850 Building Inspection Services 0.007 0.007 
541410 Interior Design Services 0.007 0.006 
541360 Geophysical Surveying and Mapping Services 0.006 0.006 
541199 All Other Legal Services 0.006 0.005 
541921 Photography Studios, Portrait 0.006 0.005 
541350 Building Inspection Services 0.006 0.005 
541830 Media Buying Agencies 0.006 0.006 
541340 Drafting Services 0.006 0.005 
541420 Landscape Architectural Services 0.006 0.006 
541930 Translation and Interpretation Services 0.006 0.005 
541870 Advertising Material Distribution Services 0.006 0.006 
541922 Commercial Photography 0.005 0.005 
541490 Other Specialized Design Services 0.005 0.005 
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Table 1.OA-4 (continued) 
Panel C: Descriptive Statistics for QCEW State-Level Synthetic Control Group Samples 
 Obs. Mean Std. Dev. P1 P25 P50 P75 P99 
  
 Synthetic CPA 1 (Calculating Weights until 2005) !"#$!,#$%&' 720 66,124 16,990 39,236 53,690 63,537 74,545 122,405 %&#(!"#$!,#$%&') 720 11.069 0.244 10.577 10.891 11.059 11.219 11.715 )*+,&-*$./!,#$%&' 720 13,904 17,440 966 3,099 8,228 16,337 77,849 %&#()*+,&-*$./!,#$%&') 720 8.928 1.121 6.874 8.039 9.015 9.701 11.263 
         
 Synthetic CPA 2 (Calculating Weights until State-Specific Treatment Date) !"#$!,#$%&' 720 66,426 17,429 39,279 53,778 63,670 74,752 128,605 %&#(!"#$!,#$%&') 720 11.073 0.247 10.578 10.893 11.061 11.222 11.765 )*+,&-*$./!,#$%&' 720 13,981 17,692 938 3,075 7,721 16,351 78,039 %&#()*+,&-*$./!,#$%&') 720 8.927 1.122 6.843 8.031 8.952 9.702 11.265 
 
Panel D: CPA Mobility Effects on Wages and Employment 
 Dependent variables: 
 Synthetic CPA 1 Synthetic CPA 2 
 %&#(!"#$!,(,#$%&') %&#()*+,&-*$./!,(,#$%&') %&#(!"#$!,(,#$%&') %&#()*+,&-*$./!,(,#$%&') 
Independent variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) 0123&45,5/-!,#)*´012(  -0.013*** -0.008 -0.011** -0.007 
 (0.004) (0.016) (0.005) (0.016) 
State ´ Profession FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State ´ Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Profession ´ Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 1,440 1,440 1,440 1,440 
Adj. R2 0.991 0.998 0.991 0.998 
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This table presents the results of our difference-in-difference-in-differences (DiDiD) analysis examining CPA Mobility effects on wages and employment using two within-
state synthetic control groups. Detailed definitions for all variables and sample selection criteria are presented in Appendices 1.A and 1.B of the main paper, respectively. Panel 
A reports the mean and median weights (sorted by mean weights) assigned to each donor industry based on a synthetic control approach that matches wage and employment 
trends over the period from 2003 to 2005, that is, the sample period before the first of our sample states adopts CPA Mobility provisions. Panel B reports the mean and median 
weights (sorted by mean weights) assigned to each donor industry based on a on a synthetic control approach that matches wage and employment trends over the period from 
2003 until a state adopts CPA Mobility provisions. Panel C reports summary statistics for both synthetic control groups. We form synthetic control groups by calculating 
average state-year wage and employment levels using the weights reported in Panel A (Synthetic CPA 1) and the weights reported in Panel B (Synthetic CPA 2). In Panel D, 
we report coefficient estimates and (in parentheses) standard errors are from weighted least squares (WLS) regressions of %&#(!"#$!,(,#$%&') and ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regressions of %&#()*+,&-*$./!,(,#$%&') on 0123&45,5/-!,#)*´012(  and control variables, as indicated in each column. Regressions in Columns (1) to (3) are weighted using 
employment shares. Employment shares are defined as )*+,&-*$./!,(,#$%&' divided by the sum of all )*+,&-*$./!,(,#$%&'  in year t. Standard errors are clustered at the state 
level. ***, **, and * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 
 102 
2 Can Ethics be Taught? Evidence from Securities 
Exams and Investment Adviser Misconduct 
2.1 Introduction 
Financial markets and institutions are shaped by responses to corporate scandals 
and financial crises. One way this happens is through the design and enforcement of 
regulation. However, scandals and crises also lead to calls for changes in how market 
participants are qualified, particularly in ethics, professional conduct, and fiduciary duties 
(Piper et al.,1993). For example, in his Presidential address to the American Financial 
Association, Zingales (2015) says: 
We should not relegate our prescriptive analysis to separate, poorly attended 
ethics courses, validating the implicit assumption that social norms are a matter 
of interest only for the less bright students. Several social norms are crucial to the 
flourishing of a market economy. We should teach them in our regular classes, at 
the very least emphasizing how violating these norms has a negative effect on 
reputation. 
 
Similar calls for training in the classroom and on the job followed Enron’s failure 
and the Great Recession (Koehn, 2005; Arbogast et al., 2018).  
Others question the effectiveness and desirability of professional conduct training 
(Drucker, 1981): “business ethics courses are seen to have been created largely for the 
sake of appearances and from the imperative of initiating some form of responsive action” 
(McDonald and Donleavy, 1995: 842-843). Another line of criticism acknowledges that, 
while rules can be taught, beliefs about acceptable conduct guide behavior and these 
beliefs are primarily formed outside the classroom. Then, individuals may participate in 
ethics education, but their participation is feigned. Additionally, professional conduct 
training can be difficult to tailor to the specialized and often ambiguous nature of daily 
work.  
 103 
Claims surrounding the consequences of ethics and professional conduct training 
have not been investigated empirically. A key barrier has been that researchers do not 
observe the training that individuals receive or how this training affects their behavior. In 
this paper, we study a change in the Series 66 exam, which individuals pass before 
becoming licensed investment advisers.38 The exam, administered by the Financial 
Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) and designed by the North American Securities 
Administrators Association (NASAA), comprises two sections. One section focuses on 
allowable forms of compensation and disclosure requirements (“rules”) and prohibitions 
of unethical business practices (commonly referenced in the securities industry as 
“ethics”, a convention we follow throughout our paper). A second section covers capital 
market theory, investment vehicle characteristics, ratios, and financial reporting 
(“technical material”).  
Starting January 1, 2010, the exam weighted technical and rules/ethics questions 
equally (50% each), whereas prior, rules/ethics questions received an 80% weight while 
technical questions received a 20% weight. NASAA altered the content weights “based 
on responses to (a) survey indicating that dually licensed individuals should have 
enhanced testing in…(technical) areas” (Cole-Frieman and Mallon, 2010). Meanwhile, 
the exam’s cost, length, and time allotted remained constant, as did the qualification 
received by those passing the exam.  
We leverage several features of the exam change and the investment adviser 
setting to shed light on the consequences of professional conduct training. First, 
individuals must master a significant amount of rules- and ethics-related material before 
becoming investment advisers. A popular study guide advises individuals to spend 75-
 
38 In this paper, we refer to licensed investment advisers as “investment advisers” or “advisers”. We refer 
to other securities industry employees without this license as “registered representatives” or 
“representatives”.  
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100 hours over 4-8 weeks preparing for the exam (Cohen, 2018). After, these advisers 
provide advice to, typically, unsophisticated investors who rely on their adviser’s 
qualifications and adherence to professional standards. When violations of these 
standards occur (henceforth, “misconduct”), we observe the date, employee and employer 
identity, and a description of the incident. Misconduct incidents commonly involve 
misrepresentation, unauthorized activity, omission of key facts, and excessive trading to 
generate commissions, rather than mere formalities or violations of obscure rules. 
Second, we observe the exact date that advisers pass each securities exam. Rather 
than develop our own definition of rules and ethics training, we exploit the large reduction 
in rules and ethics coverage as defined by NASAA from the old to the new exam version. 
We simply assume that advisers passing the old exam had more rules and ethics training 
than those passing the new exam.  
Third, other common securities exams (including the co-requisite Series 7) did 
not undergo any change in content around 2010; moreover, individuals working for the 
same firm-location often take the same exams but at different times. This variation aids 
our identification strategy by providing a group of advisers with the same employer and 
qualifications, but different rules and ethics training required to achieve those 
qualifications. Together, these features help us develop credible evidence on an important 
but largely unexplored research question.  
To study adviser behavior, we compare the change in an adviser’s misconduct 
after they pass the Series 66, across those who took the old versus new exam. We omit 
those passing the exam in the window surrounding the change enactment, to mitigate 
selection concerns surrounding strategic exam registration. We include individual fixed 
effects to account for time-invariant features that could affect behavior, such as an 
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individual’s upbringing, gender, and formative career experiences (e.g., Oyer, 2008; 
Shue, 2013; Egan et al., 2018; Clifford et al., 2019; Law and Zuo, 2019).  
We find significantly less misconduct among those passing the more rules- and 
ethics-focused exam. Our estimates suggest that taking the old exam is associated with a 
one-quarter reduction in advisers’ 0.86% average annual propensity to commit 
misconduct. Our results are economically meaningful, yet not too large as to be 
implausible considering the individual nature of advising work and related research 
linking individual characteristics to misconduct. For example, the exam change is slightly 
less important than gender (Egan et al., 2018) and much less important than prior 
misconduct (Egan et al., 2019) for explaining new misconduct. 
To this point, we do not discern between selection and treatment explanations for 
the misconduct differences. In terms of selection, the results could reflect unobservable 
differences between pre- and post-2010 Series 66 passers. For example, working or sitting 
for qualification exams during the crisis could have a sustained effect on one’s view of 
appropriate interactions with investors. Related, one’s proclivity for misconduct could be 
correlated with their ability to master technical material, which the new exam more 
heavily weights. Then, differences in misconduct may not result from the change in 
content per se, but from unobservable differences in individuals capable of passing the 
old and new exam.  
We investigate selection explanations in several ways. First, we continue to find 
our results if we limit our sample to individuals with recession experience or passing any 
qualification exam (Series 66 or other) before 2010. Second, we compare the misconduct 
of one individual to another who entered the industry at the same time as them, through 
separate year fixed effects for each cohort, and find the same results. Third, in Figure 2.1 
we compare old and new Series 66 passers in event time. If our results stem from selection 
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on unobservables, then we expect to find differences in pre-exam misconduct across these 
groups. However, the differences are confined to the post-exam period. Together, these 
findings reduce concerns that our evidence of higher misconduct among new exam 
passers is explained by selection.  
Because the exam change reduced coverage of both rules and ethics-based 
questions, we then investigate why the change appears to affect adviser behavior. One 
compliance-based interpretation is that advisers passing the new exam are more likely to 
engage in misconduct simply because they are less aware of the rules. A second, not 
mutually exclusive explanation is that the exam’s focus on ethics alters individuals’ 
perceptions of right and wrong conduct. Our objective is not to fully attribute our main 
findings to either compliance or ethics-based explanations. Indeed, both classes of 
explanations could be valid, and both are relevant to understanding the consequences of 
qualification exams in financial markets (Warren et al., 2014). Rather, we aim to establish 
whether there is some role for ethics in explaining the differences in misconduct across 
old and new exam passers.  
We conduct a textual analysis of 64,972 misconduct descriptions, and identify 
18,754 incidents involving theft, fraud, and deceit. For these obvious offenses, we 
presume the exam’s reduction in rules coverage was inconsequential, as even industry 
outsiders would recognize that the adviser engaged in wrongdoing. If our main results 
were solely explained by compliance, we should find no difference in obvious misconduct 
between passers of the old and new exam. However, we find a significant difference 
comparable to that in our main results. Further, we find the misconduct differences across 
passers of the old and new exam persist for at least three years, which we would not 
expect if advisers merely memorize rules rather than draw more fundamental lessons 
about acceptable conduct from the ethics portion of the exam. In sum, this evidence 
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suggests that our main results cannot be explained by compliance alone, and that the exam 
change altered advisers’ perceptions of acceptable conduct. 
In terms of individual characteristics, those passing the exam without prior 
misconduct appear to respond most to the amount of rules and ethics material covered on 
their exam. And, the behavior of the least experienced advisers is most sensitive to the 
extent of rules and ethics testing. These results are consistent with the exam playing a 
“priming” role, where early exposure to rules and ethics material prepares the individual 
to behave appropriately later (Cohn and Maréchal, 2016). As for firm characteristics, we 
find the exam’s coverage to be less pertinent to those advisers working at firms where 
misconduct is prevalent. Thus, the contagion of misconduct behavior appears to limit the 
effectiveness of training in preventing transgressions (Dimmock et al., 2018; Easley and 
O’Hara, 2019). 
Our final set of tests examines how advisers respond to workplace ethics scandals. 
To illustrate, consider the Wells Fargo account fraud that became widely known in 2016. 
While the fraud was contained in the consumer banking division, a number of Wells 
Fargo investment advisers noted the deterioration in the firm’s culture as their reason for 
leaving to work for another employer (Flitter and Cowley, 2019). We study turnover 
among all Wells Fargo advisers, and find those passing the old exam are most likely to 
leave after the scandal broke. Because the Wells Fargo scandal did not relate to 
investment advisers or rules covered on their qualification exam, these results reinforce 
how the exam change altered advisers’ perception of acceptable conduct, and not just 
their awareness of the rules.  
While Wells Fargo provides an appealing case study, we extend our analysis to 
the full sample, and study turnover at firms subject to major penalties or company-wide 
increases in professional violations. We find a similar turnover pattern in this sample, 
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indicating that advisers with more rules and ethics training are less likely to tolerate bad 
behavior at their firm, and seek employment elsewhere. Building on this, we find that 
departures of advisers passing the old exam predicts scandals at their former employer 
next year.  
We make three contributions. First, to our knowledge our paper is the first archival 
study of the effects of rules and ethics training on professional conduct in financial 
markets. The large literature on investor protection focuses on the design and 
consequences of regulation, disclosure laws, and governance mechanisms (Campbell et 
al., 2011; Dimmock and Gerken, 2012; Hail et al., 2018; Charoenwong et al., 2019). A 
lack of data on individual qualifications and behavior has prevented researchers from 
investigating what role, if any, ethics training might play. Our results support the view 
that ethics training plays an important role in constraining fraud and influencing 
employee-firm matching. In this way, our results complement work studying financial 
literacy and financial education for consumers (see Lusardi and Mitchell, 2014, for a 
review).  
Second, we add to a growing body of research concerned with understanding the 
causes of adviser and representative misconduct (Dimmock and Gerken, 2012; Dimmock 
et al., 2018; Egan et al., 2018; 2019; Parsons et al., 2018; Clifford et al., 2019). One 
impetus for this work is that misconduct affects household saving and stock market 
participation (Guiso et al., 2008; Gurun et al., 2017).39  
Third, our results contribute to research on professional labor markets, and 
licensing in particular. Professional conduct education has long been part of licensing not 
only for advisers, but also accountants, lawyers, and other non-financial occupations 
 
39 Our paper also adds to the recent literature on individual misconduct within firms (Soltes, 2018; Stubben 
and Welch, 2018; Heese and Cavazos, 2019), and auditors’ oversight of this misconduct (Cook et al., 2019). 
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including physicians.40 In this respect, the study perhaps most related to ours is Clifford 
and Gerken (2019), who examine how labor mobility provisions in the securities industry 
affect individuals’ decisions about which qualifications to acquire, and how these 
qualifications relate to their fee model, assets under management, and customer 
complaints. In line with our findings, they conclude that an adviser’s acquisition of 
professional licenses represents an important investment in their human capital. 
 
2.2 Setting 
2.2.1 Investment Advisers 
Investment advisers guide investors engaging capital markets. All investment 
advisers must register and file certain forms with the SEC under the Investment Advisers 
Act of 1940, even if their firm’s size exempts them from SEC oversight as described in 
Charoenwong et al (2019).41 Both the SEC and FINRA, a self-regulatory enforcement 
agency tasked with protecting investors in the US securities industry, disclose adviser- 
and firm-specific information on their websites. FINRA’s BrokerCheck website notes 
that “all individuals registered to sell securities or provide investment advice are required 
to disclose customer complaints and arbitrations, regulatory actions, employment 
terminations, bankruptcy filings, and criminal or judicial proceedings.” This information 
can be submitted by an individual, their employer, or the regulator. 
 
 
40 For example, 35 state accounting boards require individuals to achieve at least a 90% score on a 40 
question ethics exam before receiving the CPA designation. Forty-eight states require prospective lawyers 
to pass a 60 question ethics exam before being admitted to the bar (the average required score across these 
states is 81%). The American Board of Physician Specialties requires members to take an ethics course 
every eight years.  
41 Congress exempted investment adviser firms with less than $25 million from SEC oversight under the 
Securities Investment Promotion Act of 1996 and increased this threshold to $100 million under the Dodd-
Frank Act of 2010. 
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2.2.2 Investment Adviser Licensing Exam 
Although some representatives happen to provide advice that is incidental to their 
fundamental business, investment advisers provide fee-based advice. Acknowledging this 
explicit advisory relationship, regulators set a higher standard of conduct as well as 
additional licensing requirements for investment advisers relative to registered 
representatives.42 Specific to licensing, these advisers must pass either the Series 65 or 
66 exam to provide fee-based advice, though neither exam is independently sufficient: 
individuals must pass the Series 63 with the 65, or the Series 7 with the 66.43 Individuals 
tend to sit for these exams early in their career, though some sit for exams later to upgrade 
their qualifications. While NASAA develops the 63, 65, and 66 exams, FINRA 
administers the related licensing for these, and other, industry exams.  
Both the Series 65 and 66 exams cover two broad areas: rules/ethics (specifically, 
“Laws, Regulations, and Guidelines, including Prohibition on Unethical Business 
Practices”) and technical material (“Economic Factors and Business Information, 
Investment Vehicle Characteristics, and Client Investment Recommendations and 
Strategies”) (NASAA, 2011). Rules/ethics material covers allowable forms of 
compensation, disclosure requirements, and various aspects of an adviser’s fiduciary duty 
to investment clients. Technical material covers capital market theory, investment vehicle 
characteristics, ratios, and financial reporting.  
While delineating between rules and ethics topics is not always straightforward, 
the exam categorizes questions in separate categories. NASAA does not disclose exam 
 
42 Whereas investment advisers must meet a fiduciary standard of conduct, other representatives are bound 
by a suitability standard during the study period, or more recently by Regulation Best Interest (SEC, 2019). 
43 Whether an individual takes the combined Series 66 exam or the Series 63 and Series 65 exam is primarily 
determined by an employer’s registration status. The Series 66 exam effectively combines the Series 63 
and Series 65 exams but requires individuals to take the Series 7 exam. The industry provides alternative 
paths since the (co-requisite) Series 7 exam can only be taken by individuals with FINRA sponsorship, i.e., 
employees of FINRA members.  
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questions, but we have collected several from a popular Series 66 study guide to illustrate 
the categorization (Mometrix, 2019): 
Example Rules Questions: 
Describe the registration process. 
Describe the obligation to ensure that client security transactions are handled and 
recorded accurately.  
Describe allowable forms of compensation for investment advisers.  
Describe the investment adviser’s responsibility to disclose the source of any 
third-party recommendations and reports.  
Describe the circumstances in which an investment adviser is permitted to 
maintain custody of its clients’ assets.  
 
Example Ethics Questions: 
Discuss the ethical and fiduciary responsibility of advisers regarding the charging 
of commissions. 
Describe the obligation to consider a client’s investment objectives when making 
recommendations. 
Describe the conditions that must be met in order for an advisor to ethically take 
custody of a client’s funds. 
Describe the fiduciary responsibilities of investment advisers. 
Discuss the act of committing fraud by omission. 
 
Example Technical Questions: 
 
Briefly describe modern portfolio theory. 
Discuss current ratios and describe what they are useful in measuring. 
Define capital gains and describe how capital gains are taxed.  
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Define S corporations, and describe their usefulness to investors.  
Describe the weak form of the efficient market hypothesis. 
Define value stocks, and describe how portfolio managers determine if a stock is 
a value stock. 
Define inflation-adjusted return and name the index used to help calculate it. 
Calculate the beta for XYZ Company using the following details: 
• Risk-Free Rate of Return = 2% 
• XYZ Company Rate of Return = 5% 
• S&P 500 Index Rate of Return = 7% 
 
Our tests study the 2010 change in the Series 66, announced in September 2009.44 
Prior to January 1, 2010 the exam contained 100 questions, with 80% of the questions 
covering rules and ethics and 20% covering technical material. Starting January 1, 2010 
the composition of the exam was altered such that rules/ethics questions and technical 
material were equally-weighted. The change was motivated by a desire to increase testing 
in “Economic Factors and Business Information, Investment Vehicle Characteristics and 
Client Investment Recommendations and Strategies” (Cole-Frieman and Mallon, 2010). 
At the same time, the Series 63 and 65 underwent similar, albeit smaller changes, with 
the rules/ethics section weights decreasing from 50% to 45%.45 None of the other major 
securities exams (e.g., the Series 6, 7, or 24) were affected. The Series 66 changed again 
in July 2016, with the rules/ethics weight falling from 50% to 45% to match the Series 
63 and 65.  
 
44 The earliest reference we can find to the exam change was a blog post on September 16, 2009 (Walks, 
2009). 
45 The changes received much interest from study guide websites and investment adviser discussion forums. 
For example, one blog dedicated to the exam stated “If you’re one of those people who need deadline 
pressure in order to actually start studying for the Series 65/66 exams, here you go: the Series 65 and 66 
are changing starting January 1st. Yikes! For example, the 45 questions on business practices/ethics is being 
reduced to 40 on the Series 65. The 80/20 split is changing to 50/50 on the Series 66” (Walks, 2009).  
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Following the 2010 change, the Series 66 exam length (100 questions), time 
permitted (150 minutes), and cost (roughly $130) remained. However, the minimum 
passing grade increased from 71% to 75%. The minimum passing grade for the Series 63 
(65) increased from 70% to 72% (68% to 72%). Thus, while all three exams experienced 
similar changes in required passing grades, the reduction in rules/ethics content was much 
greater for the Series 66 (30%) than for the 63 and 65 (5%).46  
 
2.3 Data, Summary Statistics, and Research Design 
2.3.1 Data 
In January 2018, we accessed BrokerCheck’s database of adviser and 
representative records. The database contains all registered advisers and representatives 
currently employed in the US securities industry at brokerage firms, as well as registered 
advisers and representatives employed up to ten years prior. Thus, following other work 
using this data (Egan et al., 2018; 2019; Honigsberg and Jacob, 2018; Law and Zuo, 2019) 
we study a ten year period, spanning 2007-2017. Each individual’s record contains 
information about their current employment, previous employment, exams passed 
(including the type and date), as well as disclosures of customer complaints, arbitrations, 
regulatory actions, employment terminations bankruptcy filings, and any civil or criminal 
proceeding involving them. FINRA does not report failed exam attempts or exam scores. 
Using these disclosures, we classify misconduct incidents as those fitting into six 
categories as described in Egan et al. (2019): Civil-Final, Criminal-Final Disposition, 
Customer Dispute-Award/Judgment, Customer Dispute-Settled, Employment Separation 
 
46 And, to the extent that the higher passing grade and more technical training result in more qualified 
individuals becoming advisers, it would work against us finding an increase in misconduct for those passing 
the new Series 66.   
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after Allegations, and Regulatory-Final. Appendix 2.B contains an example report from 
an individual in our sample.  
Table 2.1 describes our sample construction. We start with 8,838,880 individual-
firm observations from BrokerCheck from the years 2007-2017, for which we have a full 
record of advisers and representatives. We then adjust this initial sample in several ways. 
First, to reduce concerns about advisers selecting into the old or new exam, we 
eliminate those passing the Series 66 in the months surrounding January 2010. Figure 2.2 
shows an elevated number of Series 66 passers in November and December 2009, 
followed by a sharp reversal in January 2010 and February 2010. We study the number 
of exams passed each month in a regression framework and find significant evidence of 
bunching around January 2010 (see Appendix 2.C). Based on this evidence, our 
misconduct tests eliminate those advisers passing the Series 66 from October 2009 (the 
month after the exam change was announced) to March 2010. As nearly half of advisers 
pass the Series 66 in their first year in the industry, we see little remaining concern about 
strategic selection into the old or new exam. Nevertheless, we verify that our inferences 
are the same if we include every adviser or drop those who passed the exam within six 
months or even a year of January 2010.  
Second, we omit observations from those passing the Series 66 after July 2016, 
when the exam weights (slightly) changed again as discussed in Section 2.2.2. Last, we 
omit the year of each adviser’s Series 66 exam, because we collapse our data at the 
individual-firm-year level and it is ambiguous whether any misconduct occurred before 
or after the exam during such years. The remaining 8,500,453 observations form the 
sample for our misconduct analyses, described below. 
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2.3.2 Summary Statistics 
Table 2.2, Panel A provides summary statistics for the individual-firm-year 
observations studied in our misconduct analyses. In a typical individual-firm-year, 0.76% 
of individuals have a misconduct incident, while 0.22% have an obvious misconduct 
incident involving fraud, deceit, or theft (further described below). Nearly 8% of 
individuals have a prior incident on their record. For those with a Series 66 qualification, 
0.86% have a misconduct incident while 6.8% have a prior incident. Seventeen percent 
of advisers exit their employer each year. The typical individual has 13 years of 
experience. Thirty-seven percent (66%; 15%) of the individuals have passed the Series 6 
(Series 7; Series 24). As for the Series 63, (65), 72% (20%) have the qualification. In 20% 
of the observations, the individual has already passed the Series 66, while 16% have 
passed the pre-2010 version. Thirty-one percent of individuals have attained 
qualifications other than those involving these six major exams.  
Panel B reports statistics for investment adviser characteristics, measured at the 
date they pass their Series 66. As of the exam pass date, the average individual has 4.72 
years of experience, while 46% are taking the exam during their first year in the industry. 
Four percent of advisers already have a misconduct record from their pre-exam work as 
a representative. 
 
2.3.3 Research Design 
We study individual misconduct using the following linear probability 
specification: !!"# = #$ × %66!#+#% × ()ℎ+,-%66! × %66!#+.! + ."&# +γ × /01)203-!"# 	+ 	5!"# .(1) 
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Our specification follows that of Egan et al. (2018, 2019). The unit of observation 
is individual-firm-year, where i indexes individuals, j indexes firms, t indexes years, and 
c indexes cities. Occasionally, individuals change employers during the year, and in such 
cases we have more than one observation per individual-year. The dependent variable !!"# is an indicator for whether individual i has a misconduct incident at firm j in year t. %66!#is an indicator for whether individual i has passed the Series 66 as of year t. ()ℎ+,-%66!# is an indicator for whether individual i passes the pre-2010 exam, which 
contained more rules and ethics material.  
The main effect for ()ℎ+,-%66!# is absorbed by our inclusion of individual fixed 
effects (.!), which account for time-invariant individual characteristics having a 
sustained effect on behavior. We also include fixed effects for each firm-city-year (."&#). 
In doing so, we effectively compare the incidence of misconduct among individuals 
working for the same firm in the same location. This prevents across-firm differences in 
internal controls, risk taking, strategy, culture, or regulatory oversight from 
contaminating our analysis. The city-year dimension of the fixed effect accounts for city-
specific drivers of misconduct including investor demographics, the state of the economy, 
as well as the strictness of regulatory enforcement. Following Egan et al. (2019) we 
include controls for (log) years of experience, having passed the Series 6, 7, 24, 63, 65, 
or other qualification exams, and an indicator for whether the individual has ever been 
disciplined for misconduct prior to the current year. We cluster our standard errors by 
firm. Clustering instead by individual or individual and firm does not affect our 
inferences. 
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2.4 Results 
2.4.1 Misconduct and Exam Coverage 
Table 2.3 presents the results from estimating equation (1). In Column (1) we 
begin with a relaxed version of equation (1) with only controls and individual and year 
fixed effects, and augment the fixed effects in subsequent columns. We find the annual 
propensity to commit misconduct is 0.162% lower among those passing the old exam 
covering more rules and ethics material. Considering the average annual likelihood of 
misconduct for Series 66 qualified advisers is 0.86%, this represents nearly a one-fifth 
difference in new misconduct rates. The signs on our control variables (not tabulated for 
brevity) are consistent with prior work (e.g., Egan et al., 2018; 2019). Individuals with 
the Series 7 are more likely to be involved in misconduct incidents. This is natural because 
such individuals have more responsibility and interact in greater depth with investment 
clients who file many of the misconduct complaints. Individuals with a history of 
misconduct are more likely to commit misconduct again, as are those with more 
experience (who tend to have more clients and more responsibility).  
Column (2) introduces fixed effects for each firm, and finds a similar result.47 To 
mitigate concerns that time-varying firm heterogeneity explain these initial results, 
Column (3) adds a firm-year fixed effect. Our results remain. In Column (4) we estimate 
our fully saturated equation (1). We continue to find a significant difference related to the 
exam change, now accounting for approximately one-fourth of the average misconduct 
level for Series 66 qualified advisers.  
To benchmark this result, consider that Egan et al. (2018) use a very similar 
sample period and research design to ours to study differences in misconduct between 
males and females. In their strictest specification (comparable to our Column (4)), they 
 
47 The number of observations declines as we add stricter fixed effects because singletons are dropped.  
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find females are roughly one-third less likely to commit misconduct as males. 
Furthermore, Egan et al. (2019) show that new misconduct is five times more likely for 
individuals with a history of misconduct. Therefore, the exam change effect size appears 
both important and plausible. 
Finally, Column (5) adds a Series 66 dimension to our firm-year-city fixed effect. 
In this way, we are comparing individuals in the same year with the same qualifications, 
employer and location. Our results remain, although given the within-fixed effect 
variation required by this approach (we lose nearly half of our adviser observations, 
mostly from small cities and branches) we do not continue with this specification. 
 
2.4.2 Why Does Misconduct Vary with Exam Coverage? 
In this section, we investigate why adviser misconduct varies with the Series 66 
exam coverage. Under a treatment explanation, an adviser’s conduct is informed in part 
by the amount of rules and ethics training they have undertaken. By contrast, under a 
selection explanation, individuals passing the old and new Series 66 are fundamentally 
different, and therefore their long run propensity for committing misconduct is different. 
As an example, working or sitting for qualification exams during the financial crisis could 
affect one’s view of appropriate interactions with investors. Or, individuals’ 
predisposition for misconduct behavior may be correlated with their ability to master 
technical material, which the new exam more heavily weights.48  
We investigate these selection explanations in four ways. First, we add year fixed 
effects for each cohort to our main specification by interacting indicators for each 
calendar year with indicators for each cohort year. Thus, each year we effectively 
 
48 Yet another selection explanation relates to individuals strategically timing their exam around the change. 
However, recall from Section 2.3.1 that we eliminate advisers passing the Series 66 between the change 
announcement date and several months after enactment, suggesting this particular selection explanation is 
unlikely. 
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compare the misconduct of one adviser to another who entered the profession in the same 
year.49 One drawback of this approach is that because advisers typically take exams early 
in their career, some of the exam type variation we are interested in gets absorbed, making 
it harder to find results. Despite this, Column (1) of Table 2.4 shows that we continue to 
find less misconduct among those advisers passing the old Series 66.  
Second, we construct a sample around more comparable cohorts. Specifically, we 
evaluate the sensitivity of our results to limiting our sample of advisers and 
representatives to those passing a securities exam (either the Series 66 or some other 
exam) before 2010 (Column (2)), and those with pre-2010 work experience (Column 
(3)).50 Our results remain; moreover the coefficient on %66	8	()ℎ+,-	%66 is similar to our 
baseline results (Table 2.3). Column (4) eliminates advisers who passed the Series 66 
outside of the 2008-2011 period, such that our identification comes from advisers passing 
the exam during the same narrow window (though we continue to omit the October 2009-
March 2010 passers). Again, our results remain.  
Third, we perform a placebo test. We study the timing of individuals’ Series 7 
exam, which did not undergo any content change around 2010. Although nearly all Series 
66 passers also passed the precursor Series 7 exam, only a third of those that pass Series 
7 go on to pass the Series 66. This provides a relevant setting to examine confounding 
cohort effects. If our main results come from factors affecting securities exam passers 
around 2010 rather than the change in Series 66 coverage, then we expect to find 
differences in misconduct among those passing the Series 7 before versus after 2010. 
Column (5) reports no such difference. 
 
49 Also note that we control for experience in equation (1), and that adding polynomial experience controls 
or fixed effects for each experience level does not affect our results.  
50 Restricting the Post 2010 Series 66 sample to advisers with recession work experience produces the same 
results. 
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Fourth, we study advisers’ misconduct in event time around their obtaining the 
Series 66 qualification. Specifically, we estimate a version of equation (1), in which we 
replace the treatment indicator by event time dummies for years t-1, t=0, t+1, t+2, and 
>=t+3 (t-2 is the holdout).51 The sample is limited to the subset of advisers passing the 
Series 66. Point estimates on our event time dummy variables can be interpreted as the 
event time differences in misconduct propensities between individuals taking the old 
versus new exam. If advisers passing the old and new exam differ in some fundamental 
way, then we would expect pre-exam differences in their misconduct. However, Figure 
2.1 reveals no such differences.  
The foregoing analysis suggests the reduction in the Series 66 rules and ethics 
coverage had a direct effect on advisers’ conduct. We now study whether this only relates 
to advisers’ awareness of the rules (e.g., compliance), or also their beliefs about 
appropriate conduct (e.g., ethics). Of course, both types of explanations could apply, and 
fully distinguishing between them is not possible in our setting. Instead, our objective is 
to establish whether ethics appears to play some role in generating our findings, by 
examining adviser behavior in greater detail.  
We perform a textual analysis of our misconduct incident descriptions, and flag 
those involving fraud, theft, and deceit. For example, we flag incidents containing 
variations of the following terms and their synonyms: deception, embezzle, fabricate, 
fake, falsify, forgery, impersonate, lie, misappropriate, misrepresent, omission, omit, and 
steal. Of the 64,972 misconduct incidents in our sample window, only 18,754 get flagged. 
We refer to these incidents as Obvious Misconduct. Such misconduct seems more likely 
to result from an adviser’s lapse in ethical judgment than their ignorance about specific 
 
51 As we use lagged control variables, our sample begins in 2007, and the exam changed in 2010, t-2 is the 
earliest date we can use. 
 121 
securities industry rules. In other words, we assume that even individuals outside the 
securities industry without knowledge of its rules would find something inherently wrong 
with the adviser’s conduct.  
Table 2.5 presents the results of estimating equation (1) using an indicator for 
Obvious Misconduct as the dependent variable. We find those advisers passing the old 
exam are 14.6% less likely to engage in obvious misconduct, compared to advisers at the 
same firm location passing the new exam. This suggests that interpretations based on 
compliance or rules awareness cannot fully explain our results. Reinforcing this 
inference, Figure 2.1 shows that the misconduct differences between old and new exam 
passers persist, statistically and economically, for at least three years. Interpretations 
based on rules awareness would predict event time decay in our coefficients, as 
individuals forget specific rules covered by the exam and learn others more pertinent to 
their daily work. By contrast, under an ethics-based interpretation, misconduct 
differences between old and new exam passers persist, because individuals draw more 
lasting lessons from ethics material.  
 
2.4.3 How do Individual and Firm Characteristics Relate to Exam Coverage and 
Misconduct? 
Our next tests study how the characteristics of the individual or their employer 
affect the relation between exam content and misconduct. For individual characteristics, 
we consider whether they had a misconduct record (Prior Misconduct at S66), as well as 
their experience in the securities industry (Yrs Exp at S66), before passing the Series 66. 
For firm characteristics, we measure the percent of other advisers and representatives at 
the firm with misconduct that year (Firm Misconduct). We also assess firm size according 
to whether the firm (branch, defined as a firm-city combination) has 500 (10) or fewer 
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advisers and representatives. Our tests augment equation (1) with interactions for these 
individual and firm variables.  
 In these analyses, we tabulate only the coefficients for %66	8	()ℎ+,-	%66 and its 
interaction with individual (Table 2.6) or firm (Table 2.7) characteristics; however, our 
regression includes all two-way and main effects not subsumed by our fixed effects, as 
well as our controls from equation (1). Column (1) of Table 2.6 shows a significantly 
positive coefficient on the triple interaction term for prior misconduct, indicating that the 
rules/ethics content of the Series 66 is less relevant to those with a misconduct record 
before the exam. Column (2) studies the length of each adviser’s experience when they 
passed the exam. We find the exam content is most relevant to those who are new to the 
profession: %66	8	()ℎ+,-	%66 is most negative and significant for those passing the exam 
with two or fewer years of experience. The triple interaction for those with three years of 
experience is less negative and only marginally significant. We find no effect for those 
with four or more years of experience. Overall, our analysis of individual characteristics 
indicates that the effects of rules and ethics training on behavior depends on when the 
adviser passes the exam. Those already engaging in misconduct, or having spent several 
years working in the securities industry, respond least or not at all. This result echoes one 
respondent to a Wall Street Journal recruiter survey who said “If you’re not ethical by the 
time you’re 27, no classroom experience is going to make a difference” (Alsop, 2007). 
 Table 2.7 studies firm characteristics. In Column (1) we find the rules and ethics 
coverage is less consequential for advisers working at firms where misconduct is more 
widespread (the interaction with Firm Misconduct is positive). Economically, doubling 
the prevalence of misconduct at a firm reduces the misconduct difference between old 
and new exam passers by nearly half. Column (2) studies firm size, and finds no effect of 
the exam change for advisers working at small firms (S66 x Ethics S66 + S66 x Ethics 
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S66 x Small Firm is statistically indistinguishable from zero). Column (3) repeats this test 
for small branches. Again, we find less of an effect of the exam change for advisers at 
small branches (although the t-statistic for the triple interaction is only 1.47). 
 
2.4.4 Advisers’ Response to Ethical Scandals 
How does the extent of an adviser’s rules and ethics training affect their 
willingness to remain with an employer violating professional standards and drawing 
attention for its behavior? A salient example of one such employer in our sample is Wells 
Fargo, one of the largest financial institutions and adviser employers in the US. Starting 
in 2011, Wells Fargo branch employees began creating fake savings, checking, and credit 
card accounts without client authorization. The extent of the fraud became widely known 
in 2016, when the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) revealed that thousands 
of employees opened over two million fake accounts. Resulting fines and sanctions 
totaled $185 million, while settlements have exceeded $3 billion.  
The fraud had repercussions beyond the consumer banking division of Wells 
Fargo. A New York Times article describes the reaction of Melissa Kinnard, a former 
Wells Fargo investment adviser: “Frustrated by what she saw as the bank’s culture, Ms. 
Kinnard quit in January” (Flitter and Cowley, 2019).52 Incidentally, Kinnard passed the 
old Series 66 exam, and has no reported misconduct during her 33-year career in the 
securities industry.  
Table 2.8 studies all Wells Fargo advisers and representatives, and investigates 
whether the propensity to remain at the firm after the scandal broke relates to the Series 
66 coverage. Each year, we measure an indicator for whether the individual exits Wells 
Fargo. We model the exit indicator as a function of time, our Series 66 variables, controls, 
 
52 Interestingly, in April 2017 Wells Fargo CEO Tim Scott announced an initiative to rehire 1,000 
employees who were wrongfully terminated or had quit in protest of fraud (Keller, 2017).  
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polynomials for years of experience, and city x year fixed effects. While the CFPB 
announcement, Senate Banking Committee Hearing, fine announcement, and share price 
drop occurred in fall 2016, reports of an aggressive sales culture at the bank appeared 
before. In 2015, the City of Los Angeles sued Wells Fargo “for pressuring employees of 
its retail bank to commit fraudulent acts, such as opening customer accounts without their 
approval” (Rudegeair, 2015). Later that year, the Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency and the San Francisco Federal Reserve created probes of their own (Glazer, 
2015). Ultimately, the CFPB built upon these investigations in 2016 as later revealed in 
FOIA documents (CFPB, 2018). We therefore experiment with different event windows 
and samples.  
Column (1) shows that starting in 2015, those advisers passing the old Series 66 
exam are 2.8% more likely than those passing the old exam to exit. This represents a 
meaningful margin above the 12.9% average exit rate for this sample. Column (2) repeats 
the test with a sample beginning in 2013 instead of 2012, and finds similar results. 
Columns (3) and (4) use the year 2016 as the beginning of the post-fraud revelation 
period, and again finds advisers with the old Series 66 qualification are more likely to 
leave Wells Fargo. 
We then use this case study to motivate an analysis of employee turnover 
following evidence of a marked shift in the behavior of their colleagues in our entire 
sample. The first of the four misconduct measures we study is Misconduct Shock, based 
on the percent of a firm’s advisers and representatives involved in a misconduct incident 
that year. The second is Misconduct Ever Shock, based on the percent of a firm’s advisers 
and representatives with a misconduct incident from a prior year on their record. Thus, 
the first measure considers the flow of new misconduct, while the second considers the 
misconduct history of individuals currently working at the firm. Our third (fourth) 
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measure is Penalty Amount Shock (Penalty Number Shock) which uses the firm’s dollar 
amount of (number of incidents with) damages granted, sanctions or settlements per 
individual.  
The analysis proceeds in four steps. First, for each firm-year we model the four 
misconduct measures described above as a function of firm size (equal to the log 
individual count) and firm and year fixed effects. The firm and year fixed effects help us 
detect deviations in misconduct relative to the firm’s long run average and the industry 
as a whole. We focus on within-firm deviations rather than levels, because firm 
misconduct culture differs and we presume each individual matched to their firm knowing 
something about its culture. Second, we extract the residual from the step one regression 
as our proxy for changes in the firm’s misconduct culture. Third, we create an indicator 
for residuals above the 95th percentile for the sample. Fourth, we model individual exits 
from the firm as a function of our Series 66 variables and their interaction with this 
indicator, polynomials for years experience, as well as the controls and fixed effects from 
equation (1). To ensure the individual was not involved in the scandal, we omit 
individuals with a misconduct incident on their record that year.  
We present the results in Table 2.9, Column (1) shows that at firms experiencing 
a spike in misconduct that year, advisers with more rules and ethics training are 2.7% 
more likely to leave. This represents about one-sixth of the average turnover rate for 
advisers in this sample. Column (2) shows a negative but insignificant coefficient on 
Misconduct Ever Shock. Thus, a spike in new misconduct incidents (Column (1)) appears 
more likely to trigger turnover in our old Series 66 passers than a rise in the number of 
advisers with a misconduct history (say, due to hiring advisers with such histories or 
turnover among those without them).  
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In terms of financial penalties, both the dollar amount of penalties and the number 
of incidents involving payment predict turnover for old Series 66 passers, but only the 
latter are statistically significant at conventional levels. Overall, our results suggest that 
rules and ethics training affects employer-employee matching through advisers’ 
willingness to remain at firms experiencing scandals. 
Our final tests examine an implication of these turnover results: departures by 
advisers with more ethics training predict future scandals. Based on our Table 2.9 
findings, we examine whether advisers prefer to leave firms before a scandal breaks. For 
example, firms may hire individuals with misconduct records, fail to punish 
transgressions, underinvest in controls that protect investors, or pursue more aggressive 
sales strategies. Advisers with more ethics training may respond by leaving, before such 
developments manifest in misconduct.  
We study individual exits from firms as a function of these firms’ future 
misconduct, using the lead (year t+1) value of our firm misconduct indicators from Table 
2.9. As before, we use equation (1) and omit individuals engaging in misconduct 
themselves that year. 
Table 2.10 presents the results. Column (1) shows that, compared to advisers 
passing the new exam, advisers passing the old exam are 6.5% more likely to leave firms 
with major scandals and misconduct on the horizon. Notably, the coefficient for S66 x 
Ethics S66 x Misconduct Shockt+1 is more than double the analogous coefficient based on 
the contemporaneous misconduct shock from Column (1) of Table 2.9, Columns (2) and 
(3) also find larger coefficients than the analogous columns in Table 2.9, while Column 
(4) finds a smaller, although still significant, coefficient.  
Overall, our results are consistent with 1) advisers observing signals of future 
misconduct at their firm, and 2) advisers with more ethics training being just as likely to 
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leave before the signals manifest in misconduct as after. Then, departures of certain types 
of advisers can reveal the firm’s future misconduct. Of course, we cannot observe the 
exact circumstances under which departures occur. Rather than resignations, departures 
of ethics-trained advisers may be involuntary, perhaps because the individual refuses to 
participate in aggressive sales practices, or underperforms in firms where such practices 
are embraced. However, such departures would also predict future misconduct at the firm.  
 
2.5 Conclusion 
We study a 2010 change in the Series 66 exam, which qualifies individuals as 
investment advisers. The exam shifted emphasis from rules and ethics to technical topics. 
We use this shift to proxy for the extent of advisers’ rules and ethics training, and study 
their conduct and labor market activity through their career. Comparing two advisers at 
the same firm location, with the same qualifications, in the same year, we find those with 
more rules and ethics training are one-fourth less likely to commit misconduct. The 
misconduct differences are best explained by the exam content change having a direct 
effect on adviser behavior, instead of unobservable differences between old and new 
exam cohorts. While both compliance and ethics-based interpretations for our misconduct 
results may be valid, our analysis of obvious offenses suggests the exam influences 
perceptions of right and wrong, and not only awareness of specific rules.  
We find the exam change was less consequential for those engaging in misconduct 
before their exam, or working for firms where misconduct is common. As such, prior 
infractions and contagion of misconduct behavior appears to reduce the effectiveness of 
the exam at preventing transgressions. Finally, we show when a firm is experiencing a 
spike in misconduct and financial sanctions, those advisers with more rules and ethics 
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training are more likely to leave. Such departures also predict future misconduct and 
sanctions.  
Overall, our results can be understood through the lens of Becker’s model of crime 
(1968, 1992). In this model, “many people are constrained by moral and ethical 
considerations, and did not commit crimes even when they were profitable and there was 
no danger of detection… The amount of crime is determined not only by the rationality 
and preferences of would-be criminals, but also by the economic and social environment 
created by… opportunities for employment, schooling, and training programs.” (Becker, 
1992: 41-42). In our context, ethics training can affect an individual’s behavior by 
increasing the value of their reputation, as well as the psychological costs of committing 
misconduct. But such effects will be moderated by the employer’s culture, which affects 
the stigma of offenses, as well as the individual’s beliefs about appropriate conduct.  
While we cannot evaluate all of the tradeoffs behind adviser training, our results 
are relevant to discussions and analyses of investment adviser misconduct. More 
importantly, to our knowledge we present the first large sample evidence of rules and 
ethics training affecting the conduct and labor market activity of individuals in the 
financial industry.  
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2.6 Appendix 2.A: Variable Definitions 
Variable Definition 
Misconduct 
An indicator equal to one for individuals involved in a misconduct 
incident at the firm that year, and zero otherwise. Following Egan et 
al. (2019), misconduct incidents include the following categories: 
Civil-Final, Criminal-Final Disposition, Customer Dispute-
Award/Judgment, Customer Dispute-Settled, Employment 
Separation after Allegations, and Regulatory-Final. 
Obvious Misconduct 
An indicator equal to one for individuals involved in an obvious 
misconduct incident at the firm that year, and zero otherwise. From 
our original set of misconduct incidents, we use textual analysis to 
classify obvious cases as those involving fraud, theft, or deception as 
described in the text.  
Exit Firm An indicator equal to one for individuals who leave their employer that year, and zero otherwise.  
Log # Exams The natural logarithm of the number of securities exams passed that month. 
Series 66 An indicator equal to one for individual-years after the individual has passed the Series 66, and zero otherwise. 
Ethics 66 
An indicator equal to one for advisers who pass the Series 66 before 
January 1, 2010, and zero otherwise. The variable is recorded as zero 
until the individual passes the Series 66.  
New Placebo Series 7 
An indicator equal to one for individuals who pass the Series 7 on or 
after January 1, 2010, and zero otherwise. The variable is recorded 
as zero until the individual passes the Series 7. 
Prior Misconduct at S66 An indicator equal to one for advisers who had a misconduct incident on their record when they passed the Series 66 exam. 
Yrs Exp at S66 
A series of indicator variables each equal to one for advisers with 
various years of experience in the securities industry when they 
passed the Series 66 exam, and zero otherwise.  
Firm Misconduct 
The percent of advisers and representatives at the firm with a 
misconduct incident that year. We measure this for each individual-
year observation by omitting the individual themselves from the 
average calculation, to avoid a mechanical relation.  
Small Firm An indicator equal to one for firms with 500 or fewer advisers and representatives, and zero otherwise. 
Small Branch An indicator equal to one for firm-city pairs with 10 or fewer advisers and representatives, and zero otherwise. 
Misconduct Shock 
An indicator equal to one for firm-years with an abnormal level of 
new misconduct that year. We classify an abnormal firm-year as one 
whose residual from a regression with size controls and year and firm 
fixed effects is above the 95th percentile. 
Misconduct Ever Shock 
An indicator equal to one for firm-years with an abnormal percent of 
individuals with a misconduct history that year. We classify an 
abnormal firm-year as one whose residual from a regression with 
size controls and year and firm fixed effects is above the 95th 
percentile. 
Penalty Amount Shock 
An indicator equal to one for firm-years with an abnormal level of 
damages granted, sanctions, and settlements per individual that year. 
We classify an abnormal firm-year as one whose residual from a 
regression with size controls and year and firm fixed effects is above 
the 95th percentile. 
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Appendix 2.A (continued) 
 
Variable Definition 
Penalty Number Shock 
An indicator equal to one for firm-years with an abnormal percent of 
individuals attracting damages, sanctions, and settlements that year. 
We classify an abnormal firm-year as one whose residual from a 
regression with size controls and year and firm fixed effects is above 
the 95th percentile. 
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2.7 Appendix 2.B: Example Investment Adviser Record on BrokerCheck 
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2.8 Appendix 2.C: Exam Bunching 
 (1) (2) 
 Log # Exams Log # Exams 
Oct 2009 x S66 0.015 -0.010 
 [0.43] [-0.21] 
Nov 2009 x S66 0.215*** 0.322*** 
 [6.11] [6.78] 
Dec 2009 x S66 0.464*** 0.388*** 
 [13.16] [8.17] 
Jan 2010 x S66 -0.440*** -0.295*** 
 [-12.48] [-6.22] 
Feb 2010 x S66 -0.203*** -0.091* 
 [-5.75] [-1.91] 
Mar 2010 x S66 -0.133*** -0.054 
 [-3.78] [-1.13] 
Adj R-Sq. 0.954 0.960 
N 336 144 
Cluster by Month-Year Yes Yes 
Sample Years 2008-2011 2008-2011 
Sample Exams All S63, S65, S66 
Month-S66 FEs Yes Yes 
Month-Year FEs Yes Yes 
Exam Type FEs Yes Yes 
This table models the number of exams passed as a function of time. The dependent variable is the log 
number of exams passed. The unit of observation is exam type-month-year. The sample in Column (1) 
contains observations from the Series 6, 7, 24, 63, 65, and 66. The sample in Column (2)n contains only 
observations from the Series 63, 65, and 66, which all experienced a similar change in minimum passing 
grade around January 2010. Reported below the coefficients are t-statistics calculated with standard errors 
clustered at the month-year level. *, **, *** indicate significance at the two-tailed 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. See Appendix 2.A for variables definitions. 
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Figure 2.1: Series 66 Exam Type and Misconduct in Event Time 
 
This figure plots event year coefficients and confidence intervals obtained from estimating the following 
model: !!"# = 	∑ %#$%#&' × '(ℎ*+,66! × .66!#	+	.66!# + 	0! + 	0"# + γ ×	234(536,!# 	+	7!"#. The X-axis 
labels the event year(s) for each coefficient marking an event year relative to the investment adviser’s exam 
at t=0. We omit the indicator for t-2, which serves as the benchmark period. Vertical bands represent 90% 
confidence intervals for the point estimates in each event year, and are calculated based on standard errors 
clustered at the firm level. We drop event-time observations prior to t-2 to ensure common support for pre- 
and post-Series 66 exam passers. 
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Figure 2.2: Exams Passed by Exam Type between September 2009 and April 2010 
 
This figure presents the share of exam passers by month and exam type. Each month, we divide the number 
of exam passers by the number of exam passers for the calendar year (“Month Shares”). 
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Table 2.1: Sample Construction Misconduct Analysis 
Firm-Adviser-Year observations from 2007-2017 8,838,880 
Less Observations from:  
  Advisers who pass the S66 between October 2009 and March 2010 (73,159) 
  Advisers who pass the S66 after July 2016 (90,626) 
  Year of Adviser’s S66 exam (174,642) 
Final Sample for Table 2.3 to 2.6 misconduct analyses 8,500,453 
This table describes our sample construction. 
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Table 2.2: Summary Statistics 
Panel A: Individual Firm-Year Variables 
 Mean Std. Dev. 25% 50% 75% N 
Misconduct (%) 0.764 8.709 0.000 0.000 0.000 8,500,453 
Egregious Misconduct (%) 0.221 4.692 0.000 0.000 0.000 8,500,453 
Misconduct Ever (%) 7.879 26.941 0.000 0.000 0.000 8,500,453 
Exit Firm 0.167 0.373 0.000 0.000 0.000 8,500,453 
Years Experience 12.955 9.587 5.000 11.000 19.000 8,500,453 
S6 0.371 0.483 0.000 0.000 1.000 8,500,453 
S7 0.655 0.475 0.000 1.000 1.000 8,500,453 
S24 0.146 0.353 0.000 0.000 0.000 8,500,453 
S63 0.723 0.447 0.000 1.000 1.000 8,500,453 
S65 0.202 0.401 0.000 0.000 0.000 8,500,453 
S66 0.200 0.400 0.000 0.000 0.000 8,500,453 
Ethics S66 0.162 0.369 0.000 0.000 0.000 8,500,453 
Other Exam 0.308 0.462 0.000 0.000 1.000 8,500,453 
 
Panel B: Series 66 Exam Passer Characteristics at Series 66 Date 
 Mean Std. Dev. 25% 50% 75% N 
Years Experience  4.718 6.187 1.000 2.000 6.000 263,924 
Misconduct Ever 0.040 0.196 0.000 0.000 0.000 263,924 
This table summarizes the individual-firm-year and exam passer variables in our sample. In Panel B, we 
measure characteristics of only Series 66 passers, at the time they passed their exam.  
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Table 2.3: Exam Coverage and Adviser Misconduct 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Misconduct Misconduct Misconduct Misconduct Misconduct 
S66 0.210*** 0.217*** 0.113** 0.054   
 [4.53] [4.70] [2.33] [1.07]  
S66 x Ethics S66 -0.162* -0.168* -0.197** -0.238*** -0.201** 
 [-1.82] [-1.92] [-2.38] [-2.88] [-2.24] 
Adj R-Sq. 0.166 0.169 0.178 0.214 0.219 
N 8,423,524  8,421,628  8,379,914  7,851,574  7,630,507  
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FEs Yes Yes No No No 
Individual FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FEs No Yes No No No 
Firm-Year FEs No No Yes No No 
Firm-Year-City FEs No No No Yes No 
Firm-Year-City-S66 FEs No No No No Yes 
This table models individual misconduct as a function of exam coverage using equation (1). The unit of 
observation is individual-firm-year. The dependent variable is Misconduct, the flow of new misconduct for 
the individual during the year. The regression sample is defined in Table 2.1. Reported below the 
coefficients are t-statistics calculated with standard errors clustered at the firm level. *, **, *** indicate 
significance at the two-tailed 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. See Appendix 2.A for variables 
definitions. 
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Table 2.4: Exam Coverage and Adviser Misconduct—Robustness Analysis 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Misconduct Misconduct Misconduct Misconduct Misconduct 
  Full Has Pre-2010 Has Recession Series 66 Full 
 Sample Exam Experience 2008-2011 Sample 
S66 0.004 0.069 0.070 0.095  
 [0.07] [1.31] [1.34] [1.11]  
S66 x Ethics S66 -0.155* -0.214** -0.214** -0.332***  
 [-1.82] [-2.40] [-2.40] [-3.27]  
S7 x New Placebo S7     -0.039 
     [-0.37] 
Adj R-Sq. 0.214 0.226 0.225 0.213 0.217 
N 7,851,535 6,574,094 6,638,732 6,449,919 7,696,320 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Individual FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm-Year-City FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cohort-Year-Year FEs Yes No No No No 
This table models individual misconduct as a function of exam coverage using equation (1). The unit of observation is individual-firm-year. The dependent variable is 
Misconduct, the flow of new misconduct for the individual during the year. The regression sample is defined in Table 2.1, and further restricted as labeled in the column headers. 
Reported below the coefficients are t-statistics calculated with standard errors clustered at the firm level. *, **, *** indicate significance at the two-tailed 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively. See Appendix 2.A for variables definitions. 
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Table 2.5: Exam Coverage and Obvious Misconduct 
  (1) 
 Obvious 
 Misconduct 
S66 0.023 
 [1.20] 
S66 x Ethics S66 -0.146*** 
 [-3.60] 
Adj R-Sq. 0.147 
N 7,851,574 
Controls Yes 
Individual FEs Yes 
Firm-Year-City FEs Yes 
This table models obvious misconduct as a function of exam coverage using equation (1). The unit of 
observation is individual-firm-year. The dependent variable is Obvious Misconduct, the flow of new 
misconduct involving fraud, theft, or deception for the individual during the year. The regression sample is 
defined in Table 2.1. Reported below the coefficients are t-statistics calculated with standard errors 
clustered at the firm level. *, **, *** indicate significance at the two-tailed 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. See Appendix 2.A for variables definitions. 
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Table 2.6: Individual Characteristics 
  (1) (2) 
 Misconduct Misconduct 
S66 x Ethics S66 -0.399***   
 [-5.12]  
S66 x Ethics S66 x Prior Misconduct at S66 0.036***  
 [3.76]  
S66 x Ethics S66 x <=2 Yrs Exp at S66  -0.589*** 
  [-5.09] 
S66 x Ethics S66 x 3 Yrs Exp at S66  -0.411 
  [-1.53] 
S66 x Ethics S66 x 4 Yrs Exp at S66  -0.095 
  [-0.46] 
S66 x Ethics S66 x >=5 Yrs Exp at S66  -0.071 
  [-0.56] 
Adj R-Sq. 0.214 0.214 
N 7,851,574 7,851,574 
Controls, Main and Two-Way Effects Yes Yes 
Individual Fes Yes Yes 
Firm-Year-City FEs Yes Yes 
This table models individual misconduct as a function of exam coverage and individual characteristics 
using equation (1). The unit of observation is individual-firm-year. The dependent variable is Misconduct, 
the flow of new misconduct for the individual during the year. Prior Misconduct at S66 is an indicator for 
whether the individual had a misconduct record at the time they passed the Series 66. Yrs Exp at S66 is an 
indicator for various levels of adviser years of experience at the time they passed the Series 66. The 
regression sample is defined in Table 2.1. Reported below the coefficients are t-statistics calculated with 
standard errors clustered at the firm level. *, **, *** indicate significance at the two-tailed 10%, 5%, and 
1% levels, respectively. See Appendix 2.A for variables definitions. 
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Table 2.7: Firm Characteristics 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 Misconduct Misconduct Misconduct 
S66 x Ethics S66 -0.324*** -0.286*** -0.259*** 
 [-3.73] [-3.48] [-3.15] 
S66 x Ethics S66 x Firm Misconduct 0.204***   
 [4.15]   
S66 x Ethics S66 x Small Firm  0.330***  
  [3.82]  
S66 x Ethics S66 x Small Branch    0.142 
    [1.57] 
Adj R-Sq. 0.215 0.214 0.214 
N 7,851,574 7,851,574 7,851,574 
Controls, Main and Two-Way Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Individual FEs Yes Yes Yes 
Firm-Year-City FEs Yes Yes Yes 
This table models individual misconduct as a function of exam coverage and firm characteristics using 
equation (1). The unit of observation is individual-firm-year. The dependent variable is Misconduct, the 
flow of new misconduct for the individual during the year. Firm Misconduct is the percent of advisers and 
representatives at the firm with a misconduct incident on their record before that year. Small Firm (Small 
Branch) is an indicator for firms (firm-city combinations) with fewer than 500 (10) advisers and 
representatives. The regression sample is defined in Table 2.1. Reported below the coefficients are t-
statistics calculated with standard errors clustered at the firm level. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 
two-tailed 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. See Appendix 2.A for variables definitions. 
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Table 2.8: Exam Coverage and Adviser’s Response to Ethical Scandals: Wells 
Fargo 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Exit Firm Exit Firm Exit Firm Exit Firm 
  Year>2011 Year>2012 Year>2011 Year>2012 
S66 x Ethics S66 x Year>=2015 0.028*** 0.031***   
 [3.18] [3.39]   
S66 x Ethics S66 x Year>=2016   0.040*** 0.042*** 
   [4.87] [5.22] 
Adj R-Sq. 0.052 0.047 0.052 0.047 
N 200,074  167,077  200,074  167,077  
Controls and Main Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls for Polynomials of Experience Yes Yes Yes Yes 
City-Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes 
This table models individual turnover as a function of exam coverage. The unit of observation is individual-
firm-year. The dependent variable is Exit Firm, an indicator equal to one if the individual leaves the firm 
that year. The sample is limited to individuals employed by Wells Fargo and the years labeled at the top of 
the column. Reported below the coefficients are t-statistics calculated with standard errors clustered at the 
city level. *, **, *** indicate significance at the two-tailed 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. See 
Appendix 2.A for variables definitions. 
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Table 2.9: Exam Coverage and Adviser’s Response to Ethical Scandals: Full 
Sample 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Exit Firm Exit Firm Exit Firm Exit Firm 
S66 x Ethics S66 -0.026*** -0.025*** -0.029*** -0.029*** 
 [-3.48] [-3.29] [-3.79] [-3.77] 
S66 x Ethics S66 x Misconduct Shock 0.027***    
 [2.94]    
S66 x Ethics S66 x Misconduct Ever Shock  0.022   
  [1.21]   
S66 x Ethics S66 x Penalty Amount Shock   0.009  
   [1.58]  
S66 x Ethics S66 x Penalty Number Shock    0.051** 
    [2.28] 
Adj R-Sq. 0.359 0.359 0.359 0.359 
N 7,787,627 7,787,627 7,787,627 7,787,627 
Controls and Main Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls for Polynomials of Experience Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Individual FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm-Year-City FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes 
This table models individual turnover as a function of exam coverage. The unit of observation is individual-
firm-year. The dependent variable is Exit Firm, an indicator equal to one if the individual leaves the firm 
that year. Misconduct Shock (Misconduct Ever Shock) is an indicator equal to one for firm-years whose 
abnormal misconduct that year (the percent of advisers and representatives with a misconduct history) is 
above the 95th percentile. Penalty Amount Shock (Penalty Number Shock) is an indicator equal to one for 
firm-years whose damages granted, sanctions, and settlements per individual (percent of advisers and 
representatives attracting damages, sanctions, and settlements) is above the 95th percentile. Reported below 
the coefficients are t-statistics calculated with standard errors clustered at the firm level. *, **, *** indicate 
significance at the two-tailed 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. See Appendix 2.A for variables 
definitions. 
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Table 2.10: Exam Coverage, Adviser Exits, and Future Ethical Scandals 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Exit Firm Exit Firm Exit Firm Exit Firm 
S66 x Ethics S66 -0.030*** -0.025*** -0.031*** -0.030*** 
 [-3.80] [-3.31] [-4.06] [-3.84]    
S66 x Ethics S66 x Misconduct Shockt+1 0.065***    
 [4.09]    
S66 x Ethics S66 x Misconduct Ever Shockt+1  0.024***   
  [2.92]   
S66 x Ethics S66 x Penalty Amount Shockt+1   0.013***  
   [3.07]  
S66 x Ethics S66 x Penalty Number Shockt+1    0.034*** 
    [3.75] 
Adj R-Sq. 0.359 0.359 0.359 0.359 
N 7,787,627 7,787,627 7,787,627 7,787,627 
Controls and Main Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls for Polynomials of Experience Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Individual FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm-Year-City FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes 
This table models individual turnover as a function of exam coverage. The unit of observation is individual-
firm-year. The dependent variable is Exit Firm, an indicator equal to one if the individual leaves the firm 
that year. Misconduct Shock (Misconduct Ever Shock) is an indicator equal to one for firm-years whose 
abnormal misconduct next year (the percent of advisers and representatives with a misconduct history next 
year) is above the 95th percentile. Penalty Amount Shock (Penalty Number Shock) is an indicator equal to 
one for firm-years whose damages granted, sanctions, and settlements per individual next year (percent of 
advisers and representatives attracting damages, sanctions, and settlements next year) is above the 95th 
percentile. Reported below the coefficients are t-statistics calculated with standard errors clustered at the 
firm level. *, **, *** indicate significance at the two-tailed 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. See 
Appendix 2.A for variables definitions. 
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3 Mandatory Peer Review and CPA 
Entrepreneurship 
3.1 Introduction 
I study whether mandatory peer review affects CPA entrepreneurship—that is, 
CPAs’ decisions to start, continue, or cease operating their own CPA firms. In an effort 
to promote audit quality, CPA firms have to be reviewed by other CPA firms to meet 
CPA firm licensing requirements. Proponents of this peer review system argue that it 
allows to leverage industry expertise. Critics, on the other hand, contend that peer review 
lacks the necessary independence that effective oversight requires. While peer review is 
the main oversight mechanism for CPA firms without public clients, little is known about 
its consequences. 
I study the consequences of mandatory peer review in the context of CPA 
entrepreneurs for two main reasons. First, this provides a setting in which litigation costs 
and reputational capital at risk—factors that prior literature has identified to shape the 
audit environment—are less severe. Focusing on a setting in which these factors are 
hardly present provides an opportunity to empirically isolate potential effects of 
mandatory peer review (Vanstraelen and Schelleman, 2017). Second, there is a wider and 
open debate whether imposing licensing requirements—such as mandatory peer review—
fosters or hampers entrepreneurial activity.  
On the one hand, mandatory peer review may foster CPA entrepreneurship. 
Current CPA firm licensing requirements prescribe peer review in an effort to maintain 
and promote service quality. Theory posits that such licensing requirements can provide 
minimum quality standards, reduce quality uncertainty, and, ultimately, prevent market 
failures (Akerlof, 1970; Leland, 1979). Recent entrepreneurship research argues that this 
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may particularly benefit entrepreneurs, who lack alternative means—such as reputation—
to credibly signal their quality (Albert et al., 2019).53  
On the other hand, mandatory peer review may hamper CPA entrepreneurship. 
Requiring participation in peer review programs to meet CPA licensing standards entails 
compliance costs and entrepreneurs may be particularly sensitive to such costs, 
presumably because they face acute resource constraints. Regulators are increasingly 
concerned that compliance costs present barriers to entrepreneurship, negatively affecting 
the rate of entrepreneurial activity. In fact, the U.S. Department of the Treasury Office of 
Economic Policy, the Council of Economic Advisers, and the Department of Labor 
(2015) place potential adverse effects of licensing-induced compliance costs among their 
top reasons why licensing regimes may necessitate immediate reform efforts. 
To empirically study the effects of mandatory peer review on CPA 
entrepreneurship, I construct a novel dataset based on CPA (firm) licenses, which allows 
to observe CPA entrepreneurs,54 and exploit the state-level staggered introduction of peer 
review mandates in a difference-in-differences (DiD) design. This research design allows 
to control for general time trends as well as time-invariant state-level factors that may 
possibly also correlate with CPA entrepreneurship. A potential concern with this research 
design that is shared with virtually any study investigating policy interventions is that 
regulation does not occur in a vacuum (Ball, 1980; Leuz and Wysocki, 2016; Karpoff and 
 
53 In addition, based on research in the sociology of occupations, Albert et al. (2019) argue that licensing 
may not only help to overcome information asymmetry problems within an occupation but also by boosting 
the legitimacy of an occupation relative other occupations offering substitute services. In the context of tax 
preparers, the authors argue (and provide some cross-sectional evidence consistent with the idea) that 
licensing provides a signal to consumers that tax preparers are more legitimate than providers of substitute 
services, e.g., tax software providers. 
54 In order to start a CPA firm, an individual must hold a CPA license. For CPAs, licensing does not only 
apply at the individual level but also at the firm level and both of these licenses can be observed through 
license verification tools. Crucially, some states also provide CPA firm ownership data which allow to infer 
founding manager-owners, i.e., CPA entrepreneurs. Thus, CPA licenses allow to observe actual 
(prospective) CPA entrepreneurs (at least in the short run). Throughout this paper, I follow recent literature 
(as well as Census definitions) and define an entrepreneur as “someone who launches a business” (e.g., 
Levine and Rubinstein, 2017).  
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Wittry, 2018; Leuz, 2018). To alleviate such concerns, I explore differences in the 
characteristics of early- and late-adopting states. Comparisons suggest that the adoption 
timing is partly driven by the organizational structures of State Boards of Accountancy, 
which mitigates related concerns and provides some insights into the political economy 
of audit market regulation.  
Turning to my main analysis, I first explore whether the announcement of peer 
review mandates affects the probability of individual CPAs to become CPA 
entrepreneurs. To do so, I estimate DiD models comparing the probabilities before and 
after a peer review mandate announcement relative to a control group. The estimates show 
that CPA entrepreneurship declines with the announcement of peer review mandates. The 
estimates are statistically significant and economically meaningful. Compared to an 
unconditional CPA entrepreneurship rate of 0.7%, the most conservative estimates 
suggest that the likelihood of an individual to start a CPA firm declines by around 14%. 
The validity of these estimates critically assumes that trends in CPA entrepreneurship 
rates would move in parallel absent any regulatory intervention. Evidence suggests that 
probabilities do not differ before the announcement date but gradually decline with the 
announcement of peer review mandates, which provides some assurance that the main 
identifying assumption is not violated.  
In the next step of my analysis, I compare exit rates of CPA entrepreneurs in the 
treatment group to exit rates of CPA entrepreneurs in the control group and find that exit 
rates double with the introduction of mandatory peer review. Mapping out exit rates in 
event time shows that these increases occur with the introduction of mandatory peer 
review but not before. 
The findings, thus far, indicate that CPA entrepreneurship declines with the 
introduction of mandatory peer review, which is in line with research investigating the 
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effects of entry costs on firm formation (e.g., Djankov et al., 2002; Klapper et al., 2006; 
Branstetter et al., 2011). However, a remaining question is whether the reported entry and 
exit patterns are consistent with mandatory peer review promoting screening on service 
quality. While the findings do not support the idea that mandatory peer review sparks 
entrepreneurial activity by boosting the legitimacy of the profession (Albert et al., 2019), 
the results may still be in line with the (stated) policy objective if mandatory peer review 
facilitates screening out CPA entrepreneurs that provide low-quality services. 
To investigate whether mandatory peer review facilitates active screening on 
quality, I explore potential heterogenous exit effects based on CPA entrepreneur (pre-
treatment) service quality. Specifically, I conduct tests akin to DeFond and Lennox 
(2011), who investigate audit firm exits around the introduction of Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) inspections. Following the conceptual arguments 
by DeFond and Lennox (2011), I argue that if mandatory peer review facilitated active 
screening on quality, we would expect that providers of low-quality services 
predominantly account for observed exits, since, at the margin, it is more costly for these 
entrepreneurs to meet more stringent regulatory requirements. Cross-sectional tests 
comparing changes in exit rates for CPA entrepreneurs subject to disciplinary actions 
prior to the introduction of mandatory peer review—that is, CPA entrepreneurs fined by 
State Boards of Accountancy for substandard service provision—to those that are not do 
not suggest that providers of low-quality services exit the market at higher rates with the 
introduction of mandatory peer review. 
I proceed by exploring which CPA entrepreneurs account for the stark increase in 
exit rates. Prior literature proposes that increases in licensing requirements may overly 
affect historically underrepresented groups and suggests different mechanisms through 
which this may occur. Specifically, Law and Marks (2009; 2017) offer conceptual 
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arguments that an increase in licensing requirements may either harm historically 
underrepresented groups as it gives rise to discriminatory practices—such as “group 
favoritism”—or as these groups find it more costly to meet licensing standards. To test 
whether this is the case and, if so, through which mechanisms, I provide several additional 
cross-sectional tests. 
I first explore whether exit rates are pronounced for (relatively) underrepresented 
groups.55 Estimates show that increases in exit rates are pronounced for female but not 
for non-white CPA entrepreneurs. These results are consistent with the idea that increases 
in licensing requirements reduce the presence of historically underrepresented groups 
because they find it more costly to meet these requirements but are not consistent with 
group favoritism. If mandatory peer review gave rise to group favoritism, we would 
expect to observe similar exit patterns for non-white CPA entrepreneurs (Egan et al., 
2018).56  
To further substantiate which mechanisms may be at play, I explore differences 
in exit rates by gender and age and find that exits are most pronounced for young female 
CPA entrepreneurs. There are two main explanations for this pattern.57 First, there may 
be differences in revenues between young female and male CPA entrepreneurs. Gurley-
 
55 A related literature investigates the effects of licensing on minority labor participation (see, for instance, 
Federman et al., 2006; Law and Marks, 2007; 2012; 2017; Klein et al., 2012; Blair and Chung, 2018a; 
2018b). Thus far, this literature arrives at mixed conclusions. One of the reasons for the mixed evidence 
might be that it is challenging to identify actual licensees within the (aggregated and anonymized Census) 
data prior literature primarily uses (see the discussion in Klein et al., 2012; Law and Marks, 2012; as well 
as Gittleman et al., 2018). My approach that directly builds on licensing data and uses variation in regulatory 
requirements (for licensees) may provide an alternative that helps to overcome some of the data limitations 
this literature faces. 
56 Recent work by Egan et al. (2018) shows that women face harsher career outcomes than men subsequent 
to (the same) low-quality service provision. Egan et al. (2018) attribute this “gender punishment gap” to 
group favoritism. Following their conceptual arguments, I explore potential differences in policy responses 
for both female (relative to male) and white (relative to non-white) CPA entrepreneurs. The rationale for 
this test is that if the observed differences in exit rates across gender were due to group favoritism, we 
would expect to observe similar exit patterns for non-white CPA entrepreneurs. 
57 Prior literature has also proposed other explanations such as differences in (re-)financing availability 
(e.g., Lee et al., 1999). Such explanations, however, seem less likely in light of the observed differences in 
exit rates across gender and age. 
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Calvez et al. (2009) report that young female entrepreneurs allocate less time to working 
in their firms than male entrepreneurs due to childcare. The (related) second explanation 
is rooted in the literature on household production and proposes that women show greater 
income elasticities than men due to a larger number of substitution margins—such as 
childcare (e.g., Mincer, 1962; Becker, 1965; Heckman, 2015). Additional tests show that 
the increase in exit rates among young female (but not young male) CPA entrepreneurs 
is even more pronounced in areas with limited childcare availability, which hints at the 
latter explanation. 
I provide several additional tests. First, I use Census data on CPA sole proprietors 
and show that the stock of CPA sole proprietors declines with the introduction of 
mandatory peer review, while revenues accruing to CPA sole proprietors remaining in 
the market stay constant.58 Second, I match CPA entrepreneur license data with firm 
incorporation (and dissolution) documents and show that some CPA entrepreneurs do not 
only cease to hold CPA firm licenses but dissolve their firms altogether. Similar to prior 
findings, increases in firm dissolutions are pronounced for female CPA entrepreneurs but 
not for non-white CPA entrepreneurs. Third, I collect CPA entrepreneur entity filing 
histories and provide evidence alleviating concerns about concurrent changes in CPA 
firm ownership or firm relocation around the introduction of mandatory peer review. 
This paper makes three distinct contributions. First, this paper provides novel 
evidence on the audit market consequences of mandatory peer review. Prior literature 
provides some evidence on the relation between peer review and audit quality (e.g., Hilary 
 
58 As I outline in Appendix 3.B.1. and 3.B.2., the ownership information required to infer CPA 
entrepreneurs in combination with information on disciplinary actions is only available for two states, i.e., 
Colorado and Texas. While these states are among the largest in terms of the number of CPAs (Barrios, 
2019), there may be concerns that my findings do not carry over to other states. My additional Census-
based estimates mitigate such concerns. 
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and Lennox, 2005; Casterella et al., 2009; Anantharaman, 2012).59 I add to this literature 
by showing that mandatory peer review hampers CPA entrepreneurship. In addition, the 
findings do not suggest that CPA entrepreneurs subject to disciplinary actions exit the 
market at higher rates, which questions to what extent mandatory peer review facilitates 
active screening on service quality. The findings may even hint at (unintended) effects on 
participation outweighing (intended) quality screening effects. 
Second, this paper contributes to a nascent literature at the intersection of 
accounting and labor economics (e.g., Aobdia et al., 2017; Bloomfield et al., 2017; 
Barrios, 2019; Cascino et al., 2020). This literature investigates the audit labor market 
composition and how institutions shape the audit supply. Aobdia et al. (2017) provide 
evidence on the composition of the audit workforce. Bloomfield et al. (2017) assess the 
effects of regulatory harmonization on cross-border migration of accounting 
professionals. Cascino et al. (2020) provide the first evidence on the labor market effects 
of moving from state- to national-level CPA licensing regimes. Barrios (2019) 
investigates the labor market consequences of increasing the licensing requirements for 
individual CPAs. My paper adds to this literature by showing that the design of CPA 
licensing and oversight regimes may also have meaningful effects on CPA 
entrepreneurship and, thus, on accounting professionals’ labor participation choices. 
Third, this paper is among the first to provide evidence on the relation between 
licensing regulation and entrepreneurship. Prior empirical work exploring this relation, 
thus far, provides primarily cross-sectional and inconclusive evidence (e.g., Rostam-
Afschar, 2014; Albert et al., 2019). Part of the reason for the inconclusive findings may 
 
59 Recent literature exploring the consequences of statutory PCAOB oversight primarily finds positive 
effects (e.g., Gipper et al., 2019). Since the audit firms studied in this literature (often) transition from peer 
review to statutory PCAOB oversight (Loehlein, 2016), this evidence can be interpreted as PCAOB 
inspections yielding desirable effects vis-à-vis peer review. However, this literature does not (and does not 
intend to) provide direct evidence on the consequences of maintaining (or mandating) peer review as an 
oversight mechanism. 
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be data limitations or lack of plausibly exogenous variation in licensing requirements.60 
My findings suggest that increases in licensing requirements primarily hamper 
entrepreneurship and may even harm historically underrepresented groups within 
regulated professions. In this respect, my findings provide empirical support for the 
conjecture by Haltiwanger (2015) that increases in licensing regulation may have 
contributed to the substantial decline in U.S. entrepreneurial activity and may inform 
current regulatory debates on licensing reform efforts. 
The remainder of this paper unfolds as follows. Section 3.2 introduces the 
institutional setting. Section 3.3 discusses the research design. Section 3.4 describes the 
main data sources and provides comprehensive descriptive statistics. Section 3.5 presents 
the empirical analyses. Section 3.6 concludes. 
 
3.2 Institutional Background 
Peer review has historically been the main way of monitoring quality among CPA 
firms that provide mandated financial statement audits, i.e., public client audits 
(Anantharaman, 2012; Loehlein, 2016). Under the peer review system, CPA firms select 
another CPA firm to review its engagements and internal controls. Peer review started in 
the 1970s as a response to a wave of audit failures (see Loehlein, 2016, for a review). The 
resulting self-regulated peer review system, however, has been subject to substantial 
critique. This critique is primarily based on descriptive and anecdotal evidence. For 
instance, most peer reviews result in unmodified reports (Hilary and Lennox, 2005), and 
most audit failures involve peer-reviewed firms (Fogarty, 1996). Others argue that peer 
review may not be effective due to the general lack of independence among reviewers 
 
60 Studying entrepreneurship is generally challenging due to the absence of readily available data on both 
prospective entrepreneurs, which can be essentially anyone, and actual entrepreneurs (Kerr et al., 2017). 
Leveraging licensing data provides one alternative that may help to overcome some of these data 
limitations. 
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and reviewees (DeFond, 2010). In line with this idea, Anantharaman (2012) as well as 
Lennox and Pitman (2010) provide evidence that CPA firms select reviewers issuing 
favorable reports.61  
Other empirical research, in contrast, attributes positive effects to peer review. For 
instance, Casterella et al. (2009) provide cross-sectional evidence based on malpractice 
claims alleging auditor negligence. They find that some (adverse) peer review findings 
positively correlate with audit failures and conclude that their results are “encouraging 
and supportive of the effectiveness of a self-regulatory peer-review regime” (Casterella 
et al., 2009: 732).62 
Ultimately, the creation of the PCAOB ended self-regulated oversight for public 
client audit engagements. Empirical work  investigating the transition from self-regulated 
peer review to statutory PCAOB inspections documents positive effects and concludes 
that the introduction of the PCAOB yields desirable outcomes.63 Despite this implicit 
failure of self-regulated peer review vis-à-vis statutory PCAOB inspections (Casterella et 
 
61 Theory predicts such opinion shopping. For instance, Tirole (1986) shows that peer review is, in general, 
biased towards positive reported outcomes and, when allowing for side payments, not effective in detecting 
low quality. Interestingly, another stream of analytical work (e.g., Baliga and Sjostrom, 2001) shows that 
peer monitoring may result in “predative” reviews, i.e., peer reviewers might issue unfavorable peer review 
reports to curb competition. Anantharaman (2012) provides evidence consistent with this notion. She finds 
that reviewers operating in the same (client) industry as well as geographically closer reviewers are less 
likely to issue favorable peer reviews. She concludes that this result is due to greater reviewee-specific 
expertise. The finding, however, is also consistent with the Baliga and Sjostrom (2001) model, in which 
close competitors have incentives to issue less favorable reports to challenge a competitor’s standing. Due 
to data availability constraints and the focus on the relation between peer review mandates and CPA 
entrepreneurship, differentiating between these two possibilities is beyond the scope of this paper. 
62 Other studies investigate the link between peer review and perceived audit quality. For instance, Hilary 
and Lennox (2005) report positive correlations between clean (adverse) peer review reports and client gains 
(losses). 
63 For instance, DeFond and Lennox (2011) provide evidence suggesting that, at the margin, low-quality 
CPA firms leave the public client audit market with the introduction of the PCAOB. Similarly, studies 
investigating the effects of statutory PCAOB inspections suggest that this statutory regime yields desirable 
effects (e.g., Aobdia, 2017; Aobdia and Shroff, 2017; DeFond and Lennox, 2017; Gipper et al., 2019). 
Some of these studies use DiD approaches, in which the control group consists of auditor-client pairs not 
(yet) subject to PCAOB inspections. Since public client auditors were subject to peer review prior to 
introduction of PCAOB inspections, this stream of research can be interpreted as providing evidence of 
statutory oversight being more effective than self-regulated peer review. However, this line of research 
does not (and does not intend to) directly speak to the consequences of maintaining or mandating peer 
review. 
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al., 2009), peer review remains the main oversight mechanism for CPA firms without 
public clients and has been significantly extended in scope. In fact, peer review became 
mandatory for CPA firms regardless of their client portfolios. Over time, U.S. states 
introduced peer review as a necessary condition for holding a CPA firm license, resulting 
in mandatory peer review for CPA firms.64  
In Table 3.1, I show the mandatory peer review adoption dates for all states 
adopting mandatory peer review as of 2007.65 In addition, I tabulate State Board of 
Accountancy characteristics in Panel B. I provide mean estimates of these board 
characteristics together with t-tests comparing the mean characteristics of states that 
adopted peer review 2007 (early adopters) and states switching to mandatory peer review 
after 2007 (late adopters). The mean comparisons of State Board of Accountancy 
characteristics reveal that the board size of State Boards of Accountancy differs between 
early and late adopting states. Comparing compositional differences related to 
professional association, i.e., state-specific shares of CPAs vis-à-vis public (non-CPA) 
members, does not suggest substantial differences, however. Next, I compare the share 
of board members with ties to the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
(AICPA). The motivation for this comparison is that the AICPA is the main proponent of 
peer review and also the professional organization providing the largest peer review 
program. Therefore, one might argue that the (self-regulated) AICPA pursues its own 
 
64 Prior to peer review mandates enrolment in peer review programs was only required for AICPA member 
firms. To this end, part of my identification strategy using state-level mandates is akin to the approach in 
Barrios (2019), who investigates the effects of the 150-hour rule on CPA labor market outcomes. Similar 
to the peer review requirement, the 150-hour requirement was part of (voluntary) AICPA membership 
requirements (Barrios, 2019: 7-8) and only became mandatory for all (prospective) CPAs with the passage 
of state-level mandates. Note that the possibility to voluntarily enroll in a peer review program works 
against finding potential effects but helps in separating effects of licensing requirements, i.e., mandatory 
requirements, from potential certification, i.e., voluntary commitment, effects. For a detailed discussion of 
the differences between licensing and certification, see Kleiner (2000), Klein et al. (2012) and Law and 
Marks (2012). 
65 I collect these adoption dates from AICPA oversight reports as documented in Table 3.1. Data on earlier 
adoption dates is, unfortunately, not available (in a verifiable way). 
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interests in rolling out mandatory peer review to increase both its reach within the 
profession as well as its revenue base (Stigler, 1971; Maurizi, 1975; Posner, 1975; 
Peltzman 1976; Shaked and Sutton, 1981). However, while early adopting states show 
higher shares of AICPA-related board members, differences between early and late 
adopters are not statistically significant at conventional levels. Interestingly, we observe 
statistically significant differences when comparing states in which State Boards of 
Accountancy have funding autonomy with those states in which they do not. Funding 
autonomy means that state boards autonomously decide how to allocate budgets 
(including collected fees). The introduction of mandatory peer review increases the cost 
of license renewals (as well as the number of licensees subject to peer review, i.e., the 
potential fee base) and part of these fees are directly passed on to State Boards of 
Accountancy. Hence, State Boards of Accountancy might have stronger incentives to 
mandate peer review when they have funding autonomy (e.g., Maurizi, 1974). Funding 
autonomy, however, is also determined by the organizational structure of State Boards of 
Accountancy. For instance, the California State Board of Accountancy does not have 
funding autonomy since it is subordinate to the California Department of Consumer 
Affairs. Anecdotal evidence suggests that states in which State Boards of Accountancies 
are subordinate to other governmental bodies tend to take longer to pass any regulation.66 
 
3.3 Research Design 
To assess the relation between peer review mandates and entrepreneurship, I take 
advantage of the staggered introduction of mandatory peer review across states over time 
(see Table 3.1). I exploit variation in the announcement and adoption dates in a 
 
66 I thank two sources at the National Association of State Boards of Accountancy (NASBA) for pointing 
this out. 
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generalized DiD research design, effectively comparing individual-(entrepreneur-)level 
outcomes in states that announce or mandate peer review with those that already 
announced or implemented peer review mandates.  
More specifically, to assess the relation between peer review and the probability 
of an individual CPA to start a CPA firm, I compare the probabilities of an individual to 
start a CPA firm in states adopting mandatory peer review with the probabilities of an 
individual to start a CPA firm in states that already adopted mandatory peer review over 
time. Formally, I estimate model specifications of the following form: 
!{#$%&'()'*+}!,# = .$//)0/12/3%445647/8/4'$,# + :! + ;# + <!,#. (1) 
In this model, !{#$%&'()'*+}!,# is an indicator variable that is switched on in 
the year t an individual CPA i starts a CPA firm. The policy announcement indicator $//)0/12/3%445647/8/4'$,# is switched on for states that announce (and later 
implement) peer review in the year of the policy announcement and thereafter.67 To 
control for time-invariant factors, I include individual-level fixed effects (:!). 
Furthermore, to control for time-varying common confounders, I include year fixed 
effects (;#) in this baseline specification.  
To complement my analysis of potential effects of peer review on the probabilities 
to start a CPA firm, I assess the relation between peer review mandate implementation 
and the probability that a CPA entrepreneur exits the market. Formally, I estimate models 
of the following form: 
 
67 The policy indicator, !""#$"%&"'())*+),"-").!,#, effectively corresponds to the product of an 
individual-level indicator variable (which is nested within a state-level indicator variable) and a post-
adoption indicator variable. To enhance readability, I do not write out the interaction of the individual-level 
indicator and the post-adoption indicator but, rather, refer to this interaction as !""#$"%&"'())*+),"-").!,#. Since I include individual and year fixed effects, I suppress the respective 
main effects. 
 157 
!{#$%=4')/+/4/6)=>2'}!,%,# = .$//)0/12/3$,# + :! + ;# + <!,%,#. (2) 
In this model, !{#$%=4')/+/4/6)=>2'}!,%,# is an indicator variable that is 
switched on in the year t an individual CPA i exits the market. The policy indicator $//)0/12/3$,# is switched on for states implementing peer review in year t and 
thereafter. To control for time-invariant factors, I include individual-(entrepreneur-)level 
fixed effects (:!). Furthermore, to control for time-varying common confounders, I 
include year fixed effects (;#) in this baseline specification. 
To further assess potential heterogenous responses to peer review mandates, I 
estimate models of the following form: !{#$%=4')/+)/4/6)=>2'}!,%,# = .$//)0/12/3$,# × %'')2@6'/!& + :!  +;&,# + A$,# + <!,%,#.  (3) 
In this model, all variables are defined as in model (2). In addition, allowing the 
policy variable to vary by individual-(entrepreneur-)level characteristics a (i.e., .$//)0/12/3$,# × %'')2@6'/!&) allows to further saturate the baseline fixed effects 
structure. Specifically, I include state-year fixed effects (A$,#) to control for any 
(unobservable) state-year confounders, as well as attribute-year fixed effects (;&,#) to 
control for potential differences in trends for individuals with attribute a.68  
Throughout my main analysis investigating the relation between peer review 
mandates and CPA entrepreneurship, I estimate linear probability models, i.e., I estimate 
all of the above models using ordinary least squares (OLS). I estimate the models using 
 
68 This design effectively corresponds to a DiDiD design. As before, I only write out the (interacted) policy 
indicator of interest. All main effects and two-way interactions are subsumed by the fixed effect structure. 
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OLS despite the binary outcome variable since it allows for a comprehensive fixed effect 
structure. I cluster standard errors at the individual (entrepreneur) level.69  
 
3.4 Individual CPAs, CPA Entrepreneurs, and Disciplinary Actions 
Given that there is, to the best of my knowledge, no evidence on the individual-
level characteristics of CPA entrepreneurs and only limited evidence on the 
characteristics of entrepreneurs providing complex professional services, I first provide 
detailed summary statistics together with a comprehensive discussion of the individual 
characteristics of CPA entrepreneurs. Furthermore, since this paper is the first to utilize 
detailed individual-level data on disciplinary actions, I also provide descriptive evidence 
on the characteristics of CPAs subject to disciplinary actions.70 
In Table 3.2, I report the summary statistics for my Individual CPA Sample as 
well as my CPA Entrepreneur Sample. The (raw) data underlying these samples comprise 
all individual CPA licenses and CPA firm licenses in Colorado and Texas. I provide 
detailed variable definitions together with comprehensive sample construction steps in 
Appendices 3.A and 3.B, respectively.  
Panel A reports the summary statistics for my (cross-sectional) Individual CPA 
Sample. Overall, this sample comprises 76,366 individual CPAs. The mean issue year of 
a CPA license, i.e., the year an individual CPA license is granted, is 1999. The mean exit 
year, i.e., the year an individual CPA license expires, is 2019. Accordingly, the mean age 
 
69 Due to the group-level assignment of the treatment one might be inclined to cluster standard errors at 
this group level. Given data availability constraints and the small number of groups, i.e., two states, such 
clustering choice is not feasible in the present setting (e.g., Bertrand et al., 2004; Donald and Lang, 2007). 
In my later cross-sectional tests, in which I allow the policy indicator to vary conditional on the location of 
CPA entrepreneurs, I assess the robustness of my inferences to this research design choice. Additional 
(untabulated) tests, in which I cluster standard errors at the ZIP code level, yield similar confidence bands 
and, hence, similar inferences.  
70 Prior research uses aggregated AICPA fine data but does not compare individuals receiving fines with 
those that do not since the latter group is not observable in these settings (e.g., Armitage and Moriarity, 
2016; Cascino et al., 2020).  
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of a license is 20 years. Furthermore, lower license expiration year percentiles show that 
expired individual CPA licenses are also included in the samples, which provides comfort 
that my data collection process is not restricted to collecting active licenses only.71 I 
outline this data collection process in Appendix 3.B.1. and further provide an illustrated 
guide on how to collect CPA license information in Section 3.9.1.  
In terms of demographic characteristics, about 42% of individual CPAs in my 
sample are female and the share of non-white CPAs amounts to 14%. These numbers are 
comparable to prior studies using Census micro-level data (e.g., Barrios, 2019), which 
provides some comfort in terms of the representativeness of my estimation samples. 
Furthermore, 4.1% percent of individual CPAs have disciplinary action records. 
Disciplinary actions capture violations of professional standards (including substandard 
audit service provisions) and serve as the main proxy for audit quality in this paper.72 
Panel B presents the summary statistics for my CPA Entrepreneur Sample, which 
is a subset of the Individual CPA Sample as outlined in Appendix 3.B.2. In terms of 
individual-(entrepreneur-)level characteristics, CPA entrepreneurs, at the mean, tend to 
have licenses that are issued earlier, and show higher license ages when compared to the 
Individual CPA Sample. Further, the share of female CPA entrepreneurs (31%) is 
considerably lower than the share of women in the Individual CPA Sample, while there 
are no major differences when comparing the share of non-white CPAs across samples. 
Interestingly, the share of CPA entrepreneurs with disciplinary action records is higher 
 
71 To provide an additional test whether my data collection process yields all individual CPA (and CPA 
firm) licenses, I exploit the fact that license numbers are assigned sequentially, i.e., early-issued licenses 
have lower license numbers than late-issued licenses. I sort (cross-sectional) data on daily issue dates and 
calculate increments in license numbers. In the raw data, more than 95% of these increments have a value 
of one, which provides further assurance that the data collection approaches outlined in Appendix 3.B.1 
and B.2. as well as in Section 3.9.1 yield license information for all individual CPAs and CPA firms. 
72 I use disciplinary action incidents to proxy for quality for two main reasons. First, disciplinary action 
incidents are a discrete and actual (not perceived) quality metric, which mitigates concerns about 
measurement error (DeFond and Zhang, 2014). Second, measuring audit quality based on engagement (or 
client) characteristics is not feasible in this setting due to data availability constraints and, even if it was, 
would lack appropriate benchmark (quality) models.  
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(5.3%) than the respective share for all individual CPAs (4.1%). Similarly, the number of 
CPA entrepreneurs with multiple fine records is higher than what the population mean 
indicates. 
I next assess the individual-level characteristics of CPA entrepreneurs, i.e., linking 
the (cross-sectional) samples shown in Table 3.2, Panel A and Panel B. To do so, I 
estimate logistic regressions, for which the response variable, #$%&'()'*+!,#, is an 
indicator variable equal to one in the year an individual CPA starts a CPA firm. To capture 
some of the dynamics of the decision to start a CPA firm, I convert (cross-sectional) 
license data to a panel using the issue year of an individual CPA license as the year of 
sample entry and the license expiration year as the year of sample exit. In addition, I drop 
an individual CPA from the estimation sample after this individual CPA starts a CPA 
firm. Thus, this analysis is akin to estimating hazard models, in which the hazard event is 
the formation of a CPA firm by an individual CPA.  
Table 3.3, Panel A shows the results of the analysis exploring the individual-level 
characteristics of CPA entrepreneurs. The estimates show that baseline probabilities to 
start a CPA firm in any given year are around 1%. In terms of demographic 
characteristics, female CPAs are two thirds as likely as male CPAs to start a CPA firm. 
This result is consistent with the notion that females, on average, show higher risk 
aversion (e.g., Bertrand, 2011), and that risk aversion may negatively correlate with 
entrepreneurship (e.g., Levine and Rubinstein, 2017; 2018). Non-white individual CPAs, 
on the other hand, are about 1.3-times more likely than white CPAs to start a CPA firm. 
This result is consistent with recent research showing that (non-white) immigrants show 
higher probabilities of becoming entrepreneurs (e.g., Kerr and Kerr, 2017). An alternative 
explanation, however, pertains to discrimination against non-white CPAs during hiring 
processes. Prior research argues that there may be discrimination against non-white 
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professionals during audit firm hiring processes based on comparisons between the share 
of minorities in accounting firms and the share of minorities in accounting degree 
programs (Glover et al., 2000; Moyes et al., 2000; Madsen, 2013).73,74 While the estimates 
are consistent with prior work in the accounting literature, recent work in economics 
shows seemingly different associations. Specifically, Levine and Rubinstein (2017) show 
cross-sectional evidence suggesting that entrepreneurs tend to be white. However, they 
further show that entrepreneurs are more likely to come from high-earning families. Thus, 
the seemingly different findings may simply be due to selection into industries (and 
entrepreneurship) based on capital availability, which may also correlate with ethnicity 
or race (Levine and Rubinstein, 2017). 
I also explore differences in probabilities to start a CPA firm across license age 
cohorts. The relationship between age and entrepreneurship is ultimately an empirical 
question. On the one hand, models such as Lucas (1978) suggest that (time-invariant) 
ability is the main dimension along which individuals select into entrepreneurship. Under 
this view, age (or cohort effects) should not matter. On the other hand, older individuals 
may have had more time to accumulate the experience and wealth necessary to become 
an entrepreneur. Yet another alternative pertains to risk tolerance being concentrated 
among younger individuals. My estimates are consistent with this latter explanation and 
 
73 Recent research models entrepreneurship as an individual’s decision to either start formal employment 
or becoming an entrepreneur (e.g., Levine and Rubinstein, 2018). The higher likelihood of non-white CPAs 
to become an entrepreneur is consistent with discrimination in hiring processes (e.g., Bertrand and 
Mullainathan, 2004), since such discrimination lowers the relative (option) value of formal employment 
for minorities and, ceteris paribus, increases the probability to become an entrepreneur. However, while the 
results are consistent with this notion, I do not directly test whether discrimination may be at play in audit 
firm hiring. Thus, this paper does not directly speak to this question and the respective correlations should 
be interpreted with great care.  
74 A recent stream of literature assesses the relation between occupational licensing and minority labor 
market participation (e.g., Law and Marks, 2009; 2017; Blair and Chung, 2018a; 2018b). Thus far, this 
literature reaches mixed conclusions. My approach differs from this stream of literature in that I study 
individuals, who already hold a license. 
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in line with recent work by Bernstein et al. (2019), who show that entrepreneurial 
responsiveness to local demand shocks is primarily driven by younger individuals. 
Furthermore, individual CPAs subject to disciplinary actions exhibit higher 
likelihoods of becoming CPA entrepreneurs. I report the respective estimates in Columns 
7 and 8. Point estimates suggests a positive relation between disciplinary action incidents 
and entrepreneurship. This finding is consistent with prior literature proposing that 
“illicit” individuals tend to be more likely to become entrepreneurs (Levine and 
Rubinstein, 2017).75 
A natural follow-up given the data at hand relates to the individual-level 
characteristics of CPAs subject to disciplinary actions. In Panel B, I investigate the 
demographic characteristics of these CPAs. Consistent with recent research exploring 
misconduct in the financial adviser industry (e.g., Egan et al., 2018; 2019), I find that 
female CPAS are about two-thirds as likely as male CPAs to have disciplinary action 
record, while there are no noticeable differences when comparing likelihoods between 
white and non-white CPAs. Lastly, I explore the role of license age. The estimates suggest 
an inverted U-shaped pattern, suggesting that mid-career CPAs exhibit comparably 
higher probabilities of being subject to disciplinary actions. 
 
3.5 Peer Review Mandates and CPA Entrepreneurship 
3.5.1 Peer Review Mandates and CPA Entrepreneurship: Baseline 
In this section, I explore the relation between mandatory peer review and CPA 
entrepreneurship. To do so, I first assess whether peer review mandate announcements 
affect CPA entrepreneurship by estimating model (1). The dependent variable in this 
 
75 I provide a more detailed discussion as well as additional estimates regarding the relation between 
disciplinary action incidents and entrepreneurship in Section 3.9.2. Note that this correlation highlights that 
CPA entrepreneurs are a powerful setting to explore whether peer review mandates facilitate screening on 
quality. 
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model is an indicator set to one in the year an individual CPA starts a CPA firm. I estimate 
model (1) based on the Individual CPA Sample, which I describe in detail in Appendix 
3.B.1.  
Table 3.4 shows the results of this analysis. Across all model specifications, the 
negative coefficient estimate on the policy announcement indicator 
($//)0/12/3%445647/8/4'$,#) is statistically significant and economically 
meaningful. Compared to the unconditional probability of an individual to start a CPA 
firm of 0.7%, we observe an approximately 50% decline in the probability to start a CPA 
firm subsequent to peer review mandate announcements (based on estimating model 
specifications saturated with individual-level fixed effects). Coefficient magnitudes are 
stable across (cross-sectionally) saturated model specifications. It is noteworthy, 
however, that the point estimates on the policy announcement indicator as well as the R-
Squareds increase with the introduction of individual fixed effects, which highlights the 
role of individual-level attributes (Oster, 2019). Overall, the estimates suggest that the 
anticipation of peer review mandates deters entrepreneurship. 
The validity of the estimates presented in Table 3.4 hinges on the assumption that 
trends in probabilities to start a CPA firm between CPAs in the treatment and control 
group would have moved in parallel absent a policy announcement. To gauge the validity 
of this assumption, I provide graphical evidence. Figure 3.1 plots the point estimates 
obtained from estimating a version of model (1), in which I suppress the policy 
announcement indicator and include event-time dummies instead. Figure 3.1 shows that 
there are no statistically significant differences in probabilities to start a CPA firm 
between treated and control individuals before the announcement date. Beginning with 
the announcement date, however, we observe a decline in the probabilities to start CPA 
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firms for individual CPAs in the treatment group. Overall, the plotted point estimates 
provide some comfort that the main assumption of the DiD estimator is not violated. 
To further substantiate the findings on the relation between peer review mandates 
and CPA entrepreneurship, I next assess whether the actual implementation of peer 
review mandates affects exit probabilities of CPA entrepreneurs already in the market, 
i.e., CPA firms founded prior to the announcement and implementation of peer review 
mandates. To do so, I estimate model (2) based on the CPA Entrepreneur Sample, which 
I construct as outlined in Appendix 3.B.2. Table 3.5 shows the results of this analysis. 
Across all model specifications, the positive coefficient estimates on the policy indicator 
($//)0/12/3$,#) are statistically significant and economically meaningful. Compared to 
the unconditional probability to exit the market of 1.3%, we observe stark increases in 
exit probabilities up to around 8% with the introduction of peer review mandates (based 
on model specifications saturated with entrepreneur fixed effects). As before, the 
inclusion of entrepreneur fixed effects results in meaningful changes in both coefficient 
magnitudes as well as R-Squareds, which highlights the importance of entrepreneur-level 
characteristics (Oster, 2019). I explicitly explore the role of these entrepreneur-level 
characteristics in my cross-sectional analyses in Section 5.2.  
Before moving to these cross-sectional tests, I map out CPA entrepreneur exit 
probabilities in event-time to assess the validity of the generalized DiD estimator. In 
Figure 3.2, I plot event time indicator point estimates around the policy intervention. 
Figure 3.2 shows a sharp increase in exit probabilities with the introduction of peer review 
mandates, while there are no statistically significant differences between entrepreneurs in 
the treatment and control group prior to the policy intervention. This graphical evidence 
provides comfort that the main assumption underlying the DiD estimator, i.e., the parallel 
trends assumption, is not violated. 
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Overall, my analyses suggest that entrepreneurial activity declines with the 
introduction (and announcement) of peer review mandates. 
 
3.5.2 Peer Review Mandates and CPA Entrepreneurship: Cross-Sectional Analyses 
My empirical analysis, thus far, suggests that entrepreneurial activity declines 
with the introduction of peer review mandates. This finding is in line with prior literature 
assessing the relation between entry regulation and entrepreneurship (e.g., Djankov et al., 
2002; Branstetter et al., 2011), and inconsistent with the argument that increases in 
licensing requirements spark entrepreneurial activity or facilitate the survival of 
entrepreneur firms (Albert et al., 2019). However, a remaining question is whether the 
reported entry and exit patterns are consistent with peer review facilitating screening on 
quality.76 Djankov et al. (2002) argue that (costly) regulation may serve the public if it 
facilitates screening out providers of low-quality services. 
To investigate whether mandatory peer review facilitates such active screening on 
quality, I first explore potential heterogenous effects based on CPA entrepreneur (pre-
treatment) service quality. Specifically, I conduct tests akin to DeFond and Lennox 
(2011), who investigate auditor exits around the introduction of statutory PCAOB 
inspections. Following the conceptual arguments by DeFond and Lennox (2011), I argue 
that if peer review mandates provided an effective oversight mechanism, we would expect 
that providers of low-quality services predominantly account for observed exits, since, at 
 
76 Mandatory peer review increases the fixed costs of operating a CPA firm. Such increases in fixed costs 
are akin to raising entry costs, which prior literature identifies to hamper firm formation (e.g., Bertrand and 
Kramarz, 2002; Klapper et al., 2006; Mullainathan and Schnabel, 2010). Furthermore, when fixed costs 
increase, the number of firms in a market may decline when holding constant demand (e.g., Tirole, 1988). 
Thus, increases in exits and declines in entry alone are not sufficient to view increases in licensing 
requirements as consistent with screening on quality. Note, however, that the above argument assumes 
constant demand, which seems hard to reconcile with the idea that peer review mandates reduce quality 
uncertainty. If peer review mandates reduced quality uncertainty, demand may actually increase (e.g., 
Arrow, 1971; Shapiro, 1986). Rather than relying on this theoretical argument alone, I explicitly test 
whether peer review mandates are associated with exit patterns that are consistent (or inconsistent) with a 
reduction in quality uncertainty.  
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the margin, it is more costly for these firms to meet CPA firm licensing requirements 
under the mandatory peer review regime. 
To operationalize this idea, I estimate model (3). In this model, I allow the policy 
intervention indicator to vary conditional on the presence of past (pre-treatment) 
disciplinary actions. As discussed in Section 4, I use the past disciplinary action incidents 
as a proxy for (pre-treatment) audit service quality. Disciplinary action incidents capture 
substandard professional service provision, such as violations of professional standards, 
and provide a binary measure of actual (not perceived) quality, which mitigates potential 
concerns pertaining to measurement error (DeFond and Zhang, 2014). 
Table 3.6 reports the results of my analysis of the relation between peer review 
mandates and CPA entrepreneur exits conditional on (pre-treatment) service quality 
provision. The estimates do not indicate any statistically significant differences in exit 
rate changes between high- and low-quality service providers. Of course, one concern 
that comes to mind is that the absence of statistically significant estimates might be due 
to a lack of power. Binary disciplinary action incidents are (relatively) low-frequency 
events, a concern that I share with most studies relying on binary quality proxies (DeFond 
and Zhang, 2014). However, when we compare the economic significance (across 
specifications) with prior estimates (and even if we assumed statistical significance), we 
observe that even the largest (but insignificant) point estimates account for just a fraction 
of the increase in exit rates subsequent to the adoption of peer review mandates. Overall, 
these estimates are not consistent with the notion that peer review mandates facilitate 
screening on quality.  
The natural question that follows in light of the stark increase in exit rates, which 
does not seem to vary conditional on (pre-treatment) service quality, is which CPA 
entrepreneurs account for the observed exits. The licensing literature provides several 
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predictions in this regard. Specifically, this literature posits that licensing requirements 
may overly harm historically underrepresented groups and further suggests different 
mechanisms through which this may occur. For instance, Law and Marks (2009; 2017) 
propose that the design of licensing regimes may either harm historically 
underrepresented groups as it gives rise to discriminatory practices (“group favoritism”) 
or as these groups find it more costly to meet increasing licensing requirements. To test 
whether peer review mandates overly affect historically underrepresented groups and, if 
so, through which mechanism(s), I provide several additional cross-sectional tests, in 
which I allow the policy response to vary conditional on entrepreneur-level demographic 
as well as local characteristics. 
I first explore whether exit rates are pronounced for (relatively) underrepresented 
groups. Since CPA entrepreneurs (and, to a lesser extent, individual CPAs) are 
predominantly male and white, I explore changes in exit rates for female (relative to male) 
as well as for non-white (relative to white) CPA entrepreneurs in a DiDiD design.  
I present the results of this analysis in Table 3.7. In Panel A, I present DiDiD 
estimates in which I allow the policy response to vary by gender. We observe statistically 
significant increases in exit rates for female CPA entrepreneurs. Point estimates suggest 
relative increases in exit rates of 2.3%, which is economically meaningful when compared 
to an unconditional base (exit) rate of 1.3%. In Panel B, I show the results of estimating 
a version of model (3), in which the policy indicator varies for white and non-white CPA 
entrepreneurs. The DiDiD estimates do not suggest meaningful differences in exit rate 
changes with the introduction of peer review mandates between white and non-white CPA 
entrepreneurs. Overall, these results are consistent with the idea that increasing licensing 
requirements overly affects some historically underrepresented groups because they find 
it more costly to meet licensing requirements but are not consistent with the idea that 
 168 
licensing requirements harm these groups by giving rise to group favoritism. If peer 
review mandates gave rise to group favoritism, we would expect to observe increases in 
exit rates for non-white CPA entrepreneurs (Egan et al., 2018), which we do not.  
To substantiate which mechanism may account for the pronounced increase in 
exit rates for female CPA entrepreneurs, I further estimate models investigating the policy 
response by gender and age. I show the results of this analysis, in which I estimate model 
(1) for subsamples comprising CPA entrepreneurs of different age and gender in Table 
3.8. I provide a graphical counterpart to these estimates in Figure 3.3. Several interesting 
patterns emerge. First, it is noteworthy that exit rates increase with the introduction of 
mandatory peer review across all subsamples. However, there is considerable variation 
in coefficient magnitudes when comparing exit rate changes across subsamples. In terms 
of age, we observe a U-shaped pattern, i.e., the youngest as well as the oldest CPA 
entrepreneurs exit at higher rates. This pattern is consistent with younger CPA 
entrepreneurs potentially having smaller revenue bases, as well as peer review mandates 
facilitating natural CPA entrepreneur exits, such as retirements. However, the U-shaped 
pattern is less pronounced for male CPA entrepreneurs. Specifically, for the youngest 
CPA entrepreneurs, we observe that exits of female CPA entrepreneurs increase more 
than exits of male CPA entrepreneurs around the introduction of mandatory peer review. 
There are two main explanations for this finding. First, there may be revenue 
differences between young female and young male CPA entrepreneurs.77 For instance, 
Gurley-Calvez et al. (2009) report that female entrepreneurs, on average, allocate less 
 
77 Egan et al. (2018) do not find empirical support indicating that women show lower revenues (or 
productivity) than men in the financial adviser industry. Nonetheless, I entertain this possibility since it is 
inherently challenging to measure such differences at the individual level and it is not clear whether the 
absence of such differences in one industry carry over to other industries. 
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time to working in their firms than male entrepreneurs, primarily due to childcare.78 This 
negative relation between time spent on the job and childcare might suggest potential 
differences in revenues (assuming similar hourly payment between female and male CPA 
entrepreneurs) but also hints at the second potential explanation, which is rooted in the 
household production literature (e.g., Mincer, 1962; Becker, 1965; Heckman, 2015). This 
literature proposes that females show greater income elasticities—that is, for a negative 
income shock (of the same magnitude) women may be more likely than men to exit 
entrepreneurship, even when income levels are similar. This arises as women are argued 
to have, on average, a larger number of substitution margins, such as childcare (Mincer, 
1962; Becker, 1965; Heckman, 2015). 
It is empirically challenging to separate these two interrelated explanations due to 
a lack of data on CPA entrepreneur revenues (or income). Nonetheless, I present further 
cross-sectional analyses, in which I restrict the estimation samples to young female 
entrepreneurs or young male entrepreneurs and allow the policy response to vary 
conditional on local childcare availability. To operationalize local childcare availability, 
I construct a dataset based on childcare facility licenses.79 I outline the respective data 
collection process as well as the variable construction steps in Appendix 3.B.3. and 
present variable definitions in Appendix 3.A. 
Table 3.9 shows the results of estimating a version of model (3), in which I interact 
the policy variable with an indicator that is switched on for CPA entrepreneurs located in 
areas with low childcare availability (#ℎ2CD7()/E/F/)''). I estimate this version of 
model (3) for samples comprising only young female (Panel A) or only young male CPA 
 
78 In her 2014 presidential address to the American Economic Association, Goldin (2014) reports 
descriptive evidence closely in line with these patterns and states that “children are the main contributors 
to women’s labor supply changes” (Goldin, 2014: 1111). 
79 The approach broadly builds on Malik and Hamm (2017). 
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entrepreneurs (Panel B). The point estimates on the interacted policy intervention 
indicator suggest that increases in exit rates among young female CPA entrepreneurs are 
pronounced in areas with limited childcare availability, while we do not observe such 
pronounced increases in exit rates for young male CPA entrepreneurs. These findings hint 
at the idea that differences in income elasticities may account for some of the 
heterogeneity in exit rates. However, I acknowledge that in the absence of individual-
level CPA entrepreneur revenue or time-use data it is inherently difficult to separate the 
two potential mechanisms. 
There are other potential concerns. One concern relates to the geographical 
partitioning. It might be that the childcare availability proxy simply captures differences 
between urban and rural areas. For instance, rural areas may have fewer childcare 
facilities and, at the same time, CPA entrepreneurs in rural areas have smaller revenue 
bases. I address this concern in multiple ways. First, the fixed effect structure should 
capture most of these (time varying) differences, as I include separate year fixed effects 
for areas with limited childcare availability. Second, the proxies are based on scaled 
childcare availability, i.e., I account for differences in the size of the local population 
(under the age of five). Third, I provide graphical evidence investigating the overlap 
between urban areas and low childcare availability. I present this graphical evidence in 
Figure 3.4. The graphical evidence does not indicate perfect overlap between rural areas 
and limited childcare availability. For instance, Panel B suggests multiple areas with 
limited childcare availability in the Denver area.  
To summarize, the cross-sectional tests assessing the relation between peer review 
mandates and CPA entrepreneurship conditional on and across multiple entrepreneur-
level attributes provide first micro-level evidence on the audit market consequences of 
mandatory peer review. The estimates do not suggest that mandatory peer review 
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facilitates active screening on quality—that is, I do not find pronounced exit rate changes 
for CPA entrepreneurs subject to disciplinary actions. Exit rates are, however, 
pronounced for female CPA entrepreneurs. These findings may hint at some potential 
unintended consequences of mandatory peer review—that is, (unintended) effects on 
participation may outweigh (intended) screening effects. As for the mechanism through 
which such effects on participation may arise, the findings point towards differences in 
income elasticities between female and male CPA entrepreneurs. These latter estimates, 
however, rely on an indirect approach due to the absence of data on CPA entrepreneur 
income (or revenues) and ought to be interpreted accordingly.  
 
3.5.3 Peer Review Mandates and CPA Entrepreneurship: Census NES Estimates 
The analysis, thus far, suggests that the introduction of mandatory peer review 
drives (prospective) entrepreneurs out of the market. Further tests reveal substantial 
cross-sectional variation in exit effects. While the samples constructed from CPA license 
information allow to assess such heterogenous responses, these data can only be collected 
for two states, i.e., Colorado and Texas.80 This limited (geographical) coverage may raise 
concerns about the external validity of the findings. To mitigate such potential concerns, 
I complement the individual-level estimates with estimates based on Census data. 
Specifically, I construct a dataset based on data provided by the Census Non-Employer 
Statistics (NES) program. The NES provides the most comprehensive data on sole 
proprietors disaggregated by detailed industry codes and U.S. states, which allows to 
construct a state-year panel of CPA sole proprietors. I use these data to construct my 
Census NES Sample, for which I provide detailed sample construction steps in Appendix 
 
80 While CPA license data can be collected for most U.S. states, my empirical analyses investigating the 
relation between mandatory peer review and CPA entrepreneurship require data on firm ownership. I 
require firm ownership data to identify founding manager-owners—that is, CPA entrepreneurs—following 
the approach outlined in Appendix 3.B.2 as well as Section 3.9.1. 
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3.B.4. To replicate and extend the analysis based on the Census NES Sample, I estimate 
an adjusted version of model (2). Specifically, since the units of observation are state-
years, I replace entrepreneur fixed effects by state fixed effects. The policy indicator is 
coded according to the adoption years reported in Table 3.1 but lagged by one year.81  
Table 3.10 shows the results of this state-level analyses based on the Census NES 
Sample. The findings are in line with both the reported decline in CPA entrepreneurship 
as well as the increase in CPA entrepreneur exits. As a consequence of increases in exit 
rates and declines in the formation of CPA firms, the stock of CPA sole proprietors 
declines with the introduction of mandatory peer review. Coefficient magnitudes on the 
policy indicator are statistically significant and suggest a decline of about 5% in the 
number of CPA sole proprietors. Furthermore, the Census NES program data allow to 
observe total revenues accruing to CPA sole proprietors in a state-year. If peer review 
mandates increased (perceived) quality, one might expect that revenues accruing to CPA 
entrepreneurs increase.82 In Column 2, I present the results of my analysis exploring this 
possibility. Coefficient estimates on the policy intervention variable do not suggest 
increases revenues. Similarly, we do not observe that the average revenue per CPA 
entrepreneur (remaining in the market) changes with the introduction of peer review 
mandates (Column 3). I further provide graphical evidence in Figures 3.5 to assess the 
validity of the assumptions underlying the DiD estimation strategy. While there are no 
statistically significant differences between treated and not (yet) treated states, we do 
 
81 In addition to addressing potential concerns pertaining to the external validity of the findings, these 
additional tests exploiting the introduction of peer review mandates across multiple states also help to 
mitigate potential concerns regarding concurrent state-year factors that may correlate with both the policy 
timing and CPA entrepreneurship (Leuz and Wysocki, 2016; Leuz, 2018; Ruhm, 2018; Christensen, 2019). 
I lag the policy intervention indicator since the aggregate nature of Census data does not allow within year 
pinpointing. Such design choice is common in the economics literature using aggregated state-year data 
(e.g., Autor et al., 2006; 2008; 2016) as well as the accounting literature exploring the effects of state-year 
regulatory changes using aggregated state-year data on accounting professionals (e.g., Cascino et al., 2020).  
82 Note that one might expect revenues to increase if peer review mandates facilitated screening on quality 
and, thereby, reduced quality uncertainty (Arrow, 1971; Shapiro, 1986). 
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observe a decline in the (logged) number of CPA sole proprietors subsequent to the 
introduction of peer review mandates.  
Overall, the estimates based on the Census NES Sample are consistent with the 
entry and exit patterns reported before. Furthermore, consistent with the absence of 
pronounced exit rates for low-quality CPA entrepreneurs, we do not observe increases in 
the demand CPA entrepreneurs face, as evidenced by the absence of increases total (and 
average) revenues. 
 
3.5.4 Peer Review Mandates and CPA Entrepreneurship: Additional Tests 
In this section, I discuss several additional tests, which I present in Section 3.9 to 
this paper. Specifically, I estimate a determinant model exploring the individual-level 
characteristics of CPA entrepreneurs subject to disciplinary actions, I explore whether my 
findings are robust to operationalizing CPA entrepreneur entry and exit dates to using 
firm incorporation and dissolution dates, and I assess whether CPA firms (in the sample) 
exhibit address or ownership changes around the passage of peer review mandates. 
First, I explore the individual-level characteristics of CPA entrepreneurs subject 
to disciplinary actions. Prior literature argues that entrepreneurs may have distinct risk 
preferences (e.g., Levine and Rubinstein, 2017), and risk preferences may correlate with 
the likelihood of being subject to disciplinary actions. Thus, it is unclear whether the 
associations between individual-level characteristics and disciplinary action probabilities 
I report for individual CPAs (Table 3.3, Panel B) carry over to CPA entrepreneurs. Table 
3.OA-1 shows the results of estimating a determinant model of disciplinary action 
incidents based on a sample restricted to CPA entrepreneurs. Overall, we observe similar 
correlations (in direction and magnitude) between demographic characteristics and 
disciplinary actions. We only observe minor differences when comparing disciplinary 
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action rates across age groups. Disciplinary action incidents are pronounced for younger 
CPA entrepreneurs, although these differences are not statistically significant at 
conventional levels when including fixed effects. Nonetheless, I further explore this 
dimension and estimate linear probability models, in which I include recent disciplinary 
action incidents as a predictor for CPA entrepreneurship, while holding constant 
individual-level time-invariant characteristics, such as innate risk preferences. Table 
3.OA-3 reports the results of this analysis. The results suggest that recent disciplinary 
actions are positively associated with CPA entrepreneurship. I view this pattern as 
consistent with disciplinary actions capturing a quality dimension, as I outline in Section 
3.9.2.83 
Second, I explore whether my findings are robust to operationalizing CPA firm 
entry and exit dates using incorporation and dissolution dates as opposed to CPA firm 
license issue and expiration dates.84 To do so, I obtain incorporation filings for CPA firms 
in my CPA Entrepreneur Sample via the OpenCorporates project. I match CPA firms in 
my sample with the OpenCorporates entity profile dataset via the OpenCorporates 
Research API using CPA firm names. Then, I re-construct the CPA Entrepreneur Sample 
using incorporation and dissolution dates as opposed to CPA firm license issue and exit 
dates (see Section 3.9.3 for a more detailed discussion of the matching procedure as well 
as sample construction steps). Table 3.OA-4 shows the results of this analysis. Overall, 
using firm incorporation and dissolution dates yields very similar coefficient magnitudes 
 
83 Note that this positive correlation is consistent with disciplinary action incidents capturing quality as 
opposed to (time invariant) risk preferences. Recent disciplinary action incidents are available to the 
public—including potential employers. Thus, the decision to start a CPA firms may, in part, be explained 
by changes in employment opportunities. 
84 Prior research discusses the advantages and disadvantages of using incorporation (or register) data vis-
à-vis other data sources to operationalize firm entries and exits (see, for instance, the response by Runst et. 
al., 2017 to Rostam-Afschar, 2014). 
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(and, inferences). Besides, these additional tests suggest that CPA firms cease to operate 
as distinct (entrepreneur) firms rather than simply dropping their CPA firm license.85,86 
Third, I explore whether firms exhibit changes to entity statutes around the 
passage of peer review mandates. My classification of entrepreneurs relies on cross-
sectional data on firm ownership. Thus, there might be a potential concern that I am 
misclassifying (some) CPA firms as CPA entrepreneur firms. Note that such concern 
would only be severe if potential misclassifications coincided with the introduction of 
mandatory peer review. Similarly, some of my cross-sectional tests rely on inferring an 
entrepreneur’s location based on ZIP codes. If entrepreneurs moved to other locations in 
anticipation of peer review mandates, this may raise potential concerns about the validity 
of my (geographical) partitioning. To explore these possibilities, I collect data on entity 
filings indicating changes to entity ownership or entity addresses. I outline the respective 
data collection approach in Section 3.9.4. Using these data, I then assess the association 
between peer review mandates and incidents of entity ownership or address changes. The 
results of this analysis do not suggest that peer review mandates predict any such changes, 
which provides further comfort.  
 
85 Note that CPA entrepreneurs must hold CPA firm licenses to offer audit services. Thus, my prior analyses 
using CPA firm license issue and expiration dates to operationalize CPA entrepreneur entry and exit may 
pick up the decision to offer audit services. While studying this decision is of first order importance when 
assessing market dynamics in the audit industry (e.g., Francis, 2011), my additional tests do not suggest 
that CPA entrepreneurs only cease to offer audit service.  
86 To obtain entity incorporation and dissolution dates, I rely on a (fuzzy) merge using CPA firm names. 
Fuzzy matching techniques are noisy and, therefore, I am not able to match all (incorporated) CPA firms. 
However, some (other) CPA firms may not have matching entries in the OpenCorporates entity profile 
dataset for the simple reason that these firms chose not to incorporate. To explore the potential role of such 
systematic differences, I further estimate models in which I allow the policy indicator to vary conditional 
on whether a CPA firm has an identifiable OpenCorporates entity profile entry. I present these estimates in 
Table 3.OA-4. The estimates suggest that increases in exit rates among CPA entrepreneurs without 
matching OpenCorporates entity profile entry are slightly pronounced for CPA entrepreneurs, although 
these differences are not statistically significant at conventional levels. Overall, I view these additional 
estimates as providing further assurance pertaining to the robustness of my main analyses, but I 
acknowledge that some of my estimates may also pick up differences in, say, firm size or revenues. I 
explicitly discuss this possibility as part of my cross-sectional analyses presented in Section 3.5.2. 
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3.6 Conclusion 
This paper explores the relation between mandatory peer review and CPA 
entrepreneurship. I exploit the staggered introduction of peer review mandates and find 
that CPA entrepreneurship declines with the introduction of mandatory peer review. I 
further document substantial cross-sectional variation in CPA entrepreneur exit effects. 
Exits are pronounced for female CPA entrepreneurs, specifically for young female CPA 
entrepreneurs in areas with limited childcare availability, but not for CPA entrepreneurs 
subject to disciplinary actions. Overall, the paper provides first evidence on the audit 
market consequences of mandatory peer review and may question its effectiveness as an 
active quality screening mechanism. The findings may be of interest to audit regulators 
and may also contribute to the wider debate on licensing regulation and its effects on 
entrepreneurial activity. 
This study is subject to several caveats. First, while leveraging licensing data helps 
to observe prospective entrepreneurs in the short run, my findings ought to be interpreted 
at the intensive margin (i.e., holding constant selection into the profession). Second, this 
study focuses on specific audit market participants: CPA entrepreneurs. While focusing 
on specific market participants offers a comparably high degree of internal validity (e.g., 
Christensen, 2019), future research may explore the long-run or market-wide effects of 
mandatory peer review, or the consequences of changes in audit market dynamism—that 
is, CPA firm entries and exits. Leveraging CPA license data provides one way to study 
entry and exit dynamics for the population of CPA firms as well as individual CPAs and 
may further provide an impetus for research investigating engagement partner 
characteristics, which seems timely in light of recent regulation requiring audit 
engagement partner disclosures. 
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3.7 Appendix 3.A: Variable Definitions 
Variable Definition ∆01!!  Pre-treatment change in real GDP per capita in state s (Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis). ∆234*#5*#,"!  Pre-treatment change in the labor force in state s (Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis). ∆6)"-78*9-").#3."!  Pre-treatment change in the unemployment rate in state s (Source: Census Local Area Unemployment Statistics). ∆:*4;#"3.&*)$3."!  Pre-treatment change in the job creation rate in state s (Source: Census Statistics of U.S. Business). ;!(<!  The number of CPAs on the State Board of Accountancy’s board in state s (Source: Colbert and Murray, 2013, and hand 
collection). !+48&,="-4"#!  The number of public members on the State Board of Accountancy’s board in state s (Source: Colbert and Murray, 
2013, and hand collection). >*3#?@&A"!  The sum of CPAs and public members on the State Board of Accountancy’s board in state s (Source: Colbert and Murray, 
2013, and hand collection). ;!(@ℎ3#"!  The number of CPAs on the State Board of Accountancy’s board in state s scaled by the total number >*3#?@&A"!  
(Source: Colbert and Murray, 2013, and hand collection). 
C3.&*)38D&#-@ℎ3#"!  The number of CPAs in national accounting firms on the State Board of Accountancy’s board in state s scaled by the total number >*3#?@&A"!$% (Source: Colbert and Murray, 2013, 
and hand collection). 
(E;!(="-4"#@ℎ3#"!  The number of AICPA members on the State Board of Accountancy’s board in state s scaled by the total number >*3#?@&A"!  (Source: Colbert and Murray, 2013, and hand 
collection). D+)?&)F(+.*)*-9!  An indicator variable set equal to one if the State Board of Accountancy’s board in state s has funding autonomy (Source: 
Colbert and Murray, 2013, and hand collection). E<<+"G"3#&  The year the CPA license of individual CPA i is issued. HI7&#3.&*)G"3#&  The year the CPA license of individual CPA i expires. 2&,")<"(F"&  HI7&#3.&*)G"3#&  minus E<<+"G"3#&. 
D"-38"&  An indicator variable set to one if individual CPA i is female. Since the gender of individual CPA i is not directly observable, I use names (first names) to predict individual i’s gender. I use 
a prediction model based on Sood and Laohaprapanon (2018).  
C*)Jℎ&."&  An indicator variable set to one if individual CPA i’s race is not classified as “white.” Since the race of individual CPA i is not directly observable, I use names (first name and surname) 
to predict individual i’s race. I use a prediction model based 
on Sood and Laohaprapanon (2018). 1&<,&78&)3#9(,.&*)&  An indicator variable set to one if there is at least one disciplinary action incident associated with the CPA license of 
individual CPA i. =+8.&78"1&<,&78&)3#9(,.&*)<&  An indicator variable set to one if there is more than one disciplinary action incident associated with the CPA license of 
individual CPA i. 
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Appendix 3.A (continued) 
 
Variable Definition D&#-1&<,&78&)3#9(,.&*)&,' An indicator variable set to one if there is at least one fine associated with the CPA firm license j founded by individual 
CPA entrepreneur i. =+8.&78"D&#-1&<,&78&)3#9(,.&*)&,' An indicator variable set to one if there is more than one fine associated with the CPA firm license j founded by individual 
CPA entrepreneur i. ;!(@.3#.67&,# An indicator variable set equal to one in the year t individual CPA i starts a CPA firm.  (F"K+&).&8"&( An indicator variable set to one if individual CPA i belongs to age quintile q. Age quintiles are defined based on license issue 
years.  
!""#$"%&"'())*+),"-").!,# 
An indicator variable set to one in the year t, in which state s 
announces the introduction of mandatory peer review and 
thereafter. This indicator corresponds to a treat-times-post 
interaction in conventional difference-in-differences research 
designs. For my estimation sample, the indicator is switched 
on for all individual CPAs in Colorado in 2010 and thereafter.  
;!(H).#"7#")"+#HI&.&,',# An indicator variable set to one in the year t CPA firm j of entrepreneur i exits. Exit years are coded according to the CPA firm license expiration year of firm j founded by individual 
CPA i.  
!""#$"%&"'!,# 
An indicator variable set to one in the year t, in which state s 
implements mandatory peer review and thereafter. This 
indicator corresponds to a treat-times-post interaction in 
conventional difference-in-differences research designs. For 
my estimation sample, the indicator is switched on in the 
mandatory peer review dates reported in Table 3.1, Panel A.  !3<.E)?&%&?+381&<,&78&)3#9(,.&*)&  An indicator variable set to one if individual CPA i has a fine record with the respective State Board of Accountancy prior to 
2014. !3<.D&#-1&<,&78&)3#9(,.&*)'  An indicator variable set to one if firm j founded by individual CPA entrepreneur i has a fine record with the respective State 
Board of Accountancy prior to 2014. 
;ℎ&8?,3#"1"<"#.)  
An indicator variable taking the value of one if a ZIP code is 
classified as a childcare desert. A ZIP code is defined as a 
childcare desert if the ratio of the population of children under 
five to licensed childcare capacity in the respective ZIP code 
exceeds three or if there is no licensed childcare facility in the 
respective ZIP code. My partitioning follows Malik and 
Hamm (2017). I provide detailed data collection steps required 
to construct this variable in Appendix 3.B.3. ;!(@*8"!#*7!,# The number of CPA sole proprietors in state s in year t. log	(;!(@*8"!#*7!,#) The natural logarithm of ;!(@*8"!#*7!,#. ;!(@*8"!#*7$"%")+"!,# The total revenues of all CPA sole proprietors in state s in year t.  
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Appendix 3.A (continued) 
 
Variable Definition log	(;!(@*8"!#*7$"%")+"!,#) The natural logarithm of ;!(@*8"!#*7$"%")+"!,#. (%F@*8"!#*7$"%")+"!,# ;!(@*8"!#*7$"%")+"!,# divided by ;!(@*8"!#*7!,#. logR(%F@*8"!#*7$"%")+"!,#S The natural logarithm of (%F@*8"!#*7$"%")+"!,#. 
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3.8 Appendix 3.B: Data and Samples 
3.B.1 Individual CPA Dataset 
This dataset is based on collecting every available individual CPA license in 
Colorado and Texas. For both states, I employ a two-stage data collection approach. In 
the first step, I compile lists of all available individual CPA license numbers. Second, I 
search for each of these license numbers and collect all available individual-level 
information. For Colorado, I search the license verification function tool of the 
Department of Regulatory Agencies (available at: 
https://apps.colorado.gov/dora/licensing/Lookup/LicenseLookup.aspx). More 
specifically, in the first step, I search for all licenses by ZIP codes. I obtain a list of all 
Colorado ZIP codes from Census geography reference files.87 These searches yield a list 
of all individual CPAs holding a Colorado CPA license (in each ZIP code). In the second 
step, I search for each individual CPA license and collect all available information 
associated with the respective individual CPA license. This information includes names 
(first and last), an address, the issue date of the license, the expiration date of the license, 
the status of the license, as well as any disciplinary actions associated with the license. I 
employ a conceptually similar data collection strategy for Texas. The license lookup 
function for individual CPAs in Texas is available at: 
http://www.tsbpa.state.tx.us/php/fpl/indlookup.php. The collection process yields one 
observation for each individual CPA holding a license in Colorado or Texas. Table 3.2, 
Panel A provides the summary statistics for this dataset. For my estimates exploring the 
characteristics of CPA entrepreneurs, I convert this dataset to a panel. To do so, I define 
the license issue year as the year an individual CPA enters the sample, and I define the 
license expiration year as the year an individual CPA exits the sample. I assume that a 
 
87 Census Geography reference files are available under: https://www.census.gov/geographies/reference-
files/time-series/geo/relationship-files.html. 
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CPA is active in all years in between the entry and exit year. For most tests, I restrict this 
panel to CPA-years between 2010 and 2018.88 These steps yield my Individual CPA 
Sample. In addition to the sample construction steps above, I provide a graphically 
illustrated step-by-step guide on how to collect CPA license information in Section 3.9.1.  
 
3.B.2 CPA Entrepreneur Dataset 
To identify CPA entrepreneurs, I complement my Individual CPA Sample with 
information on CPA firm licenses as well as information on manager-owners of each 
CPA firm. To collect information on all available firms in Colorado and Texas, I use an 
approach similar to the collection approach for individual CPA licenses (see Appendix 
3.B.1.). Then, I collect information allowing to identify managing partners (i.e., manager-
owners) of each CPA firm. For Colorado, each CPA firm license contains information on 
the manager-owner of the respective CPA firm. I collect this information (along with all 
other information available for this firm) and merge the individual-level license 
information with the respective firm using individual CPA license numbers. For Texas, I 
employ a similar approach. First, I collect all CPA firm license numbers as well as all 
available firm-level information. For Texas, the information on manager-owners is stored 
in the individual-level records (including the CPA firm license number). Hence, for 
Texas, I use CPA firm license numbers to merge CPA firm data with individual CPA 
license data. To identify founding manager-owners, i.e., CPA entrepreneurs, for both 
Colorado and Texas, I use the date (year) as of which a respective manager-owner 
assumes her role. I require this date to coincide with the founding year of the CPA firm. 
As before, this collection process yields one observation per CPA entrepreneur. I convert 
 
88 I slightly depart from this (time) restriction for my tests gauging the effects of peer review 
announcements and CPA entrepreneurship (i.e., Table 3.4). For these tests, I form the estimation sample 
around the peer review announcement year in Colorado (i.e., 2010) and include licenses active around 2006 
to 2014. In addition, I require individual CPA licenses to be issued before the announcement in 2010. 
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these data to a panel by using the firm founding year (i.e., the CPA firm license issue 
year) as the year a CPA firm enters the sample and the CPA firm license expiration year 
as the year a firm exits the sample.89 This approach yields my CPA Entrepreneur Sample. 
In addition to the sample construction steps above, I provide a graphically illustrated step-
by-step guide on how to collect CPA license information in Section 3.9.1. 
 
3.B.3 Constructing Childcare Availability Proxies 
For constructing childcare availability proxies, I use three main data sources: 
childcare facility license search tools for Colorado, childcare facility license search tools 
for Texas, and population counts by age for both states.90 For Colorado, I collect childcare 
facility licensing data from Colorado’s Department of Human Services’ Office of Early 
Childhood.91 These data contain information on the location of each licensed childcare 
facility as well as information on the licensed capacity, i.e., the maximum number of 
children a facility may accommodate. I search the Colorado childcare license database by 
ZIP codes.92 Then, I collect the information on each childcare facility by ZIP code. For 
Texas, I take a similar approach. Texas childcare facility license information can be 
collected via the license search function provided by the Texas Department of Health and 
Human Services.93 Again, I collect information on all childcare facilities by ZIP Code.  
Then, I use Census ZIP code files to create a “frame” of all ZIP codes in Colorado 
and Texas and merge childcare facility information with this ZIP code frame. This yields 
 
89 I explicitly explore the robustness of my findings to this operationalization decision in Section 3.9.3. 
90 My procedure broadly builds on Malik and Hamm (2017).  
91 The Colorado childcare facility search function is available under: 
https://www.coloradoshines.com/search. 
92 A reference list of all Colorado (and Texas) ZIP codes can be obtained from Census Geography reference 
files, which are available under: https://www.census.gov/geographies/reference-files/time-
series/geo/relationship-files.html. 
93 The Texas childcare facility search function is available under: https://www.dfps.state.tx.us/Child_Care/ 
Search_Texas_Child_Care/default.asp. 
 183 
a dataset containing the total number of licensed childcare capacity (and the total number 
of childcare providers) for each ZIP code. Note that the approach using a “frame” ensures 
that ZIP codes without any childcare providers, i.e., “true” zeros, are included in the final 
dataset.  
In the next step, I obtain data on the population by age (as well as the land area) 
of each ZIP code (to calculate population densities). Data on the population by age is 
collected from the American Community Survey’s (ACS) five-year files using Census 
API access points.94 Specifically, I collect data on the total number of children under 3 
(ACS variable name “B09001_003E”), children age 3 and 4 (ACS variable name 
“B09005_004E”), children age 5 (ACS variable name “B09005_005E”), as well as the 
total population (ACS variable name “B01001_001E”).95 Data on the (land) area of each 
ZIP code is available from Census geography files.96 Finally, I merge this dataset with 
my CPA Entrepreneur Sample using ZIP codes. CPA entrepreneur ZIP codes are 
extracted from CPA firm license information, which I collect following the approach 
outlined in Appendix 3.B.2.  
 
3.B.4 Census NES Dataset 
This dataset is based on data provided by the Census Non-Employer Statistics 
(NES) program. The Census NES program provides the most comprehensive data on sole 
proprietors in the United States. The NES program provides these data disaggregated by 
U.S. state and industry (6-digit NAICS code). To identify CPA sole proprietors, I collect 
 
94 The Census ACS API documentation is available under: 
https://api.census.gov/data/2017/acs/acs5/examples.html. I query the ACS API using Python scripts. The 
scripts are available from the author upon request.  
95 A full list of all variables available via the Census ACS API is available under: 
https://api.census.gov/data/2017/acs/acs5/variables.html.  
96 These data can (best) be obtained via Census FTP access available under: 
ftp://ftp2.census.gov/geo/tiger/. Geography files further include the shapefiles required to map childcare 
deserts (e.g., Figure 1.3.4). 
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information for all sole proprietors assigned to the 6-digit-NAICS code 541211 “Offices 
of Certified Public Accountants.” Prior research using data based on this industry 
classification to study audit markets includes Duguay et al. (2020) as well as Cascino et 
al. (2020). I collect these data for all states adopting mandatory peer review during my 
sample period. These sample construction steps yield my Census NES Sample.97 
 
 
 
97 I obtain data from the Census NES using the Census API. The full Census NES API documentation is 
available at: https://www.census.gov/data/developers/data-sets/cbp-nonemp-zbp/nonemp-api.html. Scripts 
querying the Census NES statistics to form my estimation sample are available from the author upon 
request. 
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Figure 3.1: Peer Review Announcement and CPA Entrepreneurship 
 
This figure reports the coefficients of ordinary least squares regressions investigating the effect of peer 
review mandate announcements on CPA entrepreneurship in event time. Formally, I estimate T{;!(@.3#.67}&,# = X!""#$"%&"'())*+),"-").!,# + Z& + [# + \&,# but replace the policy 
announcement indicator variable with separate event time dummies, each marking a period relative to the 
year prior to the policy announcement (t=-1). I omit the indicator for t-1, which serves as the benchmark 
period. Vertical bands represent 95% confidence intervals for the point estimates in each event time period 
and are calculated based on standard errors clustered at the individual level.  
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Figure 3.2: Peer Review and CPA Entrepreneur Exits 
 
This figure reports the coefficients of ordinary least squares regressions investigating the effect of peer 
review mandates on CPA entrepreneur exits in event time. Formally, I estimate T{;!(H).#"7#")"+#HI&.}&,',# = X!""#$"%&"'!,# + Z& + [# + \&,# but replace the policy indicator 
variable with separate event time dummies, each marking a period relative to the year prior to the policy 
implementation (t=-1). I omit the indicator for t-1, which serves as the benchmark period. Vertical bands 
represent 95% confidence intervals for the point estimates in each event time period and are calculated 
based on standard errors clustered at the individual (entrepreneur) level.  
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Figure 3.3: Peer Review and CPA Entrepreneur Exits by Gender and Age 
 
This figure reports the coefficients of ordinary least squares regressions investigating the effect of peer 
review mandates on CPA entrepreneur exits across subsamples of gender and age terciles (as presented in 
Table 3.8). Formally, I estimate T{;!(H).#"7#")"+#HI&.}&,',# = X!""#$"%&"'!,# + Z& + [# + \&,#. 
Vertical bands represent 95% confidence intervals for each point estimate on the policy indicator and are 
calculated based on standard errors clustered at the individual (entrepreneur) level. 
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Figure 3.4: Childcare Availability in Colorado and Texas 
Panel A: Childcare Deserts in Colorado 
 
 
Panel B: Overlap between Childcare Deserts and Urban Areas in Colorado 
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Figure 3.4 (continued) 
 
Panel C: Childcare Deserts in Texas 
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Figure 3.4 (continued) 
 
Panel D: Overlap between Childcare Deserts and Urban Areas in Texas 
 
This figure shows ZIP codes classified as childcare deserts as well as ZIP codes that are classified as both 
childcare deserts and urban areas. Following Malik and Hamm (2017), childcare deserts are defined as ZIP 
codes in which the share of children under the age of five to licensed childcare facility capacity is larger 
than three or areas without any childcare facility. Urban areas are defined as above median population 
density ZIP codes. Population density is defined as the ratio between the total population to (land) area. I 
provide detailed variable definitions in Appendix 3.A. The data used to calculate partitions (and create 
figures) are collected using the approach outlined in Appendix 3.B.3. Panel A shows ZIP codes classified 
as childcare deserts (darker shaded areas) in Colorado. Panel B shows Colorado ZIP codes classified as 
both childcare deserts and urban areas (dark shaded areas). Panel C shows ZIP codes classified as childcare 
deserts (darker shaded areas) in Texas. Panel D shows Texas ZIP codes classified as both childcare deserts 
and urban areas (dark shaded areas). Non-filled (white) areas denote ZIP codes with missing data. 
 
 
 191 
Figure 3.5: Peer Review and CPA Sole Proprietors 
 
This figure reports the coefficients of ordinary least squares regressions investigating the effect of peer 
review mandates on the number of CPA sole proprietors in event time. Formally, I estimate log(;!(@*8"!#*7!,#) = X!""#$"%&"'!,# + Z! + [# + \!,# but replace the policy indicator variable with 
separate event time dummies, each marking a period relative to the year prior to the policy implementation 
(t=-1). I omit the indicator for t-1, which serves as the benchmark period. Vertical bands represent 95% 
confidence intervals for the point estimates in each event time period and are calculated based on robust 
standard errors.  
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Table 3.1: Mandatory Peer Review Adoption Dates 
Panel A: Peer Review Mandatory Adoption Dates 
Adoption Rank # State Adoption Year 
1 Maryland  2008 
2 Michigan 2008 
3 California 2010 
4 New York 2012 
5 Illinois 2012 
6 District of Columbia 2012 
7 Colorado 2014 
8 Florida 2015 
9 Hawaii 2015 
10 Delaware 2017 
 
Panel B: State Characteristics of Early Adopting vs. Late Adopting States 
Variables ="3)!*+,-./012# ="3)!3+#4/012# ="3)!*+,-./012# −="3)!3+#4/012# ∆01!!  -0.039 -0.020 0.019 ∆234*#5*#,"!  0.012 0.011 0.001 ∆6)"-78*9-").#3."!  0.994 1.197 -0.203 ∆:*4;#"3.&*)$3."!  -0.267 -0.241 -0.026 ;!(<!  5.475 6.900 -1.425* !+48&,="-4"#!  1.825 3.200 -1.375** >*3#?@&A"!  7.300 10.100 -2.800** ;!(@ℎ3#"!  0.796 0.733 0.063 C3.&*)38D&#-@ℎ3#"!  0.114 0.119 -0.005 (E;!(="-4"#@ℎ3#"!  0.576 0.486 0.090 D+)?&)F(+.*)*-9!  0.700 0.400 0.300** 
This table reports mandatory peer review adoption years and state-level characteristics of early and late 
adopting states. Panel A presents effective years for mandatory peer review, which I collect from the 
AICPA’s “Annual Report on Oversight” (AICPA, 2006; 2008; 2010; 2011; 2013; 2015; 2017) for all states 
and the District of Columbia that adopted mandatory peer review as of 2006. All other U.S. states adopted 
mandatory peer review prior to 2006. In Panel B, I present state characteristics of early and late adopting 
states together with t-tests for differences in each characteristic. Early adopting states are defined as all 
states adopting mandatory peer review prior to 2006. Detailed definitions for all variables are presented in 
Appendix 3.A. ***, **, and * denotes statistical significance in mean differences at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
level, respectively. 
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Table 3.2: Summary Statistics 
Panel A: Summary Statistics for the Individual CPA Sample (Cross-Section) 
Variable #Licenses Mean Std. Dev. P1 P25 P50 P75 P99 !""#$%$&'!  76,336 1999 14 1965 1988 1999 2011 2018 ()*+'&,+-.%$&'!  76,336 2019 1 2012 2019 2019 2019 2020 /+0$."$12$!  76,336 20 14 1 8 20 31 53 3$4&5$!  76,336 0.425 0.494 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 6-.7ℎ+,$!  76,336 0.137 0.344 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 9+"0+*5+.&':10,+-.!  76,336 0.041 0.198 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 ;#5,+*5$9+"0+*5+.&':10,+-."!  76,336 0.007 0.081 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
Panel B: Summary Statistics for the CPA Entrepreneur Sample (Cross-Section) 
Variable #Licenses Mean Std. Dev. P1 P25 P50 P75 P99 !""#$%$&'!  7,249 1988 11 1964 1980 1987 1995 2011 ()*+'&,+-.%$&'!  7,249 2019 1 2015 2019 2019 2019 2020 /+0$."$12$!  7,249 31 11 8 24 32 39 55 3$4&5$!  7,249 0.312 0.463 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 6-.7ℎ+,$!  7,249 0.141 0.314 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 9+"0+*5+.&':10,+-.!  7,249 0.053 0.216 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 ;#5,+*5$9+"0+*5+.&':10,+-."!  7,249 0.018 0.091 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 3+'49+"0+*5+.&':10,+-."!,# 7,249 0.026 0.161 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 ;#5,+*5$3+'49+"0+*5+.&':10,+-."!,# 7,249 0.002 0.042 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
This table provides the summary statistics for my (cross-sectional) Individual CPA Sample as well as my (cross-sectional) CPA Entrepreneur Sample. I provide detailed variable 
definitions as well as sample construction steps in Appendices 3.A and 3.B, respectively. 
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Table 3.3: Demographic Characteristics of CPA Entrepreneurs and CPAs Subject to Disciplinary Actions 
Panel A: Demographic Characteristics of CPA Entrepreneurs 
 Dependent variable: <=1>,&',?*!,$ 
Independent variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 3$4&5$!  -0.400*** -0.393***       
 (0.036) (0.036)       6-.7ℎ+,$!    0.256*** 0.197***     
   (0.047) (0.047)     12$@#+.,+5$!%     -0.428*** -0.439***   
     (0.056) (0.056)   12$@#+.,+5$!&     -0.509*** -0.533***   
     (0.055) (0.055)   12$@#+.,+5$!'     -0.715*** -0.762***   
     (0.053) (0.053)   12$@#+.,+5$!(     -0.623*** -0.679***   
     (0.045) (0.045)   !.A+B+A#&53+.$!        0.501*** 0.515*** 
       (0.070) (0.070) <-.",&.,  -4.799*** -4.574*** -4.990*** -4.751*** -4.502*** -4.222*** -5.071*** -4.861*** 
 (0.021) (0.049) (0.018) (0.048) (0.032) (0.055) (0.018) (0.050) 
Year FE  No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
State FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 494,588 494,588 494,588 494,588 494,588 494,588 494,588 494,588 
Pseudo R-Squared 0.003 0.009 0.001 0.001 0.006 0.013 0.001 0.006 
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Table 3.3 (continued) 
 
Panel B: Demographic Characteristics of CPAs Subject to Disciplinary Actions 
 Dependent variable: 9+"0+*5+.&':10,+-.!,$ 
Independent variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 3$4&5$!  -0.292*** -0.294***     
 (0.055) (0.055)     6-.7ℎ+,$!    0.025 0.056   
   (0.079) (0.080)   12$@#+.,+5$!%     0.713*** 0.713*** 
     (0.112) (0.112) 12$@#+.,+5$!&     0.974*** 0.971*** 
     (0.104) (0.104) 12$@#+.,+5$!'     1.010*** 1.022*** 
     (0.099) (0.100) 12$@#+.,+5$!(     0.441*** 0.463*** 
     (0.100) (0.101) <-.",&.,  -5.751*** -5.603*** -5.870*** -5.724*** -6.522*** -6.423*** 
 (0.033) (0.075) (0.029) (0.073) (0.086) (0.111) 
Year FE  No Yes No Yes No Yes 
State FE No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 494,588 494,588 494,588 494,588 494,588 494,588 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.001 0.006 0.000 0.005 0.008 0.013 
This table shows the results of the analyses assessing the individual characteristics of CPA entrepreneurs as well as the individual characteristics of CPAs subject to disciplinary 
actions, which are based on my Individual CPA Sample and estimated over a sample period covering 2010 to 2018. I provide detailed variable definitions together with sample 
construction steps in Appendices 3.A and 3.B, respectively. Panel A, reports odds ratios and (in parentheses) standard errors from logit regressions of <=1>,&',#*!,$ on 
predictors as denoted in each column. Panel B, reports odds ratios and (in parentheses) standard errors from logit regressions of 9+"0+*5+.&':10,+-.!,$ on predictors as denoted 
in each column. Individual CPAs are removed from the estimation sample after starting a CPA firm. Standard errors are clustered at the individual CPA level. ***, **, and * 
denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
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Table 3.4: Peer Review Mandates and CPA Entrepreneur Entries 
 Dependent variable: <=1>,&',?*!,$ 
Independent variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) =$$'C$B+$D1..-#.0$4$.,),$  -0.001** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** 
  (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) <-.",&., 0.007***      
 (0.001)      
State-FE No Yes No No No No 
Individual-FE No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year-FE No Yes Yes No No No 
Female-Year-FE No No No Yes No Yes 
NonWhite-Year-FE No No No No Yes Yes 
Observations 386.337 386.337 386.337 386.337 386.337 386.337 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.000 0.000 0.152 0.153 0.151 0.154 
This table shows the results of my analysis assessing the relation between peer review mandate announcements and CPA entrepreneurship, which is based on my Individual 
CPA Sample and estimated over a sample period from 2006 to 2014. I further restrict the estimation sample to include only CPAs with licenses granted prior to the announcement 
of mandatory peer review. I provide detailed variable definitions together with sample construction steps in Appendices 3.A and 3.B, respectively. Reported coefficients and 
(in parentheses) standard errors are from ordinary least squares regressions of <=1>,&',#*!,$ on =$$'C$B+$D1..-#.0$4$.,),$ and controls as denoted in each column. <=1>,&',#*!,$ is an indicator variable equal to one in the year an individual CPA starts a CPA firm. Individuals are removed from the estimation sample after they start a CPA 
firm. Standard errors are clustered at the individual CPA level. ***, **, and * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
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Table 3.5: Peer Review Mandates and CPA Entrepreneur Exits 
 Dependent variable: <=1(.,'$*'$.$#'()+,!,#,$ 
Independent variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) =$$'C$B+$D),$  0.027*** 0.078*** 0.078*** 0.078*** 0.077*** 
  (0.012) (0.017) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) <-.",&., 0.013***      
 (0.002)      
State-FE No Yes No No No No 
Entrepreneur-FE No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year-FE No Yes Yes No No No 
Female-Year-FE No No No Yes No Yes 
NonWhite-Year-FE No No No No Yes Yes 
Observations    40,912    40,912    40,912    40,912    40,912    40,912 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.000 0.013 0.136 0.136 0.136 0.136 
This table presents the results of my analysis assessing the relation between peer review mandates and CPA entrepreneur exits, which is based on my CPA Entrepreneur Sample 
and estimated over a sample period from 2010 to 2018. I further restrict the estimation sample to include only CPA entrepreneur firms founded prior to the introduction of 
mandatory peer review. I provide detailed variable definitions together with sample construction steps in Appendices 3.A and 3.B, respectively. Reported coefficients and (in 
parentheses) standard errors are from ordinary least squares regressions of <=1(.,'$*'$.$#'()+,!,#,$ on =$$'C$B+$D),$	and controls as denoted in each column. Entrepreneurs 
(firms) are removed from the estimation sample after they exit. Standard errors are clustered at the entrepreneur level. ***, **, and * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 3.6: Peer Review Mandates and CPA Entrepreneur Exits by Past Disciplinary Action Incidents 
 Dependent variable: <=1(.,'$*'$.$#'()+,!,#,$ 
Independent variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) =$$'C$B+$D),$ × =&",!.A+B+A#&59+"0+*5+.&':10,+-.!  0.007 -0.001 0.001    
 (0.017) (0.025) (0.026)    =$$'C$B+$D),$ × =&",3+'49+"0+*5+.&':10,+-.#     0.013 0.012 0.019 
    (0.016) (0.017) (0.025) 
State-FE Yes No No Yes No No 
PastIndividualDisciplinaryAction-FE Yes No No No No No 
PastFirmDisciplinaryAction-FE No No No Yes No No 
State-PastIndividualDisciplinaryAction-FE No Yes No No Yes No 
State-PastFirmDisciplinaryAction-FE No No No No Yes No 
Entrepreneur-FE No No Yes No No Yes 
State-Year-FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
PastIndividualDisciplinaryAction-Year-FE Yes Yes Yes No No No 
PastFirmDisciplinaryAction-Year-FE No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 40,912 40,912 40,912 40,912 40,912 40,912 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.041 0.044 0.163 0.040 0.043 0.164 
This table presents the results of my analysis assessing the relation between peer review mandates and CPA entrepreneur exits conditional on past disciplinary action incidents, 
which is based on my CPA Entrepreneur Sample and estimated over a sample period from 2010 to 2018. I further restrict the estimation sample to include only CPA entrepreneur 
firms founded prior to the introduction of mandatory peer review. I provide detailed variable definitions together with sample construction steps in Appendices 3.A and 3.B, 
respectively. Reported coefficients and (in parentheses) standard errors are from ordinary least squares regressions of <=1(.,'$*'$.$#'()+,!,#,$ on =$$'C$B+$D),$ ×=&",!.A+B+A#&59+"0+*5+.&':10,+-.!  or =$$'C$B+$D),$ × =&",3+'49+"0+*5+.&':10,+-.#  and controls as denoted in each column. Entrepreneurs (firms) are removed 
from the estimation sample after they exit. Standard errors are clustered at the entrepreneur level. ***, **, and * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively.  
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Table 3.7: Peer Review Mandates and CPA Entrepreneur Exits by Gender and 
Race 
Panel A: Peer Review Mandates and CPA Entrepreneur Exits by Gender 
 Dependent variable: !"#$%&'()'(%(*'$+,&!,#,$ 
Independent variables: (1) (2) (3) "(('-(.,(/%,$ × 1(234(!  0.023** 0.029** 0.032*** 
 (0.011) (0.014) (0.007) 
State-FE Yes No No 
Female-FE Yes No No 
State-Female-FE No Yes No 
Entrepreneur-FE No No Yes 
State-Year-FE Yes Yes Yes 
Female-Year-FE Yes Yes Yes 
Observations         40,912         40,912         40,912 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.042 0.042 0.164 
 
Panel B: Peer Review Mandates and CPA Entrepreneur Exits by Race 
 Dependent variable: !"#$%&'()'(%(*'$+,&!,#,$ 
Independent variables: (1) (2) (3) "(('-(.,(/%,$ ×56%7ℎ,&(!  -0.017 -0.020 -0.045 
 (0.022) (0.029) (0.037) 
State-FE Yes No No 
NonWhite-FE Yes No No 
State-NonWhite-FE No Yes No 
Entrepreneur-FE No No Yes 
State-Year-FE Yes Yes Yes 
NonWhite-Year-FE Yes Yes Yes 
Observations         40,912         40,912         40,912 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.040 0.041 0.161 
This table presents the results of my analysis assessing the relation between peer review mandates and CPA 
entrepreneur exits conditional on gender or race, which is based on my CPA Entrepreneur Sample and 
estimated over a sample period from 2010 to 2018. I further restrict the estimation sample to include only 
CPA entrepreneur firms founded prior to the introduction of mandatory peer review. I provide detailed 
variable definitions together with sample construction steps in Appendices 3.A and 3.B, respectively. In 
Panel A, reported coefficients and (in parentheses) standard errors are from ordinary least squares 
regressions of !"#$%&'()'(%(*'$+,&!,#,$ on "(('-(.,(/%,$ × 1(234(!  and controls, as denoted in each 
column. In Panel B, reported coefficients and (in parentheses) standard errors are from ordinary least 
squares regressions of !"#$%&'()'(%(*'$+,&!,#,$ on "(('-(.,(/%,$ ×56%7ℎ,&(!  and controls, as 
denoted in each column. !"#$%&'()'(%(*'$+,&!,#,$ is an indicator variable equal to one in the year a CPA 
entrepreneur (firm) exits. Entrepreneurs (firms) are removed from the estimation sample after they exit. 
Standard errors are clustered at the entrepreneur level. ***, **, and * denotes statistical significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
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Table 3.8: Peer Review Mandates and CPA Entrepreneur Exits by Gender and Age 
 Dependent variable: !"#$%&'()'(%(*'$+,&!,#,$ 
 Young Age  Mid Age  Old Age 
Independent variables: Female  Male  Female Male  Female  Male "(('-(.,(/%,$ 0.132***  0.066***  0.082*** 0.055***  0.110***  0.098*** 
 (0.012)  (0.009)  (0.009) (0.006)  (0.009)  (0.007) 
Test for Difference in "(('-(.,(/%,$&'()'*            
F-Test [p-value]:  [0.000]  [0.012]  [0.286] 
Entrepreneur-FE Yes  Yes  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year-FE Yes  Yes  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations        3,844         8,404         4,484        9,310         5,170        10,266 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.158  0.161  0.119 0.143  0.176  0.119 
This table presents the results of my analysis assessing the relation between peer review mandates and CPA entrepreneur exits conditional on gender and age, which is based 
on my CPA Entrepreneur Sample and estimated over a sample period from 2010 to 2018. I further restrict the estimation sample to include only CPA entrepreneur firms 
founded prior to the introduction of mandatory peer review. Young Age, Mid Age, and Old Age refer to sample partitions based on age terciles. Female and Male refer to sample 
partitions based on gender indicators (as previously defined). I provide detailed variable definitions together with sample construction steps in Appendices 3.A and 3.B, 
respectively. Reported coefficients and (in parentheses) standard errors are from ordinary least squares regressions of !"#$%&'()'(%(*'$+,&!,#,$ on "(('-(.,(/%,$ and 
controls, as denoted in each column. Entrepreneurs (firms) are removed from the estimation sample after they exit. Standard errors are clustered at the entrepreneur level. ***, 
**, and * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
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Table 3.9: Peer Review Mandates, CPA Entrepreneur Exits, and Childcare 
Availability 
Panel A: Childcare Availability and Exits Among Young Female CPA Entrepreneurs 
 Dependent variable: !"#$%&'()'(%(*'$+,&!,#,$,% 
Independent Variables: (1) (2) (3) "(('-(.,(/&,% × !ℎ,2345'(6(7('&$  0.091*** 0.097*** 0.118*** 
 (0.022) (0.032) (0.027) 
State-FE Yes No No 
ChildcareDesert-FE Yes No No 
State-ChildcareDesert-FE No Yes No 
Entrepreneur-FE No No Yes 
State-Year-FE Yes Yes Yes 
ChildcareDesert-Year-FE Yes Yes Yes 
Estimation Sample  Young Female Young Female Young Female 
Observations           3,844           3,844           3,844 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.064 0.066 0.215 
 
Panel B: Childcare Availability and Exits Among Young Male CPA Entrepreneurs 
 Dependent variable: !"#$%&'()'(%(*'$+,&!,#,$,% 
Independent variables: (1) (2) (3) "(('-(.,(/&,% × !ℎ,2345'(6(7('&$ 	 -0.014 0.009 -0.020 
 (0.014) (0.022) (0.018) 
State-FE Yes No No 
ChildcareDesert-FE Yes No No 
State-ChildcareDesert-FE No Yes No 
Entrepreneur-FE No No Yes 
State-Year-FE Yes Yes Yes 
ChildcareDesert-Year-FE Yes Yes Yes 
Estimation Sample  Young Male Young Male Young Male 
Observations           8,404           8,404           8,404 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.034 0.035 0.202 
This table presents the results of my analysis assessing the relation between peer review mandates and CPA 
entrepreneur exits conditional on local childcare availability. Estimates are based on the CPA Entrepreneur 
Sample spanning a sample period from 2010 to 2018. I further restrict the estimation sample to include only 
CPA entrepreneur firms founded prior to the introduction of mandatory peer review. I provide detailed 
variable definitions together with sample construction steps in Appendices 3.A and 3.B, respectively. In 
addition, I provide a detailed guide on how to construct local childcare availability proxies in Section B.3. 
Reported coefficients and (in parentheses) standard errors are from ordinary least squares regressions of !"#$%&'()'(%(*'$+,&!,% on "(('-(.,(/&,% × !ℎ,2345'(6(7('&!  and controls, as denoted in each 
column. !ℎ,2345'(6(7('&!  is an indicator variable taking the value of one, if CPA entrepreneur (firm) i 
(j) is located in a ZIP code z classified as having low childcare availability. In Panel A, I restrict the 
estimation sample to include young female CPA Entrepreneurs only (as previously defined in Table 8). In 
Panel B, I restrict the estimation sample to include young male CPA Entrepreneurs only (as previously 
defined in Table 8). CPA entrepreneurs (firms) are removed from the estimation sample after they exit. 
Standard errors are clustered at the entrepreneur level. ***, **, and * denotes statistical significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
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Table 3.10: Peer Review Mandates and CPA Sole Proprietors 
Panel A: Census NES Sample Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. P1 P25 P50 P75 P99 !"#$%&'"(%)!,# 72 1,795 1,398 34 901 1,133 2,946 4,734 !"#$%&'"(%)*'+',-'!,# 72 109,775 97,932 2,761 44,336 60,122 167,860 341,508 #+.$%&'"(%)*'+',-'!,# 72 61 15 45 52 55 69 121 log(!"#$%&'"(%)!,#) 72 6.960 1.368 3.526 6.803 7.024 7.988 8.463 log(!"#$%&'"(%)*'+',-'!,#) 72 11.053 1.277 7.923 10.700 11.002 12.030 12.741 log4#+.$%&'"(%)*'+',-'!,#5 72 4.093 0.219 3.807 3.954 4.014 4.236 4.792 
 
Panel B: Peer Review Mandates and CPA Sole Proprietors 
 Dependent variables: 
 log(!"#$%&'"(%)!,#) log(!"#$%&'"(%)*'+',-'!,#) log4#+.$%&'"(%)*'+',-'!,#5 
Independent variables: (1) (2) (3) "''(*'+6'7!,#$% -0.051*** -0.047 0.003 
 (0.021) (0.038) (0.029) 
State-FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year-FE Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  72 72 72 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.998 0.993 0.862 
This table presents summary statistics together with the results of my analysis assessing the relation between peer review mandates and CPA sole proprietors, which is based 
on my Census NES Sample covering contiguous U.S. states from 2007 to 2016. I provide detailed variable definitions together with sample construction steps in Appendices 
3.A and 3.B, respectively. In Panel A, I provide summary statistics for my estimation sample. In Panel B, I provide the results of my regression analysis. Reported coefficients 
and (in parentheses) standard errors are from ordinary least squares regressions of log(!"#$%&'"(%)!,#)	(Column 1), log4!"#$%&'"(%)*'+',-'!,#5 (Column 2), or log	4#+.$%&'"(%)*'+',-'!,#5 (Column 3) on "''(*'+6'7!,#$% and controls, as denoted in each column. I report robust standard errors. ***, **, and * denotes statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
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3.9 Online Appendix 
3.9.1 An Illustrated Guide to Collecting CPA License Data 
In this section, I provide a guide to collecting CPA license information using 
online license verification tools. In the following graphically illustrated example, I focus 
on collecting Colorado CPA firm licenses. The general approach, however, can be 
employed for collecting CPA licensing data for most states and for both firm- and 
individual-level licenses. Of course, any collection approach depends on the state-specific 
license verification tool, its search fields, search result limitations, etc. For most states, 
license verification tools are available via the website of the respective State Board of 
Accountancy. A list of State Board of Accountancy websites can be obtained from the 
National Association of State Boards of Accountancy (NASBA).98 
Turning to the Colorado example, the CPA license verification tool is available 
via the website of Colorado’s Department of Regulatory Agencies. The Colorado 
Department of Regulatory Agencies allows to verify licenses for most licensed firms (and 
professionals) holding a Colorado license. To collect Colorado CPA firm licenses, one 
first has to select “Accountancy.” This limits the returned search results to licenses issued 
by Colorado’s State Board of Accountancy. In addition, selecting a “License Prefix,” 
allows to limit the returned results to only include CPA firm licenses or individual CPA 
licenses. In this example, I limit the returned search results to include CPA firm licenses 
only by selecting the license prefix “FRM.” The following figure displays Colorado’s 
license verification tool preset to search for CPA firms only:  
 
98 The NASBA further provides a license verification tool that allows to validate CPA licenses across 
multiple states. This tool is available at: https://cpaverify.org/about/. The NASBA’s license verification 
tool allows to search for both individual and firm CPA licenses. While the possibility to search for licenses 
across jurisdictions is appealing, a downside is that NASBAs verification tool, for most states, provides 
less information for both individuals and firms than state-specific verification tools provide. Furthermore, 
the NASBA’s tool limits the number of displayed results per search. Thus, the NASBA’s verification tool 
provides an appealing approach for collecting information on specific individual CPAs or CPA firms but 
is of limited use only when attempting to collect information on the population of individual CPAs and / or 
CPA firms.  
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For most states, search functions only accept searches with at least one defined 
search parameter. One possible way to fulfil this requirement, while not searching for 
specific (and potentially unknown) individuals or firms, is searching by ZIP codes. ZIP 
codes provide a fine enough search criterion, i.e., using ZIP codes does not return too 
many search results, which could otherwise exceed the maximum number of results a 
license verification tool returns. At the same time, ZIP codes are a coarse criterion, which 
limits the number of distinct searches one has to perform to collect information on the 
population of either CPA firms or individual CPAs. Besides, lists of all ZIP codes (in a 
state) are comparably easy to obtain (e.g., via Census geography reference files). Thus, 
ZIP codes provide a search criterion, which allows the researcher to capture the 
population, while minimizing the number of searches returning zero results. 
Turning back to the example, entering a ZIP code into the Colorado search mask 
yields a list of all CPA firms in the respective ZIP code. The following figure provides 
an example search result: 
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The returned search result list includes the name of each CPA firm in the entered 
ZIP code, CPA firm license numbers, and some geographical information. To obtain more 
detailed information on a CPA firm, one has to go to the firm-specific license entry (by 
clicking on the “Detail” icon in the above example). The following figure shows such 
firm-specific license entry: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Firm-specific license entries provide information on the name, address, license 
number, as well as license issue and expiration dates. Furthermore, for Colorado, the firm-
specific license entry contains information on the manager-owners as well as disciplinary 
action incidents. The information provided will, of course, differ by state and license 
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verification tool. Most states provide information on names, addresses, license numbers, 
as well as license issue and expiration dates. 
 
3.9.2 CPA Entrepreneurs and Disciplinary Actions 
Part of the paper’s findings may be interpreted as peer review mandates having 
unintended consequences as (unintended) effects on participation may outweigh 
(intended) screening on quality. For instance, female CPA entrepreneurs exit at higher 
rates than male CPA entrepreneurs with the introduction of mandatory peer review, while 
they, on average, show lower probabilities of being subject to disciplinary actions. This 
conjecture, thus far, builds on comparing disciplinary action incident rates between male 
and female CPAs for the population of individual CPAs in Colorado and Texas.  
Prior literature (e.g., Levine and Rubinstein, 2017; 2018), however, argues that 
entrepreneurs may show distinct risk preferences, which may correlate with the likelihood 
of disciplinary action incidents. To the extent that risk preferences, or other unobservable 
factors, correlate with both the likelihood to become an entrepreneur as well as 
disciplinary action rates, it is not clear whether we observe similar differences in 
disciplinary action probabilities, say, across gender when holding constant the decision 
to become a CPA entrepreneur. Therefore, in this section, I separately explore the 
individual-level characteristics of CPA entrepreneurs subject to disciplinary actions. The 
analysis is akin to the analysis of individual CPAs subject to disciplinary actions 
discussed in Section 3.4 (Table 3.3, Panel B presents the respective estimates). The main 
difference compared to the prior analysis is that I limit the estimation sample to include 
CPA entrepreneurs only.  
Table 3.OA-2 shows the results of this analysis. I show odds ratios from logit 
regressions of !"#$"%&"'()*+$,"-'!,#, an indicator variable equal to one if CPA i is 
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subject to a disciplinary action in year t, on individual-level characteristics. Overall, the 
comparison between estimates based on the sample restricted to include CPA 
entrepreneurs only (Table 3.OA-2) and estimates based on all individual CPAs in my 
sample (Table 3.3, Panel B) does not suggest major differences. Female CPA 
entrepreneurs are less likely to be subject to disciplinary actions than male CPA 
entrepreneurs, while there are no meaningful differences comparing white to non-white 
CPA entrepreneurs. One difference when comparing entrepreneur estimates to individual 
CPA estimates is that younger CPA entrepreneurs are more likely to receive disciplinary 
actions. Even though these differences are not statistically significant at conventional 
levels when including state and year fixed effects (Column 6), I further explore this 
pattern. Specifically, I re-estimate a CPA entrepreneurship (prediction) model in which I 
include recent disciplinary action incidents as predictor variables.  
I present the results of this analysis in Table 3.OA-3. Coefficient estimates from 
a linear probability model suggest that individual CPAs with recent disciplinary actions 
tend to be more likely to become CPA entrepreneurs than those individual CPAs without 
recent disciplinary actions. This relation also remains when holding constant (time-
invariant) risk preferences. One explanation for this pattern might be that part of the 
choice to start a CPA firm is determined by the availability of other (employment) 
opportunities. Note that disciplinary action incidents are observable to potential 
employers via license verification tools (as I show in Section 3.9.1), and the presence of 
such disciplinary action incidents may decrease the chances of employment in audit firms. 
This notion is in line with recent research modeling the decision to become an 
entrepreneur in Roy models (e.g., Levine and Rubinstein, 2018). In these models, the 
decision to become an entrepreneur is determined by the value of other outside 
(employment) options. Publicly observable disciplinary action incidents may lower the 
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chances of employment, which, ceteris paribus, increases the odds of an individual to 
become an entrepreneur by lowering the outside option value. Furthermore, note that, if 
such dynamics are at play and low(-quality)-type CPAs tend to select into 
entrepreneurship, CPA entrepreneurs provide a powerful setting for exploring whether 
mandatory peer review facilitates screening on quality. 
 
3.9.3 Peer Review Mandates and CPA Entrepreneur Firm Dissolutions 
My previous analyses leverage CPA license information and operationalize CPA 
entrepreneur (firm) entries and exits by CPA firm license issue and expiration dates. 
While this approach, in principal, allows to construct datasets effectively comprising the 
population of individual CPAs and CPA firms, there might be concerns that CPA firm 
license issue and expiration dates do not capture actual (entrepreneur) firm entries and 
exits. Firms must hold CPA firm licenses to provide audit services but may provide non-
audit services without holding a CPA firm license. Thus, it could be that my prior analyses 
pick up firms ceasing to offer audit services, while continuing to operate as distinct 
(entrepreneur) firms. While, at a conceptual level, the decision to stop offering audit 
services is akin to an exit from the audit industry and, thus, of first order interest, I further 
explore whether CPA (entrepreneur) firms dissolve subsequent to the passage of peer 
review mandates. 
To do so, I construct a dataset of CPA firm incorporation and dissolution dates. I 
obtain these data through the OpenCorporates project. OpenCorporates allows to search 
incorporation documents for all (incorporated) entities in the United States. I access 
incorporation and dissolution dates by searching OpenCorporates profiles for each CPA 
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(entrepreneur) firm in my sample via the OpenCorporates API.99,100 I use CPA firm names 
in this search process and, first, collect OpenCorporates identifiers. In the second step, I 
access each individual profile using these (matched) identifiers and collect the CPA 
(entrepreneur) firm profile data.101  
I then repeat the main analyses of the relation between peer review mandates and 
CPA entrepreneur exits based on a sample of CPA firms, for which I can collect 
incorporation (and dissolution) data. For these firms, I use incorporation dates (not CPA 
firm license issue dates) and dissolution dates (not CPA firm license expiration dates) to 
create a CPA (entrepreneur) firm panel. Using this sample, I estimate the baseline exit 
model as well as models in which I allow the policy intervention indicator to vary 
conditional on entrepreneur-level demographic characteristics. 
Table 3.OA-4 shows the results of the analysis that explores the relation between 
peer review mandates and CPA (entrepreneur) firm dissolutions. Throughout 
specifications, we observe that CPA (entrepreneur) firms tend to dissolve (not just drop 
CPA firm licenses). Table 3.OA-5 reports the results of the analysis exploring the relation 
between CPA (entrepreneur) firm dissolutions conditional on entrepreneur-level 
demographic characteristics. Again, this analysis closely resembles my estimates using 
CPA license issue and expiration dates, i.e., the increase in exit rates subsequent to peer 
review mandates is pronounced for female but not for non-white CPA entrepreneurs.  
Of course, while some of the missing information on firm incorporation (and 
dissolution) dates might be due spelling errors in names (and other common challenges 
when conducting fuzzy merges based on names), other non-matched firms may truly not 
 
99 I am indebted to OpenCorporates for providing full research API access. 
100 The OpenCorporates API documentation is available under: 
https://api.opencorporates.com/documentation/API-Reference. 
101 The query scripts for looping through profile identifiers and collecting profile information are available 
from the author upon request. 
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incorporate, and this incorporation decision may correlate with other factors, such as firm 
size.102 To the extent that matches (or non-matches) indirectly capture firm size (and non-
matches are concentrated for exiting firms), prior estimates may pick up such size 
differences. To explore this possibility, I further assess whether the relation between peer 
review mandates and CPA entrepreneur exits varies conditional on whether the respective 
CPA firm can be identified in the OpenCorporates database. Table 3.OA-6 reports the 
results of this analysis. Coefficient estimates are positive but insignificant at conventional 
levels.  
Overall, these additional tests suggest that the main findings are robust to using 
firm incorporation and dissolution dates as an alternative way of operationalizing CPA 
(entrepreneur) firm entries and exits. In addition, the estimates suggest that CPA 
entrepreneurs do not only cease to offer audit services but stop operating as distinct 
(entrepreneur) firms altogether. 
 
3.9.4 Peer Review Mandates and CPA Entrepreneur Firm Filings 
I also explore whether firms exhibit changes in entity statutes around the passage 
of peer review mandates. My classification of entrepreneurs relies on cross-sectional data 
on firm ownership. Thus, there might be a potential concern that I am misclassifying 
(some) CPA firms as CPA entrepreneur firms. Note that such concern would only be 
severe if such misclassification coincided with the introduction of mandatory peer review. 
Similarly, some of my cross-sectional tests rely on inferring an entrepreneur’s location 
based on ZIP codes. If entrepreneurs moved to other locations in anticipation of peer 
review mandates, this may raise potential concerns about the validity of my 
 
102 For instance, Cascino et al. (2020) show that there are differences in the choice of incorporation (type) 
across CPA firms of different size. 
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(geographical) partitioning. To explore these possibilities, I collect data on entity filings 
indicating changes in entity ownership or entity addresses.  
Specifically, I collect firm filing histories for CPA (entrepreneur) firms in 
Colorado from Colorado’s Secretary of State website. The Colorado Secretary of State 
website allows to search all business paper documents via its “business database search” 
function.103 I search this online database for each CPA (entrepreneur) firm, which I can 
also identify in the OpenCorporates database (I introduce the OpenCorporates database 
as well as my matching approach for using this database to obtain CPA entrepreneur firm 
incorporation in dissolution dates in Section 3.9.3). For each of these CPA (entrepreneur) 
firms, I collect the full set of regulatory filings. I then identify all filing events pertaining 
to ownership changes by conducting string searches and define an indicator variable 
(+./',0ℎ('./!,$,#) that takes the value of one in the year a firm files a document relating 
to ownership changes. Similarly, I search for changes pertaining to entity address changes 
and code an according indicator variable (+22)/##0ℎ('./!,$,#).  
Table 3.OA-7 presents the results of the analysis that investigates potential 
ownership (and address) changes subsequent to the introduction of mandatory peer 
review. Since the collection of filing histories is only feasible for Colorado CPA 
(entrepreneur) firms, I present estimates for my main cross-sectional tests based on 
individual-level demographic characteristics. Throughout specifications, point estimates 
do not suggest meaningful changes in ownership or addresses around the introduction of 
mandatory peer review. 
 
 
103 The business paper documents search function is available under: 
https://www.sos.state.co.us/biz/BusinessEntityCriteriaExt.do. 
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Table 3.OA-1: Additional Variable Definitions 
Variable Definition 
!"#"$%&'(#')*'$+,-.#%'/$!,# An indicator variable set equal to one if individual CPA i has a fine record with the respective State Board of Accountancy over the last three years, and zero otherwise. Past three years are defined relative 
to year t. 
0/%1+%#ℎ"34)"$5/,)(!  An indicator variable set to one if CPA entrepreneur firm j is not identifiable via the OpenCorporates firm profile search function, and zero otherwise. I provide a detailed description of the search process 
as well as this classification in Section 3.9.3. .6"$%5ℎ+$6"!,$,# An indicator variable equal to one if CPA entrepreneur firm j files a document pertaining to changes in the agent status in year t, and zero 
otherwise. .33,"((5ℎ+$6"!,$,# An indicator variable equal to one if CPA entrepreneur firm j files a document pertaining to changes in the entity address in year t, and 
zero otherwise. 
This table presents variable definitions for additional variables used in the analyses presented in Section 
3.9. All other variables used in the analyses in Section 3.9 are defined in Appendix 3.A. 
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Table 3.OA-2: Demographic Characteristics of CPA Entrepreneurs Subject to Disciplinary Actions 
 Dependent variable: !"#$"%&"'()*+$,"-'!,# 
Independent variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) ./0(&/!  -0.250** -0.318**     
 (0.112) (0.153)     1-'2ℎ",/!    -0.160 0.006   
   (0.247) (0.248)   +4/56"',"&/!$     -0.392** -0.215 
     (0.195) (0.197) +4/56"',"&/!%     -0.387** -0.102 
     (0.191) (0.196) +4/56"',"&/!&     -0.463** -0.089 
     (0.211) (0.217) +4/56"',"&/!'     -0.905*** -0.477* 
     (0.236) (0.244) 7-'#,(',  -5.402*** -5.028*** -5.464*** -5.121*** -5.093*** -4.982*** 
 (0.080) (0.155) (0.071) (0.152) (0.125) (0.186) 
Year FE  No Yes No Yes No Yes 
State FE No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations    52,160    52,160    52,160    52,160    52,160    52,160 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.001 0.047 0.000 0.045 0.006 0.047 
This table shows the results of my analysis assessing the individual characteristics of CPA entrepreneurs subject to disciplinary actions, which is based on my CPA Entrepreneur 
Sample. I provide detailed variable definitions together with sample construction steps in Appendices 3.A and 3.B, respectively. Reported odds ratios and (in parentheses) 
standard errors are from logit regressions of !"#$"%&"'()*+$,"-'!,# on predictors as denoted in each column. Standard errors are clustered at the CPA entrepreneur level. ***, 
**, and * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
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Table 3.OA-3: Recent Disciplinary Actions and CPA Entrepreneurship 
 Dependent variable: 78+9,(),:%!,# 
Independent variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) ;/$/',!"#$"%&"'()*+$,"-'!,#()  0.008*** 0.007*** 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.008*** 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 7-'#,(', 0.007***      
 (0.000)      
Individual-FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE No Yes No No No No 
State-Year-FE No No Yes No No Yes 
Gender-Year-FE No No No Yes No Yes 
NonWhite-Year-FE No No No No Yes Yes 
Observations  494,588  494,588  494,588  494,588  494,588  494,588 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.000 0.150 0.151 0.150 0.150 0.151 
This table shows the results of the analysis assessing the relation between recent disciplinary action incidents and CPA entrepreneurship, which is based on my Individual CPA 
Sample and estimated over a sample period covering 2010 to 2018. I provide detailed variable definitions together with sample construction steps in Appendices 3.A (as well 
as Table 3.OA-1) and 3.B, respectively. The table reports coefficients and (in parentheses) standard errors are from ordinary least squares regressions of 78+9,(),6%!,# on ;/$/',!"#$"%&"'()*+$,"-'!,#() and controls as denoted in each column. 78+9,(),6%!,# is an indicator variable equal to one in the year an individual CPA starts a CPA firm. 
Individuals are removed from the estimation sample after they start a CPA firm. Standard errors are clustered at the individual CPA level. ***, **, and * denotes statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
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Table 3.OA-4: Peer Review Mandates and CPA Entrepreneur Firm Dissolutions 
 Dependent variable: 78+.")0!"##-&6,"-'!,*,# 
Independent variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 8//);/<"/=+,#  -0.004 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.008*** 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 7-'#,(', 0.005***      
 (0.001)      
State-FE No Yes No No No No 
Entrepreneur-FE No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year-FE No Yes Yes No No No 
Female-Year-FE No No No Yes No Yes 
NonWhite-Year-FE No No No No Yes Yes 
Observations    17,728    17,728    17,728    17,728    17,728    17,728 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.000 0.002 0.142 0.143 0.142 0.143 
This table presents the results of my analysis assessing the relation between peer review mandates and CPA entrepreneur firm dissolutions. The estimation sample is based on 
my CPA Entrepreneur Sample merged with entity filing information as outlined in Section 3.9.3. The sample period covers 2010 to 2018 and I restrict the estimation sample 
to only include CPA entrepreneur firms founded prior to the introduction mandatory peer review. I provide detailed variable definitions together with additional sample 
construction steps in Appendices 3.A (as well as Table 3.OA-1) and 3.B (as well as Section 3.9.3), respectively. Reported coefficients and (in parentheses) standard errors are 
from ordinary least squares regressions of 78+.")0!"##-&6,"-'!,*,# on 8//);/<"/=+,#	and controls as denoted in each column. 78+.")0!"##-&6,"-'!,*,# is an indicator 
variable equal to one in the year a CPA entrepreneur (firm) exits. Entrepreneurs (firms) are removed from the estimation sample after they dissolve. Standard errors are clustered 
at the entrepreneur level. ***, **, and * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 3.OA-5: Peer Review Mandates and CPA Entrepreneur Firm Dissolutions 
by Gender and Race 
Panel A: Peer Review Mandates and CPA Entrepreneur Firm Dissolutions by Gender 
 Dependent variable: !"#$%&'(%))*+,-%*.!,#,$ 
Independent variables: (1) (2) (3) "//&0/1%/2%,$ × $/'4+/!  0.014** 0.015* 0.019*** 
 (0.005) (0.008) (0.005) 
State-FE Yes No No 
Female-FE Yes No No 
State-Female-FE No Yes No 
Entrepreneur-FE No No Yes 
State-Year-FE Yes Yes Yes 
Female-Year-FE Yes Yes Yes 
Observations         17,728         17,728         17,728 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.004 0.004 0.144 
 
Panel B: Peer Review Mandates and CPA Entrepreneur Firm Dissolutions by Race 
 Dependent variable: !"#$%&'(%))*+,-%*.!,#,$ 
Independent variables: (1) (2) (3) "//&0/1%/2%,$ ×5*.6ℎ%-/!  -0.019 -0.019 -0.038 
 (0.019) (0.029) (0.020) 
State-FE Yes No No 
NonWhite-FE Yes No No 
State-NonWhite-FE No Yes No 
Entrepreneur-FE No No Yes 
State-Year-FE Yes Yes Yes 
NonWhite-Year-FE Yes Yes Yes 
Observations         17,728         17,728         17,728 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.050 0.050 0.156 
This table presents the results of my analysis assessing the relation between peer review mandates and CPA 
entrepreneur firm dissolutions conditional on individual-level demographic characteristics. The estimation 
sample is based on my CPA Entrepreneur Sample merged with entity filing information as outlined in 
Section 3.9.3. The sample period covers 2010 to 2018 and I restrict the estimation sample to only include 
CPA entrepreneur firms founded prior to the introduction mandatory peer review. I provide detailed 
variable definitions together with additional sample construction steps in Appendices 3.A (as well as Table 
3.OA-1) and 3.B (as well as Section 3.9.3), respectively. Reported coefficients and (in parentheses) 
standard errors are from ordinary least squares regressions of !"#$%&'(%))*+,-%*.!,#,$ on "//&0/1%/2%,$ × $/'4+/!  or "//&0/1%/2%,$ ×5*.6ℎ%-/! and controls, as denoted in each column. !"#$%&'(%))*+,-%*.!,#,$ is an indicator variable equal to one in the year a CPA entrepreneur (firm) exits. 
Entrepreneurs (firms) are removed from the estimation sample after they exit. Standard errors are clustered 
at the entrepreneur level. ***, **, and * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively.  
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Table 3.OA-6: Peer Review Mandates and CPA Entrepreneur Exits by Matching 
Result 
 Dependent variable: !"#8.-&/9&/./,&8:%-!,#,$ 
Independent variables: (1) (2) (3) "//&0/1%/2%,$ ×5*-;4-<ℎ/=>9/.!*&9)!  0.022 0.020 0.032 
 (0.015) (0.018) (0.021) 
State-FE Yes No No 
NotMatched-FE Yes No No 
State-NotMatched-FE No Yes No 
Entrepreneur-FE No No Yes 
State-Year-FE Yes Yes Yes 
NotMatched-Year-FE Yes Yes Yes 
Observations         40,912         40,912         40,912 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.037 0.037 0.169 
This table presents the results of my analysis assessing the relation between peer review mandates and CPA 
entrepreneur exits conditional on whether a CPA (entrepreneur) firm name can be matched against the 
OpenCorporates database. I outline this matching procedure in Section 3.9.3. 5*-;4-<ℎ/=>9/.!*&9)!  
is an indicator equal to one, if a CPA (entrepreneur) firm does not have an identifiable profile entry in the 
OpenCorporates database. The presented analysis is based on my CPA Entrepreneur Sample. The sample 
period covers 2010 to 2018 and I restrict the estimation sample to only include CPA entrepreneur firms 
founded prior to the introduction mandatory peer review. I provide detailed variable definitions together 
with additional sample construction steps in Appendices 3.A (as well as Table 3.OA-1) and 3.B (as well as 
Section 3.9.3), respectively. Reported coefficients and (in parentheses) standard errors are from ordinary 
least squares regressions of !"#8.-&/9&/./,&8:%-!,#,$ on "//&0/1%/2%,$ ×5*-;4-<ℎ/=>9/.!*&9)! and controls, as denoted in each column. !"#8.-&/9&/./,&8:%-!,#,$ is an 
indicator variable equal to one in the year a CPA entrepreneur exits. Entrepreneurs are removed from the 
estimation sample after they exit. Standard errors are clustered at the entrepreneur level. ***, **, and * 
denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
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Table 3.OA-7: Peer Review Mandates and CPA Entrepreneur Firm Filings 
Panel A: Peer Review Mandates and CPA Entrepreneur Firm Filings by Gender 
 Dependent variables: 
 !"#$%&ℎ($"#!,#,$  !))*#++&ℎ($"#!,#,$ 
Independent variables: (1) (2)  (3) (4) ,##*-#./#0%,$ × 2#3(4#!  0.012 0.010  0.012 0.014  
(0.016) (0.016)  (0.016) (0.017) 
Female-FE Yes No  Yes No 
Entrepreneur-FE No Yes  No Yes 
Year-FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Observations            4,267            4,267             4,267            4,267 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.000 0.039  0.000 0.046 
 
Panel B: Peer Review Mandates and CPA Entrepreneur Firm Filings by Race 
 Dependent variables: 
 !"#$%&ℎ($"#!,#,$  !))*#++&ℎ($"#!,#,$ 
Independent variables: (1) (2)  (3) (4) ,##*-#./#0%,$ ×56$7ℎ/%#!  0.023 0.026  -0.019 -0.017  
(0.020) (0.020)  (0.029) (0.030) 
NonWhite-FE Yes No  Yes No 
Entrepreneur-FE No Yes  No Yes 
Year-FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Observations            4,267            4,267             4,267            4,267 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.000 0.046  0.000 0.045 
This table presents the results of the analysis assessing the relation between peer review mandates and CPA entrepreneur firm agent or address changes conditional on individual-
level attributes. The estimation sample is based on my CPA Entrepreneur Sample but restricted to Colorado and augmented with CPA firm filing information as outlined in 
Section 3.9.4. The sample period covers 2010 to 2018 and I restrict the estimation sample to only include CPA entrepreneur firms founded prior to the introduction mandatory 
peer review. I provide detailed variable definitions together with additional sample construction steps in Appendices 3.A (as well as Table 3.OA-1) and 3.B (as well as Section 
3.9.4), respectively. Reported coefficients and (in parentheses) standard errors are from ordinary least squares regressions of !"#$%&ℎ($"#!,#,$ or !))*#++&ℎ($"#!,#,$ on ,##*-#./#0%,$ × 2#3(4#!  or ,##*-#./#0%,$ ×56$7ℎ/%#!  as well as controls, as denoted in each column.	Standard errors are clustered at the entrepreneur level.. ***, **, 
and * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
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